


The Japanese in Manchuria, 1904

Émilien Louis
Victor Cordonnier



THE JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA
1904

VOLUME I
THE YALU AND TE-LI-SSU

THE
JAPANESE IN MANCHURIA
1904

BY
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VOLUME I
THE YALU AND TE-LI-SSU

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TO THE
ADVERTISER

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

PART I. of these studies, of which the present volume is a translation, was originally published in the *Revue d'Infanterie* in 1910-11, and has since been republished in book form by the firm of Henri Charles-Lavauzelle et Cie. It deals with the policy and the strategical plan of the war from the Japanese standpoint, with the Russian concentration and the protective manœuvres accompanying it, and with the first phases of the operations, in particular the Yalu and Te-li-ssu. Part II., now being published in the same journal, deals with the later and final stages of the Japanese advance on Liao-Yang.

I have to thank Colonel Cordonnier for his authorization to produce an English version of his work. The liberal spirit in which this authorization was given cannot be better expressed than in the following sentences, which I venture to quote from a letter: "In reading my work you will have seen that I have borrowed much documentary evidence from the Reports of the British Military Attachés, and from the admirable Journal of General Sir Ian Hamilton. I pay my debt to them by placing

The Japanese in Manchuria freely at your disposition. *C'est de l'Entente Cordiale.*"

The place - names have been transliterated throughout to agree with the British *Official History*, or, in cases of names that do not appear therein, but might do so in future issues, with the principles of that work so far as one ignorant of Chinese and Japanese can apply them. This transliteration has often been a matter of difficulty, sometimes of conjecture. Greatly as the spelling of European place-names may vary, the whole of European military history put together presents less difficulty than this one campaign—better, in fact, a thousand years of Europe than a summer of Cathay in this regard. For not only are the names polysyllabic, but also they present but slight—and to the Western student meaningless—differences amongst themselves. Further, these names come to us at third hand. In the first instance they are Chinese ideographs or picture-writings, in the next stage they are pronounced either in Chinese or in Japanese fashion (*e.g.* Chiu-lien-cheng = Turenchen), and in the third place either pronunciation may be written down by a Russian, an Englishman, a Frenchman, or a German with his own values for the letters he uses (*e.g.* Hsi-mu-cheng, Se-mu-tcheng, Schi-mu-tschöng). Moreover, the picture-names themselves have often very common-place meanings, and are therefore duplicated, triplicated, or even more frequently repeated

within the same area (*e.g.* the five or six Wu-chia-tuns, "five-family village," around Te-li-ssu; the two Sha-hos, "sandy river," north and south of Liao-Yang; and the two Hsin-kai-lings, "new high pass," in the mountains.* And, lastly, there is actual confusion of names for the same object. Thus the British "Fen-shui-ling West" is the French "Daline," the British "Middle Fen-shui-ling" the French "Fensiouline-Ouest," the British "Fen-shui-ling East" the French "Fensiouline-Centre"; and the scene of one action is variously called Chiao-tou, Kyoto, and Sihoyan. In all these difficulties, indeed, experience shows that the truly military course of a resolute offensive pays best. Nevertheless, it is the bounden duty of a translator to clear the ground as far as it may be cleared by bringing the names into the English form which the English student must know if he is to use the British *Official History*.

Advantage has been taken of the entire revision of the maps which was necessitated by this transliteration to redraw them on a larger scale, and to show the positions of troops in colours. The authority mainly followed in this revision is the British *Official History*, but other maps have been consulted for special points.

A few extra details and footnotes, chiefly of the *ordre de bataille* sort, have been inserted, practically as finger-posts to facilitate the use of our own

* The hints and vocabulary on page xi of vol. i. *British Officers' Reports* are exceedingly helpful to the student.

history in conjunction with Colonel Cordonnier's studies. I have ventured to insert a note on page 45, with the idea of bringing into greater relief the author's views on a question of peculiar interest to English readers.

C. F. A.

LONDON, January 1912.

NOTATION

Russians.—Troops from Europe are always indicated simply by their numbers (thus, 140th); *Siberian* troops by the abbreviation "Sib." in addition to their number (thus, 9th Sib.); *East Siberian* units, of which the army consisted almost entirely in these first stages of the war, by the initials E.S.

III/6th E.S. means III battalion of the 6th E.S. Rifle Regiment.

9/6th E.S. or 9/III/6th E.S. means 9th company of the same.

II/140th means II battalion of the 140th European Regiment.

2/3rd E.S.A. means 2nd battery of the 3rd E.S. Artillery Brigade.

2/1st E.S. Brigade means 2nd Brigade of the 1st E.S. Division.

2/35th Brigade means 2nd Brigade of 35th European Division.

The Russian infantry regiment (European or Siberian) has 4 battalions or 16 companies, the East Siberian regiment 3 battalions or 12 companies. The cavalry or Cossack regiment has 6 squadrons or sotnias. The field artillery brigade has 4 field batteries (European units, at a later stage, 6, sometimes 8). The battery has 8 guns (horse artillery 6).

Japanese.—The organization, being quite uniform throughout, calls for no special notes. The *ordre de bataille* of any division is as shown on p. 183.

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INTRODUCTION

WHEN Policy, having set before itself an object, has recourse to war, the object of Policy becomes logically the object of the war.

The plan to be worked out at the opening of a campaign fixes an objective for the military operations, and this remains the same for the whole duration of hostilities, unless, in the course of the war, the requirements laid down by Policy themselves undergo modification.

The determination of an object so fixed as to be unaffected by the vicissitudes and fluctuations of the military operations gives the war its special character, its form, its unity. No consideration, military or other, should enter the commander-in-chief's mind that does not tend to the success of the plan which has been settled upon in view of the object of the war.

Dumouriez has frequently been blamed for having merely followed up the Prussians after Valmy, instead of trying to bring them to battle. Now, France had fixed, as the object of the war against the Prussians, the liberation of French soil, and when, therefore, the day after Valmy, the Prussian army began to retreat towards the Rhine.

2. INTRODUCTION

Dumouriez could see that his plan of campaign was successful.

In these conditions, to deliver battle would have been in case of victory a pure waste of men, in case of defeat a gratuitous blunder that would have compromised a favourable situation, and perhaps incited the Prussians to resume their march on Paris. Thus, in not attacking Brunswick's retreating army, Dumouriez acted in conformity with the aims of Policy. His plan of campaign was based on the dictates of Policy, and he followed it.

When, in 1813, all Europe was leagued against Napoleon, the assigned object of the war was the suppression of the Emperor himself.

To attain this objective, it was necessary not merely to destroy the imperial armies, but also to dry up the imperial power at its source. The war was not, and could not be, concluded the day after Leipzig; it had to be pursued until Napoleon was deprived of his armies and his throne. The Tsar Alexander, the head of the Coalition, had consequently to lead his armies from Moscow to Paris.

The war of 1870 comprised two parts, because Policy changed its objective in the course of the campaign. At the outset Bismarck's idea, it seemed, was simply to consolidate German unity by victories in which all Germans should have borne their share. Had Prussia been satisfied with apologies and an indemnity—even a very large

one—peace would have been signed on the morrow of Sedan.

But the demands of the victor, augmented by success, went as far as proposing the amputation of French provinces, and he had therefore to go on with the war, to make himself master of Paris, to send the Prussian armies north, west, and east to St. Quentin, Le Mans, and Héricourt, to reduce France to complete helplessness.

On March 21, 1801, Spain was compelled by France to sign the Treaty of Aranjuez, whereby she engaged to make war on Portugal in order to compel the latter to abandon her alliance with England.

Portugal, for her part, only endured this alliance much against her will.

In these conditions the Portuguese general, Lafoës, wrote to the Spanish leader, Solano :

“What is the use of our fighting? Portugal and Spain are two pack mules. England has driven us on, France is goading you. Let us prance by all means, jingle our bells as hard as we like. But in God’s name let us avoid hurting each other—they would only laugh at us for our pains.” *

Here the plan of campaign is to avoid battle.

To study a war without in the first place finding out the guiding idea of it is to beat the air.

Here, then, is the starting-point of our strategical study.

* Lavissee and Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*.

CHAPTER I

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

IN 1867 the Government of Japan bore a close resemblance to that of the Franks in the days of Dagobert III.

The sovereign never came out of his palace save on rare and purely ceremonial occasions. The royal authority was wielded in Japan by a Shogun of the Yeya family, as amongst the Franks by a Mayor of the Palace of the family of Pippin. It was limited by the good or bad will of the great feudatories—the Daimyos of Japan, the “*Leudes*” of France.

In 1890 the Mikado personally wielded the imperial power in conditions somewhat similar to those prevailing in Germany. The Emperor Mutsuhito, like William II., has by his side an Imperial Chancellor and ministers who are not responsible to Parliament. Parliament, in Japan as in Germany, consists of two Chambers, the Upper House including hereditary peers and those nominated by the sovereign, the Lower House of popular representatives elected on a more or less restricted suffrage. In twenty-three years, then,

the political system of Japan has traversed a space that Europe has taken eleven hundred to cover.

In a nation in such a hurry as this, fevers are inevitable. Japan had a civil war that cost her 35,000 men. When this had more or less subsided, there came other disorders—sudden momentary outbursts, in which two ministers were murdered and a third mutilated by a bomb. All the same, progress was made by great strides. Coming into civilization of their own accord, the Japanese, “unlike so many other peoples, were able to preserve their independence, instead of accepting under compulsion a conqueror’s culture.” *

As, however, the country preserved its ancient semblance, the outside world was unable to see that the new nation deserved a place by the side of the other Great Powers. Japan was treated as a negligible quantity up to the day when, commanding an army and a navy of the first rank, the ruler of the Empire of the Rising Sun began to speak as a master.

All the European States were taken unawares, Russia most of all. It needed the Yalu to open every one’s eyes, as in 1792 it needed Valmy to reveal the advent of a “new era in world history,” in Goethe’s words.

In 1902, on the eve of the Manchurian war, no one believed in so rapid a growth of Japan. This is the excuse that Russian policy can urge when it is charged with want of foresight. It is

* Élisée Reclus, *Géographie du Japon*.

6 THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

also the excuse of those whose work it was to organize and to distribute the Russian military and naval forces in the Far East, and who did their work in so deplorable a fashion.

The pressure of economic forces obliged Japan to expand beyond her frontiers and to obtain for herself markets in Korea and Manchuria. The pretext she made use of was an old right of suzerainty in Korea. The result was a war with China, which lasted from August 1, 1894, to April 17, 1895. The war, glorious for the Japanese arms, was ended by the peace of Shimonoseki, whereby China agreed to cede the Liao-Tung Peninsula (including Port Arthur) and Formosa and to pay a war indemnity.

Thus the policy of Japan had achieved the desired end. She expected to put her mark indelibly upon Korea and Manchuria at once, so as to forestall Russia, whose Trans-Siberian Railway had been in progress since May 1891.

But it was at this point that, instigated by Russia, the Powers—viz. Russia, England, Germany, and France—declared that the territorial integrity of China must be respected. Japan then had to content herself with Formosa and a war indemnity of £37,700,000.

Presently, the Powers who had just shown themselves so solicitous for the integrity of China were themselves treading underfoot the principle they had enunciated. In 1896 Russia obtained for herself the right to run the Trans-Siberian (East Chinese)

Railway* by Harbin, and a wide strip of territory on each side of the track was granted to her.

In 1896 Germany, loudly demanding vengeance for her murdered missionaries, seized Kiao-chou. In 1898 Russia, her appetite growing larger and larger, procured the lease of Port Arthur and the Liao-Tung Peninsula, which Japan had been forced to give up after winning it by right of conquest. The same year England took her share by seizing Wei-hai-wei, and France very modestly contented herself with Hang-chou-wan.

Obviously, this *volte-face* of the Powers, this laying down of a principle as against Japan which was promptly disavowed as regards themselves, can only be explained on the supposition that they were ignorant of the civilization and the latent force of Japan. Japan, as we have said, was treated as a negligible quantity.

Nothing in all this had altered the fact of the economic pressure which had driven Japan to make war upon China. Formosa was by no means the desired commercial outlet. The net profit of £11,400,000 (the difference between the Chinese indemnity of £37,700,000 and the actual expenses of the war, £26,300,000) was not worth the consideration of a state whose last three budgets had shown surpluses in revenue.

* The line as originally planned can be traced on Map 1. It follows the course of the Amur from Strietensk to Khabarovsk and so to Vladivostok; the branch line Chita—Strietensk and the section Vladivostok—Khabarovsk, which seem like extensions, are really atrophied members of the old line. The saving in distance by the short cut through Manchuria is obviously very great.—Tn.

8 THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

War therefore, from the commercial point of view, was as necessary as ever. The economic probability became a moral certainty when the national self-esteem was wounded by a scramble amongst the European Powers for the Chinese benefits that Japan herself coveted.

Policy proposed a new war.

The predestined enemy was the Power that was installing herself at Port Arthur, that was laying hands on Manchuria by means of the East Chinese Railway, that by the establishment of Russo-Chinese and Russo-Korean banks threatened to close every commercial outlet in Manchuria and Korea.

The enemy was Russia.

Hostilities ought to begin as soon as possible, in order not to give Russia time thoroughly to establish her position in Manchuria and Korea. The only reason for retarding the outbreak of the war was the necessity for creating armaments proportionate to the object in view.

CHAPTER II

THE PLAN OF THE WAR

A. POLICY

WHEN Japanese policy found itself for the second time obliged to prepare a war, it set before itself a definite object. This object was:

To install Japan in a dominant position in the Liao-Tung.

To gain a free hand in Korea.

To expel the Russians from Manchuria.

Policy had next to ascertain whether the game was worth the candle, in view of the sacrifices war would involve, and to this end Strategy—that is, the general staff—was called in to advise.

The general staff studied the situation, and calculated (how, we shall presently see) the effectives in ships and divisions that would be required to make the venture with chances of success, and also the probable duration of the war.

The next step was for Policy to work out a balance sheet of profit and loss, and to decide whether or not it was worth while to continue the pursuit of the object proposed.

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When the wish had become the will, Policy set to work to give Strategy the means that the latter had demanded for the execution of Policy's purpose.

This shows how imperatively necessary is the harmony of Policy and Strategy in peace-time. When this harmony does not exist, when Policy wishes to impose its will on foreign nations without consenting to the sacrifices entailed by the provision of means sufficient to ensure the triumph of that will—then Policy is leading the nation to ruin.

A nation ought to have the army of its policy and the policy of its army. The reduction of a nation's armaments should logically be followed by a reduction of her ambitions. An increase of her ambitions entails an increase in her armaments.

Not that "ambitions" are necessarily ideas of conquest. They may be simply the desire of a nation to be master at home, to carry out its own ideas without regard to the effect these ideas may have on other nations beyond the pale. Such was the case in the French Revolution. When France expelled royalty, every throne felt itself menaced. Liberty had, therefore, not merely to be won at home, but also to be wrested from the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian armies, launched by the sovereigns whom this liberty menaced.

The political regenerator of Japan was Prince Ito—the Japanese Bismarck, as we may well call him. It was under his guidance that Policy prepared the two wars—first the Chinese, then the Russian, and to him fell the duty of repressing

the insurrections that occurred when Japan was compelled by Europe to renounce the advantages that the Treaty of Shimonoseki, as signed by China, had given her. The task that confronted Ito and the other ministers, who between 1895 and 1904 prepared for the *Guerre de Revanche*, was extremely difficult. In 1895 they had to teach this young nation that he who is not the stronger must be the more resigned. They had to canalize the current of popular indignation, to set it towards a future war of revenge, and to obtain from this indignation the sacrifices necessitated by the preparations for that war.

When William I. created the army which gave him the victory at Sadowa and Sedan, he had to dissolve Parliament several times, and to face widespread discontent and opposition. Often, we are told, he meditated upon the fate of Charles I. of England.

Everywhere, in fact, public opinion clamours for the results and refuses the money. It is the Government's business to impose the sacrifice.

In Japan, popular as was the idea of war, four Cabinets fell in three years because they demanded money to prepare for it. The "ordinary" military and naval expenditure was quintupled in nine years (£6,300,000 in 1903 as compared with £1,300,000 in 1894). The "extraordinary" expenses added to these figures reached in the same period a total of £43,500,000.*

The taxpayer is like the eel of Melun—he cries

* E. Théry, *La Situation économique et financière du Japon*. See also p. 62 below.

12 THE PLAN OF THE WAR

before he is flayed. His instinct is to get rid of a minister who talks of new taxes. The statesman—Bismarck, Ito—has to join battle with his countrymen, risking his portfolio, and it may be his head, in preparing his country's greatness.

But gradually, as one effort is added to another, the results become tangible. Policy is rewarded for its travail.

In 1895 the cause of Japan was just—for she only wanted to enjoy what China had ceded to her—or at any rate it was not for Germany to declare the contrary. But at that time the military power of Japan was small, and she capitulated to the humiliating admonitions of Europe.

By 1900 (Boxer revolt) Japan had acquired an army of some strength. She was admitted into the European Concert, and her troops fought side by side with Europeans, just as Piedmont was granted admittance in 1855, and Piedmontese troops joined the Allies before Sevastopol.

By 1902 the army was powerful, and its quality had been proved in China. Policy triumphed. England emerged from her "splendid isolation," and became the ally of Japan (January 30, 1902). In the same year the United States entered into friendly relations with her.

If we look back upon the course of French diplomacy since 1870 we remark a very similar phenomenon. The policy which was successful in exacting from the French nation the great sacrifices which our present military organization necessitates is justified by its fruits.

In the same year (1902) Japanese policy, already recompensed, had the supreme satisfaction of hearing Russia talk of evacuating Manchuria. In April Russia concluded a treaty with China whereby she engaged to evacuate Manchuria in three stages. On October 8, 1902, she would leave the province of Mukden; on April 8, 1903, it would be the turn of the province of Kirin; and lastly, on October 8, 1903, the Russian troops would withdraw from the province of Tsi-tsi-har.*

In July 1903 the Japanese army was ready. "In November 1903 Kuropatkin presented a fresh note, advising the sale to China for 250,000,000 roubles (£26,400,000) of the southern branch of the East Chinese Railway, and the restoration of Port Arthur, Dalny, and Manchuria south of the Sungari River, Russia reserving rights over Northern Manchuria and the Harbin-Vladivostok Railway. The proposal was accepted, but afterwards a 'lateral influence' suddenly got the upper hand, and the result, wholly unexpected by our Government, was war."†

When the army was ready, Japanese policy took up an arrogant attitude. Japan would wait no longer, she threatened.

On December 28, 1903, she contracted a war loan of £16,000,000.

On January 13, 1904, she sent an ultimatum to Russia.

* See Map I.

† General Martynov, *Quelques leçons de la triste expérience de la guerre russo-japonaise*.

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On February 6 she recalled her ambassador.

On the 9th she attacked, with an entire disregard of the antiquated formality of a declaration of war.

It is instructive to observe the close connexion between the political and the military situation in Japan.

Up to July 1903 the army and the fleet were in process of organization. Up to this point Policy diplomatizes. When the means of action are ready, Policy raises its voice. It has recourse to threats, its tone becomes arrogant, its demands open and clear; and when it thinks the moment come, it does not even wait for the fulfilment of promises. Negotiations are broken off, and the word is given for the guns to speak.

Thus the big battalions not only put an end to the humiliations to which Japan was subjected in 1895. They brought allies, they enabled Policy thereafter to speak firmly, and when its turn came, insolently.

Japanese policy appeared in the first instance as a policy of feebleness and capitulation. But it was soon to be evident that it was a policy of waiting, sustained by a strong will and proceeding to its end with confident patience.

Policy, then, prepared its war in advance by arranging for armies and fleets, contracting alliances and agreements, and overhauling the finances. But this was not the end of its reign. So far

THE PREPARATION OF THE ARMY 15

from abdicating when Strategy came upon the scene, it superintended the progress of the war from beginning to end. It interfered to put an end to the dangerous hospitality that France afforded to the Baltic squadron. It maintained the war and settled the peace. Invariably it was Policy that fixed the object at which Strategy was to aim.

Policy is the mistress, war the servant.

B. THE PREPARATION OF THE ARMY

When Policy had decided to pursue its purpose even, if necessary, by arms, and when Strategy had reported as to the extent of the armaments required, the work of constituting and preparing the armed forces began.

In 1896 a new recruiting law was passed. This yielded in 1904 :

Active Army)			
and Reserve*)	.	372,500	trained men
Territorial Army	.	90,000	„ „
		<u>462,500</u>	„ „

A total force of 462,500 trained men out of a population of 48,000,000 is small indeed. And yet in Japan all citizens were legally liable to military service between the ages of seventeen and forty.

“The Active Army (*Genki*) is formed of the three successive classes present at the same time with the colours, the term of service being three years.

* *Revue militaire des Armées étrangères*, September 1907.

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“The men of the *Genki* pass thence to the Active Army Reserve (*Yobi*); period of service four years and four months.

“The men of the *Yobi* next pass to the Reserve Army (*Kobi*); period of service five years.

“Lastly, they fulfil the remainder of their military obligations in the Territorial Army, 1st class (*Kokumin*), of which they are members up to forty.

“These four categories represent the total of men who have undergone a thorough military training.

“The men of the *Yobi* and *Kobi* may be recalled for courses of instruction, and the law allows of their being called up for service, in case of political tension, before the issue of mobilization orders.

“The *Yobi* complete the units of the active army to war strength, and the surplus men are formed in depôt units corresponding to the active army units, which it is their business to keep up to strength by drafts.

“The *Kobi* are intended to be formed in new units distinct from those of the active army, every divisional district (and the Guard as well) having to furnish a mixed * *Kobi* or reserve brigade to serve in the field along with the first-line troops.

“The *Kokumin* (territorial army), except for seven classes which have passed through the active army, have not in fact undergone any training. They are legally liable for home service only.”

* Not all *Kobi* brigades formed in the Manchurian War were “mixed.” Most of them indeed were purely infantry brigades.—Tr.

THE PREPARATION OF THE ARMY 17

With an annual contingent of about 540,000, of whom 280,000 men passed as medically fit, some 50,000 only were taken for service in the active army.

The military effort was small—and, in fact, insufficient.

Was this because Strategy did not ask for a greater effort? Or for financial reasons?

The question cannot as yet be answered, for want of documentary evidence. But if it be assumed that financial reasons restricted the number of recruits annually incorporated, it can be shown that even so the calculation was unsound.

In the first place, the 1896 recruiting law was violated. It became necessary to pour the trained men of the *Kokumin* into the ranks of the field army. These men were sent to serve in Manchuria, although legally there was nothing to authorize their being employed abroad.

This meant, too, that men of thirty were put into the field army while a very large number of younger men were not—for the simple reason that, although physically fit, they had received no military training. The Japanese knew as well as any one else that the younger a man is the fitter he is for war. And yet, to fill the gaps which were soon made in the active and reserve units of the field army, they found themselves obliged to call on the older men.

Secondly, the siege of Port Arthur had to be undertaken almost exclusively by first-line troops. This tied up three, and afterwards four divisions, whose presence on the field of Liao-Yang on

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September 1, 1904, might have secured the annihilation of the Russian army and ended the war.

Thirdly, to train new levies, to guard the home country against a possible diversion by the Russian Vladivostok troops, and to maintain internal order, the 7th and 8th divisions had for many long months to be kept in Japan, far from the battlefield. Now, everything goes to prove that if at Liao-Yang General Kuroki had had some additional divisions at his disposal to prolong the enveloping movement which brought about Kuropatkin's retreat, the Russian army would have been put out of action for the rest of the campaign, and it is probable (as we shall see) that a decisive victory over the Russian army on September 1, 1904, would either have ended the war then and there, unpopular as it was in Russia—or have hastened the outbreak of those internal disorders in Russia itself which, in the sequel, so seriously interfered with the conduct of operations in Manchuria.

Certain writers severely criticize the Japanese staff for having retained the 7th and 8th divisions at home. The superior leading is credited with ideas of a diversion and ridiculed accordingly.

In reality the Japanese staff utilized their available means to the full. If a part of the active army was missing at the rendezvous on the decisive battlefield, the cause, and the only cause, of its absence was the want of a second-line army.

It is well to bear this example in mind.

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Excuses can be found for Japan in the smallness of her financial resources, and in the fact that she had already made great sacrifices to rebuild her economic and military structure from the foundations. But the wealthier nations cannot plead this excuse.

The task of the first-line army—the young army, the army of the best officers and sergeants, the army upon whose training almost the whole of the available money is expended—is to win the battle, to push the pursuit, to keep the field until peace is signed. It must be free to devote itself exclusively to this task, and this it cannot do unless additional trustworthy troops are available—

- (a) to keep order at home,
- (b) to provide for the absolutely indispensable security of the lines of communication,
- (c) to garrison the fortresses,
- (d) to invest and capture the hostile fortresses which the victorious field army leaves behind in its progress.

The Japanese in 1904-5 went to school. They have learned their lesson, and profited by it in the present-day organization of their forces.

May the lesson profit others besides themselves—and let no one proclaim the uselessness of the Territorials, for the *Kokumin* fought.

In 1904 Japan was divided up into twelve territorial districts, each of which provided on mobilization one active division and one reserve brigade.

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The Active Army, in January of that year, consisted of 132,000 men* of the classes of 1903, 1902, and 1901. It was organized into a Guard division, 12 army divisions, 2 independent cavalry brigades, 2 independent field artillery brigades,† 21 battalions of garrison artillery, ‡ with technical, departmental, and medical units, etc. On mobilization the field army—13 divisions and the independent cavalry and artillery brigades—numbered 196,571.

The difference between 196,571 and 132,000 represents the intake of reservists (some 64,000). The proportion of *Yobi* (reservists) to *Genki* (men with the colours) was therefore roughly one to two.

The *Genki* were men of first-class physique, since only 50,000 men were selected out of each annual contingent of 540,000. The *Yobi*, of course, having themselves been in the active army, were equally picked men. No one need be startled, then, to find soldiers of rare quality in the units of the Japanese active army—it would be the contrary that would be astonishing. It was not an army of the sort disdainfully described by Von der Goltz as “an innumerable and inoffensive mob of bourgeois shopkeepers,” but *troops*, men perfectly armed and trained, well able to triumph over the corps of troops, hurriedly constituted by the addition of reservists—often untrained reservists—to which they were opposed.

* Figures from the *Revue militaire des Armées étrangères* (September-October, 1907).

† Each of 18 field batteries.—Tr.

‡ These found some heavy field artillery, as in the British service.—Tr.

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The Japanese army, then, had quality in its favour.

If, along with this superiority, it had had greater numbers, the war would certainly have been decided in a very short time.

On mobilization, each of the military regions formed a *Kobi* (reserve) brigade. Including the Guard *Kobi* brigade, to the constitution of which the twelve regions all contributed, there were thirteen of these units, their total strength being 65,000 men.

The *Kobi* troops were far from possessing the quality of the active army. In battle their rôle was generally defensive, and it was always the troops of the active army that delivered the fierce assaults.

The effective of a field division at the outset of the war was 18,875 men, 4,938 horses, and 1,765 vehicles.*

The active divisions, *Kobi* brigades, and army troops together totalled, in February 1904, 261,571 men. As the total of trained men available was 372,500 in the active army and reserves, and 90,000 in the *Kokumin*, the difference between 462,500

* The division consisted of 2 infantry brigades (= 4 regiments = 12 battalions), 1 divisional cavalry regiment (3 squadrons), 1 artillery regiment of 6 six-gun batteries (field or mountain), 1 engineer battalion (field and bridging units), with technical and special services. A *Kobi* mixed brigade was a sort of half-division, and consisted of 2 two-battalion infantry regiments, 3 field or mountain batteries, 1 company engineers, etc. By no means all the *Kobi* brigades were "mixed," however. See, for example, the *ordre de bataille* of the 2nd Army, Chapter V. below.—Tr.

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and 261,571, or about 200,000 men, represents the total of men available as drafts to make good casualties after mobilization.

Now, during the war the Japanese suffered very severe losses, and these necessitated frequent and strong drafts for the field army. Its units were reinforced until, in the second part of the campaign, the companies reached an effective of 300 men. Nor was this all. Besides this replenishment of existing divisions and brigades up to, and considerably beyond, their war effective, the organization of four more active divisions and six more *Kobi* brigades was found necessary.

It therefore became necessary to train a great number of fresh recruits during the war.

But this was only made possible by the long duration of the war. In 1870 we, too, organized corps of new levies; but it would be rash to assert that such a thing could be done again to-day in case of war.

By taking the maximum strength reached by the Japanese army, and adding to this the total of previous losses in killed, wounded, and sick, it will be seen that the original effective in trained men was tripled in the course of the war. There were therefore, roughly, two men sent out in the drafts to one man of the original army.

It would be going too far to assert that, in a future war, the demand for men would be as heavy as this. But we are obliged to conclude, from a study of this case, that the requirements in drafts will be very great.

The infantry companies, whose regulation war

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strength was 250, were brought up to the effective of 300. The Japanese realized that, after some months of campaigning, the survivors form a solid cadre for any number of recruits. They were careful, therefore, to avoid constituting too many fresh units, which, owing to their want of cohesion, would have cut a poor figure on the battlefield.

It is far better to keep old units up to strength, and even, if necessary, to overfill them, than to constitute new formations out of improvised cadres and inexperienced rank and file.

To sum up, the resources of the land army in February 1904 were :

- 13 active divisions.

- 13 *Kobi* brigades.

- 2 cavalry brigades.

- 2 field artillery brigades.

- 21 battalions of garrison artillery.

- 110,000 trained men for the drafts.

- 90,000 trained men of the *Kokumin*.

The active divisions were reinforced by regiments or brigades of *Kobi*.

The divisions were grouped by two, three, or even (for a moment) four, into armies. The army corps did not exist.

The naval strength of Japan consisted, in brief, of

- 6 battleships.

- 6 armoured cruisers.

- 17 protected cruisers.

- 9 coast-defence vessels.

- 19 destroyers.

- 84 torpedo boats.

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C. THE ESTIMATION OF THE REQUISITE MILITARY EFFORT

Proposing to itself to have recourse to war if need be, Policy applied to Strategy in order to ascertain the extent of the sacrifices that would have to be faced if the end in view was to be attained.

This "end" was the expulsion of the Russians from Manchuria, the occupation of the Liao-Tung peninsula, and a free hand in Korea.

To answer the question set by Policy, Strategy had to review the ways and means leading to the end in view, and therefore to determine the strategic objective and to estimate the intensity of the effort that the attainment of this objective would require.

(i) *The Theatre of War*.—As early as November 1857, in the first of the memoranda in which he considered the conduct of a future Franco-Prussian war, Moltke began by fixing upon the "theatre of war."

It is not merely or even principally geography which fixes this. The selection of the theatre of operations follows logically from the object of the war as laid down by Policy.

The war in Manchuria presents the peculiar spectacle of two nations fighting to decide which of the two should remain mistress of country that belonged, directly or by an arguable right of suzerainty, to a third, and this third party

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standing aloof from a contest which was to despoil her.

Manchuria was a Chinese province. The Port Arthur region was Chinese territory, leased to Russia. Korea was an empire which had scarcely shaken off China's suzerainty and was ready to fall into the conqueror's hands.

Russia had great expectations, but she had not as yet reaped any profit from her stay in Manchuria. The period of heavy capital outlay had begun, but that of remuneration for the investment was yet far distant.

Japan in no wise aimed at injuring any of Russia's vital resources.

We have seen that if on the day after Sedan Bismarck had been content with the humiliation of France and a heavy ransom, Moltke would not have been obliged to strike France to the heart in order to obtain the object upon which peace was conditional. His objective would simply have been the imperial armies, and not Paris and the armies of the *Défense Nationale* as well.

It was safe to say, then, even in 1896, that Japan would not find herself obliged to take her armies to Moscow in order to compel Russia to abandon the Chinese and Korean territories which were the objective of Japanese policy.

General Dragomirov's saying, "the affairs of Asia will be decided in Europe," was a grave error.

Had Japan been obliged to carry the war into Europe to satisfy her ambitions, had Europe been

of necessity the decisive theatre, then the intensity of the requisite military effort would have been beyond her powers. The stake would not have been worth the cost of the war, and Japanese policy would have given up the project at the outset.

If, on the other hand, Japanese strategy had selected as its objective the military power of Russia in Europe, it would have gone far beyond the aim of the war.

In 1854 the Allies made war upon Russia to induce her to abandon the ambitions which would have infringed upon the territorial integrity of the "Sick Man." To obtain the end of Policy, Strategy chose as its own main objective Sevastopol, a place which Russia could not light-heartedly abandon to its fate. By choosing as their theatre of operations a country which their command of the sea rendered easy of access for their armies, and which, in the days before railways, the enemy's troops could only reach by months of route-marching and in a half-exhausted state, the Allies made the burden of the war extraordinarily heavy for Russia. When Russia found it less onerous to make peace than to continue the struggle, she submitted to the very moderate demands of her adversaries.

Had the allied strategists decided to achieve the object of Policy by carrying the war to Moscow, they would have gone beyond the object, and perhaps they would have succumbed.

If Frederick the Great, in the Seven Years

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War, had not strictly confined himself within the limits that his policy had laid down, he would infallibly have perished under the blows of his numerous enemies. It was natural that Austria, Russia, France, and the German Empire should seek to strike at the heart of the Prussian monarchy, for they well knew that Frederick would not give up Silesia till he had been deprived not only of his field armies but also of the resources of Prussia, which would enable him if necessary to raise fresh armies.

But Frederick, who when the war broke out desired no more than to preserve his existing dominions, contented himself with mounting guard over them. He threw himself in succession upon each of his enemies whenever they came within a dangerously close distance ; but he never went far afield in search of an enemy, for the distance itself rendered this enemy for the moment harmless. He never dreamed of ruining the power of Austria by a blow at the heart. The effort would perhaps have been beyond the capacity of his means, and there was no urgent necessity to take the risk.

He decided, then: (1) To limit the theatre of war to the essential provinces of his kingdom. To this end he gave up without any attempt at resistance, all his provinces in Western Germany and left only weak forces in East Prussia.

(2) To limit his external operations to the districts adjacent to his own position, without attempting the utter ruin of any one of his opponents.

It was the moderation of his strategy that enabled him to avoid destruction. An extension

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of the theatre of war might well have ruined him, in spite of the repeated mistakes of his adversaries.

The determination of the theatre of war is therefore a problem of the very first importance, in which a wrong solution may involve failure or even disaster.

General Dragomirov, in affirming that "the affairs of the Far East would be decided in Europe," was mistaken, and his high authority misled Russia into neglecting the region which was destined to be the scene of the crisis and the decision.

The Japanese chose a theatre of war within their own reach, and imposed their choice on their enemy.

It would be unsafe, however, arguing generally from this particular case, to assume that to make one's self master of a piece of territory or of a colony it is necessary to carry the war on to the soil of this territory or colony.

Had Port Arthur been an ordinary fortress, it would have been quite superfluous to besiege it. The result of the battle of Mukden would have given it to Japan as part of the terms of peace.

In case of war between France and Germany, we should have no cause for anxiety as to the defence of Senegal—or Algeria or Corsica for the matter of that—against inroads that the Germans (presumed to have the command of the sea) might make. Conquerors on the Rhine, masters at Berlin, we should have no difficulty in inducing

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Germany to give up her gains in Corsica, Algeria, or Senegal.

As a general rule, the way to obtain the object desired is to strike at the heart.

In special cases—such as those of the Crimea and Manchuria—this is not necessary. It would have been to go beyond the object of the war, and it would have been a blunder.

The general staff of the Japanese Army, then, selected, as the theatre of war, the Far East.

(ii) *Duration of the War.*—As Russia was not to be attacked in a vital part, she would *ipso facto* be in a very favourable position for prolonging the contest.

One frequently meets, in modern strategical studies, discussions of the probable duration of future wars. Opinions are very much divided, as indeed they are bound to be, especially if the discussion is not limited to a concrete case. And even over a single concrete case, well-known as it may be, divergences of opinion easily arise.

There is no unanimity, for example, as regards the Franco-German war of 1870. Some regret that peace was not made on the morrow of Sedan. Others think that the struggle was bound to come to an end with the capitulation of Paris.

When Gambetta was asked by those who impeached his conduct of the National Defence

whether he had believed in the possibility of the resistance achieving final success, he replied * without hesitation :

“Certainly, and I still believe it to-day. I am convinced that if the Government imprisoned in Paris had capitulated on behalf of Paris only—so much it had an incontestable right to do, more it had not—and had not tied the country’s hands by accepting terms of submission for the whole of France, I am convinced, I say, that the country, with the resources at its disposal, which could have been augmented, and in fact were augmented daily, would in the end have rid itself of the invaders. There is not one European people which has not at some time seen, and endured awhile, the invader on its soil, and has not in the end driven him out.”

These manly words of Gambetta demonstrate that where there is still energy left in it, the defence can carry on, and in the long run induce the luck to turn.

The Japanese staff was therefore unable to determine beforehand how long the war would last. It could only study possible means of reducing its duration.

The Russo-Japanese war in its very conception was an economic war. Logically, therefore, the war ought to come to an end as soon as, viewed from the commercial standpoint, the losses exceeded the profits.

But it is difficult to form an exact estimate of

* *The Nation in Arms* (v. der Goltz).

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that part of the profits which is not reducible to figures. Supposing, then, that Russia exaggerated the profits likely to accrue to her by prolonging the war, she had the power to prolong it beyond the limits that an accurate appreciation would indicate as advisable.

Here, then, was one source of uncertainty.

But it is not a commercial balance-sheet which brings about the signature of a treaty of peace, even in an economic war. National self-respect quickly comes into play on both sides; and as soon as self-esteem takes the predominant part, all figures are obliterated.

The Japanese staff had therefore to reckon with factors of national pride as much as, if not more than, with those of the economic kind.

As long as Russian national pride had no cause to consider defeat as irremediable, so long the war might continue.

The main thing, then, was to make Russia understand that she could never have the chance of carrying the war on to Japanese soil.

To that end the first essential was to destroy the Russian Far Eastern squadron; this, added to other factors with which we shall presently deal, accounts for the persistence and fury of the Japanese attacks upon Port Arthur.

When the Japanese troops marched into action on the battlefield of Liao-Yang, the word was passed along the ranks that "the road home was through Liao-Yang." From the outset of that battle on August 25, officers and soldiers thought

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that it would be a decisive victory, and "Sedan" was on every man's lips.

At this same date public feeling in Japan was at high tension. The commander of the 3rd Army was accused of feebleness, and it was in obedience to the pressure of this feeling that open-force assaults were delivered against Port Arthur at a heavy cost of lives.

If in these first days of September 1904 Port Arthur had been stormed and the Russian fleet destroyed, and if at the same moment Liao-Yang had been a Sedan instead of a mere success, Russia, deprived at once of fleet and army, would surely have sued for peace, and, unless the Japanese demands had been more exacting than those finally embodied in the Peace of Portsmouth, she could have accepted them.

It was therefore legitimate for the Japanese staff to assume, in making its preparations, that the war would be over about September 1904.

It was a year out in the estimate.

Port Arthur offered a resistance which could not have been reckoned upon. Liao-Yang, instead of a decisive blow, was merely a violent thrust.

On October 16 the Russian army lay in full strength about Mukden. At this date Port Arthur seemed to be still capable of a prolonged resistance. This day, too, Admiral Rozhdestvenski's fleet set sail from Libau for the Far East. The luck seemed to be turning. There could be no question then of Russia's suing for peace.

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On May 28, 1905, the war assumed a fresh character. On this day Rozhstvenski's fleet was annihilated at Tsushima. The old Port Arthur squadron had long before ceased to exist. All hopes of beating the Japanese on their own country vanished for good.

At this moment the Russian army in Manchuria was strong, and superior in numbers to the Japanese. But the moral superiority of the victorious Japanese and the depression induced on the other side by a series of defeats, balanced this numerical superiority, and practically equalized the chances of winning the next battle. Even so, however, the new battle would have merely been like the rest—a violent thrust, not a Sedan.

In these conditions the war threatened to last for ever.

By this time the internal situation of Russia was desperate, the finances of Japan ruined, and so—from sheer lassitude, and not for want of battalions or of courage—they made peace at last.

During the period of preparation for war, neither the Japanese nor any other general staff could possibly have forecast events so far ahead. At that time it expected to march the army home “by way of Liao-Yang.”

But its expectations were disappointed principally because the military resources prepared in peace were inadequate. The siege train for Port Arthur was incapable of carrying out the work entrusted to it—hence a heavier expense of lives

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and a longer duration of the siege. The field army was capable of winning, but incapable of destroying—two, three, or four additional divisions would have been necessary for that.

(iii) *Forces*.—The Japanese staff, having determined the theatre of their war, studied the means of shortening it, and made a reasonable estimate of its probable duration, had next to work out the potential strength of the forces they would have to deal with.

These were (*a*) the Russian troops of the existing Far Eastern army, (*b*) the reinforcements that might be brought to the theatre of war before, and (*c*) those that could be brought up after the outbreak of hostilities.

After the Boxer war of 1900,* 55,000 Russian soldiers had remained in the Far East. During the period of strained relations 25,000 men were brought up in addition.

The force available at the outset, then, was 80,000 men in all, inclusive of the Port Arthur and Vladivostok garrisons, the railway guards, etc.; and when these guards and garrisons had been provided for, there was practically nothing left. The forces which could be put in the field, therefore, were quite insignificant.

Consequently the solution of the problem turned upon an accurate estimate of the output of the Trans-Siberian Railway.

* *Revue mil. des Armées étrangères*, No. 959.

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Nowadays the working out of a plan of campaign includes the study of our own and the adversary's railway system, and the submission of proposals for supplementary lines, new connecting loops, and additional platform accommodation.

In 1867 Moltke wrote to Roon, the Minister of War :

“The North German Confederation will by next year possess the forces requisite for engaging successfully in a war with France, even without South German co-operation. The only requisite is that these forces should be assembled at the proper place and time. . . . My own view is that we shall guarantee this better by hastening the development of our military system than by building fortifications, whether in one place or in another.”

He indicates the loop-lines to be constructed for the linking-up of existing sections of railway, and proceeds :

“All that is necessary is to lay down 95 miles of new railway. This will give us five through lines of transport, an advantage for which millions would not compensate in case of war.”

Begun in 1891, the Trans-Siberian had by 1896 reached the Amur at Strietensk,* from which point the river (save when frozen) carried on the transport service.

In 1896 the Russo-Chinese Bank—with the Imperial Government behind it as “undisclosed principal”—set on foot, with the authorization of

* Map I.

the Chinese Government, the East China Railway Company. This company at once put in hand the Chita-Harbin-Vladivostok Railway. In 1898 it obtained authority from China to construct a line from Harbin to Port Arthur and Niuchwang.

In 1903 the Trans-Siberian, continued by the East China line, could carry merchandise from Moscow to Vladivostok, Port Arthur, or Niuchwang. But, as the Minister of War, Kuropatkin, himself admitted, the line was inadequate for the requirements of a campaign.

From Moscow to Harbin is 4,650 miles, from Harbin to Port Arthur 600, from Harbin to Vladivostok 450.

The line was only a single track throughout. In February 1904, moreover, Lake Baikal had to be crossed, because the line passing round it was not complete, and the tunnel through the Great Khingan range was unfinished, so that the trains had to ascend and descend it by steep gradients, which limited their length and therefore their carrying capacity.

On his arrival at the theatre of war, General Kuropatkin asked the railway service to provide seven troop trains daily from Moscow to Harbin (the trains being of sixteen to twenty-three carriages), and twelve troop trains daily from Harbin to the south. At the outset of the campaign his demand could not be fully complied with.

The output was 20,000 to 40,000 men monthly between February and March, 50,000 each in August and September, 70,000 in November 1904.

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The rapid improvement in the working of the Trans-Siberian during the course of the war shows what could have been accomplished if Russia had not believed that the affairs of the Far East would be settled in Europe.

Had the Trans-Siberian Railway been capable in February 1904 of the output of which it was capable in March 1905 (that is, no less than 100,000 a month), Marshal Oyama would have met at Liao-Yang, on September 1, 1904, a host that would have overwhelmed him by sheer numbers.

And, for that matter, we can assert that had the Trans-Siberian possessed in 1903 the capacity that it possessed in 1905, Japanese statesmanship (which was well served by its reporting agents) would not have risked a struggle under such unfavourable conditions, and Russia would have been saved the cost of a war.

Reckoning by the real capacity of the line, the Japanese general staff, supposing that its calculations were correct, might count upon Russia's having in the Far East (inclusive of all garrisons):

At the outset	80,000 men
„ end of March 1904	100,000 „
„ „ April „	130,000 „
„ „ May „	160,000 „
„ „ June „	200,000 „
„ „ July „	240,000 „
„ „ August „	270,000 „

From this it could argue that, if the enemy could be compelled by attacks or threats to retain

considerable forces in the fortresses of Port Arthur and Vladivostok, and also along the railway, it would be in a position to beat the field forces that Russia could assemble in the Far East up to September 1904.

If by that date a decisive success had been obtained peace would soon be made.

Restricting to its minimum the effort to be demanded of the nation, the Japanese staff prepared the means which it considered necessary to defeat, by sea or by land, the forces that Russia could bring into the field or assemble in Manchuria between February and September 1904.

Never has a railway had, perhaps never will a railway have, such decisive importance in a war.

The Russian Government has been accused of want of foresight in that it did not accumulate in Manchuria during peace-time forces proportioned to the dangers menacing its Far Eastern possessions.

Instead of massing forces at the spot where they may be required, it is preferable to ensure the power of quickly transporting them thither when the time comes for their employment.

To economize troops and to be lavish with the means of transporting them was the line that ought to have been taken. It was more certain and more economical.

But a necessary preliminary to any measures for the assembly of large forces in the Far East was a realization of the fact that Far Eastern affairs could be settled elsewhere than in Europe.

Russia was at fault, not because she was wanting in foresight, but because she mistook the theatre of war.

D. THE DETERMINATION OF THE STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE

Policy has fixed the object of the war. Strategy has settled upon the theatre of the war, and created and organized the means. It now remains to ascertain how these means are to be employed in the determined theatre and for the given object.

The Japanese have not yet published any statement of their plan of campaign. Discussion of their plan, therefore, cannot be based on documents, but ought we on that account to condemn ourselves to follow the progress of operations blindfold, to make no effort to understand the "why" of events? Are we to set ourselves merely to narrate what we know the armies did, without an attempt to discover what they had in view in doing it?

Moreover, actions speak louder than words, and surely the facts that are written on the soil are better evidence than an official account produced after the war, to conceal or explain away blunders, it may be, or to glorify persons in high places.

When it is a question of apportioning shares of responsibility, we must go to the documents written by the persons concerned. But to interpret the facts, it is sufficient to read them as they stand engraved by fire and steel on the soil of the theatre of war.

As the wishes and intentions of the Japanese were not thwarted by their opponents at the outset, their doings cannot be otherwise than the literal

translation of their intentions. This translation we have to strive to read if we are to discover the Ariadne's thread that will guide us through the labyrinth wherein so many students have lost themselves.

On the night of February 8-9, 1904, Admiral Togo's fleet attacked the Russian Port Arthur squadron without declaration of war. From that day forth, so long as anything of this squadron remained in existence, Togo stood on guard, ready to pounce upon any Russian ship that attempted to emerge from its refuge.

On February 8 some battalions disembarked at Chemulpo and marched on Seoul. Next the Japanese 12th Division set foot in Korea and moved in a long column upon Ping-Yang. The 2nd Division and after it the Guard landed at Chinampo, the Guard completing its disembarkation on March 25. These divisions constituted the 1st Army under General Kuroki, which marched to the Yalu, forced that river on May 1, and then halted, a little beyond it, for nearly two months.

On May 5 another army, the 2nd (General Oku), landed in the neighbourhood of Pi-tzu-wo. On May 26 this army gave battle at Nanshan to a part of the mobile defence corps of Port Arthur. Then leaving one division at Nanshan the 2nd Army turned northward and moved on Wa-fang-kou.

In turn, a 3rd Army (Nogi) gathered and, absorbing the division left behind by General Oku, set to work to besiege Port Arthur, which it furiously assailed, grudging time and lavishing lives.

On May 19 a division, the nucleus of the 4th Army (Nodzu) disembarked at Takushan, and set its face in the direction of Hsiu-Yuen.

On June 15 Oku's 2nd Army defeated at Wafang-kou (Te-li-ssu) a Russian corps sent out at a venture towards Port Arthur by Kuropatkin.

Then the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Armies slowly moved upon Liao-Yang, where, in the last days of August, they joined hands for the first time during the campaign, and co-operated in the same battle.

These are the facts we have to translate.

In February 1904 the Japanese fleet consisted of the following:

Six battleships: *Mikasa*, *Asahi*, *Hatsuse*, and *Shikishima* (15,000—15,400 tons, 18·5–19 knots, 4 12-inch and 14 6-inch guns); *Fuji* and *Yashima* (12,300 tons, 18·5–19 knots, 4 12-inch and 10 6-inch guns).

Six armoured cruisers: *Asama*, *Tokitsa*, *Idzumo*, and *Iwate* (9,700–9,750 tons, 22 knots, 4 8-inch and 14 6-inch guns); *Adzuma* and *Yakumo* (9,436–9,850 tons, 21 knots, 4 8-inch and 12 6-inch guns).

Seventeen protected cruisers, nine coast defence ships, 19 destroyers, and 84 torpedo boats.

At this time Russia had in Far Eastern waters:

Seven battleships: *Tsesarevich* and *Retvizan* (12,700 tons, 18 knots, 4 12-inch and 12 6-inch guns); *Pobieda* and *Peresviet* (12,674 tons, 18 knots, 4 10-inch and 11 6-inch guns); *Poltava*, *Petropavlovsk*, and *Sevastopol* (10,950 tons, 16·5–17·5 knots, 4 12-inch and 12 6-inch guns).

42 THE PLAN OF THE WAR

Four armoured cruisers: *Gromovoi* (12,336 tons, 20 knots, 4 8-inch and 16 6-inch guns); *Rossiia* (12,200 tons, 20·2 knots, 4 8-inch and 16 6-inch guns); *Rurik* (10,940 tons, 18·7 knots, 4 8-inch and 16 6-inch guns); *Bayan* (7,800 tons, 21 knots, 2 8-inch and 8 6-inch guns).

Seven protected cruisers, 2 armoured gunboats, 25 destroyers, 17 torpedo boats.

“If the Japanese superiority in protected cruisers was very great, the number of vessels fit for the line of battle—battleships and armoured cruisers—was practically equal on both sides.

“Numerically and as regards weight of armament, the advantage of the Japanese fleet was not very marked. But it was better trained than the Russian.”

As to this last, the only test of excellent training, whether by land or by sea, is, after all, battle. In reckoning up its assets before the war each side was entitled to assume that it was better trained than the other.

The positive initial superiority of the Japanese navy lay in the fact that it was concentrated as a whole at Sasebo, whereas the Russian fleet at Port Arthur was short of the three big armoured cruisers* and of the torpedo craft that were at Vladivostok. At sea, therefore, the Japanese could work on interior lines, and, using their whole force at will against either of the ports and the portion of the Russian fleet therein, fight with the advantage of superior strength.

* *Rurik, Rossiia, Gromovoi.*

On land, the field forces of Japan, with their 13 active divisions and 13 *Kobi* brigades, numbered, on February 6, 261,500, behind whom there were available for drafts or for the formation of new corps some 200,000 trained men.

At this same date Russia had only 80,000 men, forming 11 brigades, in the Far East, and these, being distributed over an enormous area, could not be grouped into a field army of sufficient strength for battle for a considerable time. Not until September would Russia be able to dispose of 270,000 men in the Far East, and of these a large part could not be counted upon for the battle, because of the railway guards and fortress garrisons to be furnished. In February 1904 both Port Arthur and Vladivostok were unfinished, the greater part of their defences existing only on paper.

The goal of Japan's policy was the acquisition of territories on the Asiatic mainland.

But Policy required Strategy first and foremost to assure the inviolability of the home country, *i.e.* put it out of the enemy's power, once and for all, to disembark on the islands of Japan.

This necessity of assuming the position of "on guard" at the outset gave predominance for the time being to the naval side of the operations. The command of the sea was indispensable in that it secured Japan against risks which would have very considerably outweighed the prospects of profit.

The transference of the war to the mainland

necessitated the transference of the army thither, and for this the transport vessels must be able to ply to and fro unharmed.

In this regard also command of the sea was essential. The war on the continent would be one of considerable duration, and the problem was very different from that which confronted Villeneuve in 1805. The French admiral had only to gain the few days that were necessary to transport the army of Boulogne across the Channel.

Modern armies, because of their requirements in ammunition, cannot do without an established line of communication with the base—*i.e.* the home country. It was therefore essential for the Japanese to have the command of the sea, not merely temporarily, but permanently. Nowadays, with modern armaments and ammunition, such an expedition as that of Napoleon to Egypt would be suicidal. Its guns and rifles would ere long die of inanition if a Nelson controlled the Mediterranean.

It was, moreover, within the bounds of possibility that a Russian fleet would come on the scene from Europe. A squadron under Admiral Virenius was in the Red Sea, and other vessels might one day join the Far Eastern squadron. On that day Admiral Togo would find himself in inferior strength, and faced with the prospect of being beaten, perhaps destroyed.

What then would become of the Japanese armies on the mainland, even if they were

victorious,* when the Russian fleet controlled the Sea of Japan? Sooner or later, when they had fired away the projectiles that they had no means of replacing, they would have to capitulate.

The mastery of the sea, therefore, was a vital matter, not only at the outset, but throughout the campaign. If it were lost, even temporarily, the very gravest consequences might ensue.

It was essential, then, that the Russian Far Eastern, Red Sea, and Baltic squadrons, already separated *in space*, should be separated *in time* as well. The Far Eastern squadron must be destroyed to the last vessel before the others could reach Japanese waters.

Lastly, it was fair to suppose that Russia would agree to terms of peace as soon as it became absolutely impossible for her to pay off her scores with Japan on Japanese soil.

The first objective of Strategy was, therefore, the destruction of the Far Eastern squadron. The destruction of Russia's Manchurian army, from which would accrue the results that Policy desired, was a matter for later consideration.

* It seems desirable to point out that, *ex hypothesi*, the victories on the mainland struck at none of Russia's vital resources (p. 25). The argument belongs to its context, and the conclusion is not intended to be applied to other cases in which the premisses are different—to enterprises, for example, such as Napoleon's invasion of England, which combine brief duration with overpowering effectiveness. As the author shows (p. 44), Napoleon's Egyptian, and not his English expedition, is the true precedent of the present case.—T.R.

So long as the squadron was not destroyed, everything else was of secondary importance.

So long as any unit of the Russian navy was in existence its destruction must be sought for with the utmost determination, regardless of other targets.

That portion of it which the guns of the fleet, the mines, and the torpedoes failed to exterminate must be "corked up" in its refuge. This failing, Togo's fleet keeps up its dangerous and exhausting sentry-go; and the army attacks from the land side the fleet that refuses to leave its refuge. The siege guns lend their powerful aid to the guns of the Japanese battle-fleet, both pursuing one and the same objective, the Russian squadron.

Time presses. The attack becomes an open-force assault. Many more landsmen than sailors were destined to lay down their lives in taking this squadron.

Here, then, it seems, we have our long-sought Ariadne-thread. To be sure of it we have only to follow the course of events, constantly keeping the thread in our hand.

By the early days of February Policy's work was done. The alliances and understandings had been fixed, the war loan floated, the military and naval force made ready to come into action at the first signal.

Policy is mistress, but ere it takes the decisive step it calls on its servants, military and naval Strategy, to advise.

Japanese policy had already shown, in 1895, that a State which receives a slap in the face can only afford to be angry when it can return the compliment. In 1904 it delegated one of its servants to do so.

In this war by land and sea, the strategy of the one element and that of the other were to some extent in opposition.

In the opening days of the war ice blocked the coast-line, completely closing the Asiatic mainland between Chemulpo and Ta-lien-wan. The land forces could not disembark in the immediate vicinity of Port Arthur, for so delicate and tedious an operation could not be carried out in waters patrolled by hostile torpedo boats. Nor, at this date, could they disembark at a point suitable for manœuvring against the Russian land forces; for these were on the Yalu, and the ice denied all access to the coast in this quarter.

Oyama's strategy, therefore, had everything to gain from a retardation in the opening of hostilities. Policy was in no hurry, and might easily have spun out time in negotiations until April came, and the break-up of the ice enabled Strategy to land its forces at any point on the coast which suited its combinations.

But if, on February 6 (the day of the decisive act) the Russian fleet seemed to be numerically inferior to the Japanese, the difference was very slight. A lucky shot, a mine, a torpedo might cost the Japanese one or two of their big vessels and bring the numerical superiority over to the other camp.

At the time the Russian fleet was divided into two parts, at Port Arthur and Vladivostok respectively, and Virenius's squadron was in the Red Sea, on the way to the Far East. To wait would be to allow these three groups to unite, and in that event success became exceedingly doubtful.

On February 6 the rumours of war had not yet shaken the Russians out of their apathy. Admiral Makárov, the commander-in-chief designate of the Russian squadron, had not yet joined, nor had General Kuropatkin assumed command of the land forces. Without the motor the machine remained at a standstill. The fleet was in harbour, living its peace-time life until diplomacy should hand over the conduct of the business. At night lights were not extinguished, and many officers were ashore in the town.

Admiral Togo knew of all this. The chance of a successful surprise could never be better. His forces were assembled and in readiness at Sasebo, and a signal would set them in motion. Togo applied to Policy for permission to give the signal, and the permission was given him.

Land and sea strategy were then in opposition. The interest of one was to delay until the break-up of the ice, that of the other was to begin at once. Of the two, the strategy which aims at the more important objective should have precedence.

Togo, therefore, sailed from Sasebo on February 6, 1904; and his guns were to be the first intimation that war had commenced.

It is very rare, in war, to find all interests point-

ing the same way; practically no solution of a problem is free from serious defects. Victory falls to that party which can disentangle the principal from the secondary, which can discern its objective and march straight upon it, regardless of side issues.

Admiral Togo left Sasebo on the 6th. On the night of the 8-9th his torpedo boats penetrated the harbour of Port Arthur, and inflicted very serious damage on the battleships *Tsesarevich* and *Retvizan* and a protected cruiser.

This was not enough. On the 9th the whole Japanese fleet closed in to attack the hostile squadron, which lay in the harbour and the inner part of the roadstead. But the attack suffered severe injury from the fire of the coast defences, and Togo had to withdraw out of range.

The fleet then painfully kept the open sea off Port Arthur. Unable to destroy the Russian vessels, Togo tried to imprison them in their refuge. On February 24 a first attempt at "bottling-up" was made. This was followed by a war of mines and torpedoes, in the course of which the *Petropavlovsk*, with Admiral Makárov, was sunk, and the *Pobieda* put out of action.

After these events the navy was able to pursue its plan of operations in favourable conditions. All the same, the rest of the Russian squadron obstinately refused to come out of its stronghold, and Togo was unable to bring it to action.

At this point, so some of the critics allege, the Japanese staff seems to have forgotten its

objective, misled by a vain desire to lay hands on Korea. Let us see.

The 12th Division on February 5 received the order to embark four battalions of the 23rd Brigade at their peace strength (= 2,500) at Sasebo. On the 6th these left Sasebo under the escort of Admiral Uriu's squadron, and, after calling at Mokpo, reached Chemulpo on the evening of the 8th. They landed immediately, and the same evening two of them travelled by a Korean train to Seoul, where their presence brought the Sovereign of the Empire of the Morning Calm completely under Japanese control. The other two remained at Chemulpo, and early on the 9th set to work upon the construction of jetties for the eventual disembarkation of the 12th Division.

Two Russian vessels, the *Varyag* and the *Koryetz*, fell victims to the excessive optimism of the Russian minister at Seoul. After a gallant fight, they succumbed to the guns of Uriu's squadron (February 9).

On the 17th the disembarkation of the 12th Division commenced.

The moment it was finished, this division was set in motion northward towards the Yalu, 200 miles distant,* by the Mandarin Road, which in the thaw degenerated into a bog wherein the vehicles and their teams stuck fast.

By March 18 the 12th Division had covered the 150 miles between Chemulpo and Ping-Yang. Here it was joined by the Guard and 2nd Divisions,

* Distances from Map I. of British *Official History*.—Tr.

which, owing to the break-up of the ice, had been able to disembark at Chinampo (March 14-29).

The 1st Army, formed of these three divisions and placed under the command of General Kuroki, moved on to the Yalu. It encountered grave difficulties in this march, but the Koreans nowhere manifested any hostile feeling. Precautions were taken, but only against Mishchenko's Cossacks, not against the population.

There is nothing, then, to justify the critics in proclaiming that the Japanese lost sight of their strategic objective for the empty satisfaction of taking possession of Korea. The entry of two battalions at peace strength into Seoul on the night of February 8-9 had sufficed for this. The mission of the 1st Army was not to conquer a conquered State. It was for something else that it marched up the Mandarin Road to the Yalu, and the plan of operations will enlighten us as to this "something."

The objective was the Russian fleet, which had sheltered itself from Togo's guns in the harbour of Port Arthur.

In the first week of February Port Arthur and its environs are free of ice, but from Ta-lien-wan to Chemulpo the coast is unapproachable. Ta-lien-wan is too near Port Arthur to be a safe point of disembarkation, and direct action by land was therefore out of the question.

The only alternative, therefore, to waiting passively at home for the thaw was to attempt to act against the fleet indirectly.

The 12th Division, disembarking at Chemulpo, the nearest point to the scene of operations that was free of ice, was to draw Russian forces towards the Yalu. Everything that General Kuropatkin (or before his arrival Admiral Alexeiev) despatched to the Yalu and Korea would be away from Port Arthur; and when the time came and the Pi-tzu-wo coast was free of ice, the more troops that the Russians had placed on the Yalu, the more likelihood was there of the Japanese finding no one to oppose their landing on the Liao-Tung.

The first phase of the operations is direct action against the Russian squadron by Togo's fleet. The second is indirect action against the same objective by Kuroki's army.

On May 1 Kuroki won his victory on the Yalu. Close at hand, on board its transports, was General Oku's 2nd Army. This could have disembarked in the Yalu estuary, and joined the 1st in a march against Liao-Yang, where Kuropatkin was concentrating his army. But, for the moment, this was not the object in view. The Russians had two forces in Manchuria, the army and the squadron. It was the more urgent matter of the two to destroy the squadron, and it was against the squadron that the 2nd Army was directed.

When Kuroki's victory of May 1 relieved all anxiety as to the 1st Army, Oku was sent to Pi-tzu-wo.

The third phase of the operations, therefore, is a resumption of direct action against the Russian squadron. On May 5, the 2nd Army began to

disembark at Pi-tzu-wo and Yen-tai. On the 13th the Port Arthur—Mukden railway was definitively intercepted by the Japanese. On the 16th contact was gained with the mobile defence corps of Port Arthur at Chin-chou.

On May 26 Oku's three divisions carried by main force, after a sanguinary struggle, the isthmus of Nanshan.

From this day forth the Port Arthur peninsula (Kuan-Tung) was severed from the rest of the theatre of war.

A glance at the map shows that the Kuan-Tung peninsula is connected to the mainland only by an isthmus 4,000 yards wide. The mastery of this isthmus, Nanshan, which can be defended by one division against greatly superior numbers, is tantamount to the investment of Port Arthur.

Suppose that it was the fortress, and not the squadron, that had to be taken into account, and that Kuropatkin's army was the strategic objective. One division would suffice to invest Port Arthur by land, while Admiral Togo blockaded it by sea. Marshal Oyama would therefore order a division to occupy the isthmus solidly, and would move with all available forces upon Liao-Yang to crush Kuropatkin by weight of numbers.

Port Arthur stands at the extremity of the theatre of war, far from the scene of the intended decision. The fortress barred none of the routes which the armies were to follow in their advance. Never perhaps was there a fortress which could so easily have been avoided or masked.

Now, the Japanese were too thoroughly imbued with German ideas not to have contented themselves with merely investing the place had it not been for a more powerful motive which obliged them to besiege it.

The military history of Prussia, from Pirna * to Paris, indicates a general tendency of Germans, in besieging a fortress, to attack the belly and not the heart of the garrison. They have a Vauban in Von Sauer, but he was only a war-game Vauban.

In the event, not only did the Japanese deem a blockade insufficient, but they delivered one assault after another. From first to last some 140,000 of their men took part in these assaults, which in violence surpassed even the epic of Sevastopol.

It is possible, even probable, that they did not expect at the outset to encounter so energetic a resistance as they did. But the fact remains that even if they had expected it they would none the less have made the siege.

For it was a matter of urgent necessity to destroy or capture the squadron which was sheltered in the place. It was necessary, too, to release the Japanese fleet in order that it might be rested and refitted in time to meet that other danger which began to loom large—the Russian Baltic fleet.

On May 15 a terrible disaster deprived the Japanese fleet of two of its most powerful ships.

“On the morning of the 15th the three great battleships *Hatsuse*, *Yashima*, and *Shikishima* were cruising off Port Arthur when the leading ship, *Hatsuse*, struck two mines and sank with 16 officers

* Investment and starving-out of the Saxon Army, 1756.—Tr.

and 478 men. Almost at the same moment the *Yashima*, too, struck a double mine. An attempt was made to run aground, but the angle of heel soon rose to 40°. The ship was cleared of her crew, and went to the bottom a few moments later."

The sea blockade was thus extremely costly. One more disaster like that of May 15, and Japan would be almost defenceless in the presence of the Baltic fleet when the latter came on the scene.

It was not a fortress, then, that the Japanese assailed, but seagoing forces that it was a matter of the very first urgency to destroy. Hence the organization of a 3rd Army (Nogi), strong at the outset and reinforced with a lavish hand. This army was meant to destroy, in concert with Togo's fleet, the last vestiges of the enemy's Far Eastern squadron.

Port Arthur falls on January 2, 1905. In May Admiral Rozhdestvenski's fleet arrives in Japanese waters. But Togo has now no other adversary on his hands. He has had time, moreover, thoroughly to refit his ships for battle, and his victory is decisive, for it deprives Russia of the whole of her means of action afloat.

When security was assured, or practically assured—*i.e.* when the Port Arthur squadron was besieged by land and sea by the 3rd Army and Togo's fleet—Strategy was free to act against Russia's means of action on the mainland, and so

to achieve the object of the war as fixed by Policy.

The 2nd Army began its northward movement, and advanced successfully, though slowly.

The 1st Army, hitherto halted in the region of Feng-huang-cheng, set itself in motion for Liao-Yang.

A 4th Army, disembarking at Takushan on and after May 19, joined the 2nd.

These three armies moved concentrically upon Liao-Yang with the object of destroying General Kuropatkin's army at one great blow.

Had they succeeded in this object, peace would doubtless have been made soon afterwards, if the demands of the victor were still moderate. It is, in fact, most unlikely that the Russians would have built up an entirely new army, just when they were beginning to suspect that their squadron would never again put to sea. In all probability if Liao-Yang had been a Sedan, peace would have followed at once.

It was a victory of the Sedan type, indeed, that Oyama designed to win. His troops fought perfectly; Kuropatkin made one mistake after another. But, for all that, there was no chance of Liao-Yang proving decisive. Oyama had not enough men to destroy his adversary, and what he failed to secure at Liao-Yang he was no better able to secure during the rest of the war—always for want of sufficient men.

The success of the plan of campaign depended upon the destruction of Russia's two means of

action in the Far East, her fleet and her army. The fleet was destroyed, but not so the army; and having still a means of prolonging the argument, Russia still argued. Thus in the end peace was accepted by Russia, but not imposed upon her.

E. WAR AND FINANCE

Marshal Oyama, then, had not at his disposal the means of obtaining a decisive victory on September 1, 1904, Kuropatkin's army was not annihilated, the war had to go on, and Japan had to sign a treaty of peace on terms that suited her enemy as well as herself—a peace which failed to procure the war indemnity on which Policy had counted—a peace so unpopular that it led to risings in the interior which were not suppressed without bloodshed.

To make war three things are necessary, as Montecucculi, even in his generation, could say, (1) money, (2) money, (3) money.

This assertion is truer than ever to-day. In the war in Manchuria finance fought as many battles as the soldiers. The Peace of Portsmouth, though it did not satisfy the Japanese, was accepted by them because their finances, not their battalions, were exhausted.

Formerly the cost of wars to the States which engaged in them was relatively small, but the money question was nevertheless of primary importance. Frederick William I., by leaving his son Frederick II. a war treasure of 9,000,000 thalers (£1,350,000), enabled him to carry on the Silesian

Wars, or at least to hold out until Louis XV. sent subsidies.

The Seven Years' War was prepared by Maria Theresa on the basis of subsidies that she obtained from the King of France through the agency of her *bonne amie*, Mme de Pompadour, and Elisabeth of Russia only joined the coalition after Maria Theresa had passed on to her a little of this financial manna.

Only the English subsidies enabled Frederick II. to make head against this coalition.

In the seventeenth century, though war was costly, peace as a rule was not. In peace armies were disbanded, while new ones were levied for new wars.

Frederick William I., *le roi-sergent*, was the first to make peace costly, by keeping his army practically at full strength in peace.

To-day the state of "armed peace" impoverishes the States which maintain it, while the others run the risk of being ruined and of disappearing altogether.

In proportion as war becomes more scientific it comes less within the province of improvised soldiers.

Armies are no longer levied, but consist of cadres and of soldiers, reinforced at need by other cadres and other properly trained soldiers.

Armies are no longer bought *ad hoc*, or hired as in the days of the condottieri. They are composed of men serving from a sense of duty; they contain the purest blood of the nation; their

military value is the result of an adequate term of service with the colours, and service with the colours implies pay-lists and a military budget.

Nowadays we may rewrite Montecucculi's phrase thus: "To preserve the blessings of peace three things are necessary—(1) money, (2) money, (3) a great deal of money."

The Germans have not given up their old habit of keeping a permanent war chest.

In 1870 this amounted to 30,000,000 thalers (£4,500,000); to-day the cellars of Spandau contain 120,000,000 marks (£6,000,000).

Other nations have not followed Germany's example. They rightly regard the formation of a war hoard of strong-room gold as a barbarous and unprofitable device, at variance with the financial practice of the modern civilized world, in which the credit system is so highly developed.

Gold is heaped in the cellars of the Bank of France, but it is security against bank-notes. The bank-notes circulate, buy goods, and earn interest.

Had these £6,000,000 in the citadel of Spandau been used as the basis of note-issues since 1871, they would have become £20,000,000 by this time. £14,000,000, then, must be added to the debit side of Germany's account in the books of the "armed peace."

The worst result of hoarding is, however, not the loss of interest as the false security that the hoard gives. These £6,000,000 would evidently be a quite insufficient basis for undertaking a war,

for Japan, in spite of the small effective that she put into line, contracted a war loan on December 28, 1903—i.e. in advance—of £16,000,000.

The day before the Franco-German war began, Prussia had £4,500,000 in the war chest. Other sources yielded 18,300,000 thalers (£2,750,000). This gave a total of £7,250,000.

This sum was far below the capital required to keep the army alive at the outset. Application had to be made elsewhere.

Bismarck appealed to German patriotism. It was an unfortunate inspiration. The voluntary subscriptions amounted to 394 thalers, or about £60, and all Europe held its sides with laughter.*

At this moment a panic swept over the German public and endangered the banks. The shares of the Bank of Prussia fell from 141 to 119, the Four per Cents. from 93·5 to 77·75 on July 20, while at the same moment on July 1 our French Four and a Half per Cents. only fell from 104 to 99·5.

It was in these unfavourable conditions that Bismarck opened a loan of 121,000,000 thalers (£18,000,000). He offered 5 per cent. interest, issued the stock at 88, and undertook to redeem it at par in eighteen months. Even so he only obtained £10,200,000 at the time of the issue (August 4).

“M. de Bismarck immediately realized that he could get nothing from Germany but soldiers.

* Renaud, *Les Finances de la France en 1870-1*; Mathieu-Bodet, *Les Finances de la France*.

For money he applied to the City of London, the money-market of Europe, and in August he negotiated with the house of Baring a loan which gave him £50,000,000." *

It is curious to observe that the Germans, so loth to lend money to their own Government, showed themselves very eager to lend it to France. When the Delegation of Tours, on October 27-29, 1870, contracted the Morgan loan, which enabled it to form the army of the *Défense Nationale*, German money flowed freely into our coffers. Bismarck was very angry; "he directed the prosecution of several Frankfurt bankers, whom he accused of having facilitated the loan, which, to quote the words of the charge, had enabled France to constitute the Army of the Loire, and to maintain the war longer and with greater energy." *

There is thus an intimate relation between the financial and the military situations. The Morgan loan enabled France to continue the war in 1870, while, on the other hand, the exhaustion of the Japanese finances had a serious effect on the terms of peace.†

When the treaty of Shimonoseki had been revised by the European Powers, Japan had to forgo the conquests she had just made on the continent, and to content herself with Formosa and £37,700,000. A violent blow was thereby dealt to Japanese self-esteem; and as it was only submitted to because the warlike means then at

* Renaud, *op. cit.*

† E. Théry, *La Situation financière et économique du Japon.*

Japan's disposal could not compete with those of Europe, she began to augment her war power without waiting for the payment of the indemnity by China. She obtained money by raising a loan on the security of this indemnity.

Along with the loan came new taxes and registration fees—tobacco tax, income tax, stamp taxes.

This "speeding up" went on at such a rate that in 1900 the augmentation of revenue amounted to 75,590,000 yen, or £7,800,000.

The taxpayers protested loudly. In three years they upset four ministries.


It is remarkable that these portents did not attract the attention of Russia. The Japanese press made no secret either of the figures or of the object of this enormous expenditure.

Europe might have noticed, too, the growth of Japan's "ordinary" military and naval expenditure from £1,270,000 in the 1896 estimates to £6,300,000 in those of 1903; and the "extraordinary" expenditure (shown in the diagram), which was met from public loans and therefore perfectly well known. These expenses, additional to those of the budgets in the period 1896–1903, totalled very nearly £43,000,000.

What was the meaning of it all? It was not for a defensive war that Japan was subjecting herself to such sacrifices, for no one was threatening her. It was therefore in order to attack. To attack whom? Had Russia asked herself the question she could have seen that she was herself the enemy aimed at.

Frederick the Great, seeing that Maria Theresa, after the peace which closed the Silesian Wars, continued to keep up the army with which she had fought them, made no mistake as to the Empress-

DIAGRAM SHOWING "EXTRAORDINARY" MILITARY
AND NAVAL EXPENDITURE 1896-1904



Queen's intentions. He understood that a fresh war threatened him.

What Frederick discovered by counting battalions, Great Britain to-day can perceive by following the movements of German finances. She need not wait until Germany's battleships are

in the harbours to count them. The navy votes enable her to foresee the extent of her danger at a given future date, which can be fixed by calculation from the energy of her rival's present effort. England realizes that she is aimed at, and steers her political, financial, and military course accordingly.

Careful observation of the fluctuations of foreign nations' finances is nowadays of the highest importance. This is one of the characteristics of modern warfare.

These fluctuations not only afford a reliable index to the military projects of a nation, but also allow of its preparations being followed step by step.

The above diagram shows that from 1901 onward the expenditure rapidly diminished, until on the eve of the war it had settled down to a figure but little higher than that required for upkeep. 1901 therefore marks the great effort, and from that year war was imminent.

The great effort was moreover followed immediately by the Anglo-Japanese Alliance (January 1902). In April 1902 Russia began to talk of evacuating Manchuria in three stages.*

The military and naval budgets and the total of "extraordinary" expenditure, when spread over the seven preceding years, average scarcely more than £15,500,000 per annum. This figure appears small to us, who pay more than twice as much annually for the maintenance of our armed

* See p. 13.

forces. But if the population of Japan is more numerous than ours, her financial resources are very small. It must not be forgotten that in 1868-9 the total estimates of the Empire of the Rising Sun only amounted to £380,000, and that, in a country new to progress in ideas, the whole system had to be fashioned *ab initio*.

Its warlike effort on land consisted in putting into line some 261,000 men, with but 200,000 trained men in reserve, and hence without a second-line army behind the first to guard the home country and occupy the conquered lands.

It would be venturing into the realms of fantasy to work out the economy of men, time, and money that would have accrued to Japan had she put into the battle of Liao-Yang enough men to annihilate her adversary.

Similarly it would be hazardous to speculate as to what would have happened if France in October 1870 had possessed a strong second-line army, well commanded, fit to accept and even to offer the challenge of battle.

But although calculations cannot be made in figures, there is complete proof that peace would have been speedily won in Manchuria, and that peace would have been less onerous in 1870, for we should have been by no means at the victor's mercy.

Considerable as our own military expenses are to-day, they give us an excellent first-line army, with a second-line army at its back.

In February 1904 the national debt of Japan was £57,400,000, in March 1906 it had grown to

£230,700,000.* To the difference, £173,300,000, we must add loans which had already been authorized, as well as almost the whole of two annual Budgets.

The Japanese Annual for 1906 stated the total expenses of the war as £202,500,000. The Russians spent nearly £278,000,000. But not even these £480,000,000 represent the total cost to both sides, for the Japanese Finance Minister, in the Budget statement of 1906-7, estimated that £52,300,000 would be required for repairs to the fleet and to *matériel* generally, and for rewards, pensions, etc.

The millions that Japan spent on the war came from three sources :

1. The Budgets of 1904 and 1905 (which the war almost entirely absorbed).
2. Internal loans.
3. External loans, taken up principally in England and the United States.

The interior loans, against which treasury bonds were given, were as follows : †

No.	Date.	Yen.	£	Interest.	Price of issue	Interest on capital.	Extinction.
1	Feb. 1904	100,000,000	10,240,000	5%	95	5·25%	5 years
2	May 1904	100,000,000	10,240,000	5%	92	5·43%	7 years
3	Nov. 1904	80,000,000	8,192,000	5%	92	5·43%	no limit
4	March 1905	100,000,000	10,240,000	6%	90	6·66%	"
5	April 1905	100,000,000	10,240,000	6%	90	6·66%	"

“This totals 480,000,000 yen” (£49,152,000), “issued upon more and more unfavourable conditions, as the diminution of the issue price by 5 per cent. in a year shows.

* E. Théry, *op. cit.*

† *Le Pour et le Contre*, March 24, 1907.

"But, faced with ever-growing needs, it was dangerous to make incessant applications to the home markets, which manifested their saturated state by a diminished willingness to take up the loans." *

The external loans were all covered by security, except the last, which was contracted after peace had been made.

They were as follows :

No.	Date.	Place.	£	Security.	Inter- est.	Price of issue.	Interest on capital.	Extinc- tion.
1	May 1904	{ London New York	10,000,000	Customs dues	6%	93.1	6.44%	7 yrs.
2	Nov. 1904	New York	12,000,000	Customs dues	6%	90.1	6.65%	9 yrs.
3	March 1905	New York	30,000,000	Tobacco monopoly	4½%	90	5%	20 yrs.
4	July 1905	{ London New York Berlin	30,000,000	Tobacco monopoly	4½%	90	5%	20 yrs.
5	Nov. 1905	{ London New York Paris	25,000,000	None	4%	90	4.44%	25 yrs.

We see from this that, unlike internal loans, those contracted abroad became, after November 1904, less and less burdensome as the war was prolonged. In May 1904 the interest on capital was 5.43 per cent. for interior loans. Exterior loans could only be had for 6.44 per cent., though the Customs receipts were ear-marked as security.

In March 1905 the interest on capital in the case of the interior loan had risen to 6.66 per cent., whereas the exterior loan, to cover which the

* *Le Pour et le Contre*, March 24, 1907.

tobacco receipts were ear-marked, could be obtained at 5 per cent. only.

Thus the interest on capital in the case of an exterior loan is no indication of the external credit of the State; it is simply the expression of the value of the security. In November 1904 Japan, with the victories of Liao-Yang and the Sha-ho to her credit, was certainly better off than in the previous May, and yet the interest on capital of the second loan was more onerous than that of the first (6·65 per cent. as against 6·44 per cent.). This apparent anomaly explains itself when we observe that the security of the second loan was already ear-marked for the first.

Had the third loan had to be secured, like the others, on the Customs receipts, very likely Japan would not have found any lenders. Another form of security had to be found, the State monopoly of tobacco. This served for the fourth as well as for the third loan.

Had not the Peace of Portsmouth been signed, a fresh loan would have been needed to carry on the war, which was at that time costing £11,000,000 a month.

A new internal loan would have produced no money. In April 1905, in spite of the 6·66 per cent. interest, the fifth loan was only covered with difficulty; and since that date the financial resources at the State's disposal for the redemption of the loan were greatly diminished, as the Customs and the tobacco had already been ear-marked for the foreign creditors. The Japanese lender, who could not well exact a security from

his own country, could only rely upon the national credit, and this was going from bad to worse.

A new exterior loan would have meant a fresh security. Now, ear-marking security is tantamount to accepting the surveillance of foreign bondholders. Japan, therefore, in waging a war of conquest abroad, was little by little admitting foreign domination at home; and had the war gone on, it is possible that the Japanese would have found themselves established in Manchuria and evicted in Japan.

It is, therefore, no exaggeration to say that peace was imposed upon the Japanese by the state of their finances and the cost of the war.

It is easy to see that Japan was in no condition to make any larger financial effort, when her total Budget in 1902-3 amounted only to £22,500,000. That is, the war cost half a year's income a month. Our own revenue is £158,000,000, and we should indeed be in ill case if we had to support twelve months of war at £80,000,000 a month. The Russo-Japanese war went on for seventeen.

Japan, therefore, was obliged to allow Russia to bargain; she was obliged to give up the sorely needed indemnity: in fact, had to accept the price that Russia chose to offer for peace.

F. CONCLUSIONS

In this study of the plan of campaign we have tried to bring out the fact that war is not only the struggle of two armies.

It is the wrestle of two nations, which throw into the contest their blood, their money, their moral force, their hopes, and their liberty.

The battle of the soldiers is only an episode of the war. It may be, and in fact generally is, the decisive episode; but it is not an isolated and self-contained act.

Strategy employs the warlike means that Policy gives it, but does not create them. It does not come into action on its own account, but solely on the orders of Policy. It does not select its object, but marches upon the object that Strategy sets before it. It ceases its operations at the bidding of Policy.

Policy is the mistress, war the servant.

In war Policy reaps the fruit of previous sacrifices. Its triumph is conditional upon these sacrifices having been sufficient.

Antagonism between the aims of Policy, the financial conditions, the armed forces, can only be productive of disaster. Defective co-operation between them inevitably results in deadlock. There must be combination of all these forces; so alone may the country, sure of her future, march confidently in the way of progress and liberty.

Strategy, having received from Policy the means to act and directions as to the object to be sought, now determines its combinations.

The following studies deal with the strategy of the Russians and Japanese respectively, in conception and in execution.

CHAPTER III

PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS

i. *To gain TIME*

ii. *To economize SPACE*

A. POSITION AND OBJECTIVE OF THE RUSSIANS IN THE FAR EAST

AFTER obtaining from China the right to construct the Harbin—Vladivostok extension of the Trans-Siberian Railway through Manchuria, Russia had obtained authority for a second line, Harbin—Port Arthur. Further, the Port Arthur (Kuan-tung) Peninsula had been leased to her.

When in 1900 the Boxer rising led to the intervention of the great European Powers and Japan, Russia maintained an army in Manchuria for the protection of the “East Chinese” railway line.

The formation of the Russo-Chinese and Russo-Korean banks; the projected extension of the East Chinese Railway into China and Korea; the creation, at a very heavy outlay, of a great commercial port at Dalny; the organization of a naval base at Port Arthur: all these things showed that Russia firmly intended to obtain military as well as

economic control of Manchuria, perhaps of Korea as well.

It seems that Russia, though thus resolved to establish her power in Manchuria, did not at any time form the idea of going to war in order to attain her aim. She desired peace, but could not bring herself to give up the economic benefits that she had reckoned upon. She desired profits, but would not make up her mind to pay the insurance premium that would have secured her these profits.

The railways were laid out to meet the requirements of commercial, not military, transport. The millions went to Dalny, the commercial port, and not to Port Arthur, the naval station.

When the period of "strained relations" began (July 1903), great military efforts were made, but it was too late. Any considerable reinforcement of the Far Eastern troops might have brought on a conflict, and this the Russian Government wished to avoid. On the other hand, the fewer the Russian troops in Manchuria, the more likely it was that Japan would be tempted to fight. The situation was impossible.

In studying the Japanese plan of operations, we have seen that the attainment of the object laid down by Japanese policy required :

(a) The destruction of the Russian Far Eastern squadron with the least possible delay.

(b) The destruction of the Russian army in Manchuria.

From the Russians' standpoint, given the severe initial losses of their squadron between February 8 and April 13, what was required was :

(a) 'To place what remained of the Port Arthur squadron out of the enemy's reach until its damages could be repaired, even, it might be, until a fresh squadron should arrive from Europe.

(b) 'To destroy, or at least to drive back to the sea, the armies that Japan might land on the continent.

It was only in the distant future that Russia could think about attacking the heart of the Japanese monarchy, for this was impossible until the Japanese fleet was destroyed and the Russian fleet had undisputed command of the sea.

This attack upon the heart of Japan was to be the decisive act. Distant indeed it appeared, but the Russians were firmly resolved to accomplish it, and nothing short of the disaster of Tsushima convinced them of the vanity of their hopes.

The object laid down for the war, and the information collected both in peace and during the operations, fix the general direction upon which Strategy has to work. But the workings of Strategy—its combinations and manœuvres—depend upon conditions of forces, time, and space. Therefore, before we study the Russians' strategy at the outset of the war, we must examine these conditions.

B. THE RUSSIAN FORCES

We have not here to take into consideration Russia's total military strength. Her splendid army was never, at any moment in the campaign, in a position to put forth its full powers.

In view of her situation in Europe, the latent hostility of Germany, and her own fidelity to the French alliance, Russia kept her youngest classes—her best troops, those to whose thorough preparation she had devoted most of her army funds—on her western frontier.

The result was that Russia not only would not send her best troops, but, further, drained the military resources of certain districts to the uttermost, regardless of whether the troops thus employed were well or ill trained. Numerous reserve units figured on the Manchurian battlefields, while in Europe the first-line troops were kept in a state of readiness against the eventualities that might come of English hostility and German ill-will. For, in fact, Russia was well aware that in Manchuria she could only suffer in self-esteem, while in Europe it was her vital interests that were in danger.

It is absolutely necessary to bear in mind these peculiar conditions if we are not to be misled into harsh criticisms of the Russian army that the facts do not warrant.

Before the war there was, strictly speaking, no army in Manchuria, but only a corps of occupation, in which the commanders were required to be not so much troop-leaders as civil administrators, and in which exact discipline, and not tactical training, was the chief requisite in the rank and file.

Dispersed in peace over immense areas, often by small detachments, the troops of the corps of occupation were only exercised in routine duties

such as guards and barrack-square parades. Their officers were excellent in details, but in the absence of any collective training the co-operative tactics of the three arms were ignored, or at best misunderstood. Especially was this the case as regards the handling of protective forces — the most difficult of all hands to play, and that which circumstances imposed upon them at the very outset of the war.

The infantry rifle was excellent, but very often there was too strong a tendency to imagine that things were as they had been in Suvárov's day, and that "the ball is a fool, the bayonet a hero."

Artillery.—As ill-luck would have it, a new pattern of field gun was beginning to be served out to the East Siberian troops at the outbreak of war.

Thus it was on the field of battle that they had to learn to use it. At Craonne, in 1814, our young conscripts appeared before the enemy innocent of all knowledge of gun drill, but they had experienced cadres and a Drouot above them who could teach them their work even under fire. But in Manchuria there was a shortage of instructors, and the cadres could not or would not understand the value of the new equipment, a semi-quickfirer.¹

¹ The Russian 1900 gun was an advance on the previous spring-spade and wire-rope equipments, but not a true quick-firer, in spite of its 3 ft. of gun-recoil. The gun and upper carriage, on recoil, slid along the trail, compressing stout indiarubber blocks that were placed, like a column of springs, inside the trail.

The East Siberian troops had hitherto the old B.L. equipment, 1892/95. It should be observed that the 1902 gun, a very powerful long-recoil quick-firer, did not find its way over to the Far East in 1904-5.—Tr.

It was only in the middle of May, when European gunners came on the scene, that the practice-camp experts were able to initiate their comrades into the technique of the new weapon. As for its tactical employment, all learnt it at the Yalu and Te-li-ssu, and we have reason to believe that the lesson was drastic, for it bore fruit rapidly.

Cavalry.—The Russian cavalry was very considerably superior in number to the Japanese. But it cannot be said to have yielded the enormous results that could justly be expected, in a European war, from so great a superiority. This is explained by the fact that the Russian cavalry—was not cavalry.

In Manchuria there was no regular cavalry except a single brigade of dragoons. All the other *soi-disant* cavalrymen were Cossacks. M. Henry Houssaye in his 1814 gives an excellent picture of Cossacks at work. When he is speaking of cavalry—cavalry that can manœuvre and fight in tactical co-operation with other arms—he never mentions the Cossacks. At Athies he shows us Cossacks cutting off despatch riders, but it is the excellent squadrons of Zieten that attack and overthrow Marmont's troops.

“More than 7,000 horsemen, Pomeranian hussars, Posen and East Prussian uhlans, Hohenzollern, Lithuanian, and Neumark dragoons, Berg, Kurmark, Mecklenburg-Strelitz landwehr—every province of Prussia throwing itself upon the quarry—cross the brook and charge the bivouacs of Bordessoule's two thousand.”

On the one hand Cossacks—the pillagers and

highwaymen of tactics—and on the other, cavalry. The difference is enormous.

In 1904 the Trans-Baikal Cossacks were, to all intents and purposes, frontier guards, distributed by sotnias,* mounted upon very small horses and chiefly engaged in hunting down Chunchuses—the apaches of Siberia. Individuals, even if well mounted, do not constitute cavalry.

Some days before the battle of Te-li-ssu a dragoon regiment came into collision with the 1st Japanese Cavalry Brigade and gave it a lesson that it did not forget for the rest of the campaign. At Liao-Yang the turning movement of Kuroki's army was detected by the European dragoon brigade, and the commander of the XVII Corps had only to exploit the information they had gained. But when they were only Cossacks, the cavalry rendered no services. General Stackelberg had every reason to believe, on June 15, 1904,† that his right flank was secured against surprise, for he had placed on that flank the cavalry division of General Simonov. But this cavalry division was composed exclusively of Cossacks. It was surprised and dispersed by the infantry of Ando's brigade, and Stackelberg's army, thus laid bare on its right flank, had to make a rapid retreat as best it could.

A couple of squadrons of real cavalry would have reported the presence of a Japanese division on Stackelberg's outer flank as early as the 14th. A Cossack division saw nothing and let itself be surprised.

* Sotnia = squadron, averaging about 140 sabres.—*Tm.*

† See Chapter VI. F. below.

Here, too, the peculiar conditions of the war made themselves felt. All the Russian cavalry, save one dragoon brigade, was kept in Europe, ready to play its part in a possible great conflict in the West; and for this reason no conclusions can be reached as to the rôle of cavalry on the battlefield of the future, for there was no true cavalry in Manchuria.

Nevertheless, these Cossacks were gallant fellows enough—witness their action in checking the Japanese advance for a whole day with their rifles and then counter-attacking on foot, lance in hand.*

Infantry.—The Russian infantry maintained its high reputation for steadiness under fire. Subjected to the severest trials, pitted against the picked and thoroughly trained Japanese infantry, it managed to stop the enemy's progress by bulldog tenacity, to retreat time after time without disintegration and to overcome difficulties of all imaginable kinds.

This was the result of race characteristics. The Russian infantryman in Manchuria preserved intact the tradition of bravery bequeathed by those stern soldiers who extorted the admiration of Frederick the Great's Prussians and the *grognards* of Napoleon.

Training.—When the infantry is good the army ought to be good, for it is by the quality of its infantry that one judges the qualities of a race.

* The lance had just been served out; and not being expert in its use on horseback, they used it pike fashion on foot.

The Russians might therefore have had good cavalrymen, good gunners, and good infantry in Manchuria, had the technical instruction of each arm and the tactical instruction of the whole been conducted with a view to readiness for war.

But horse, foot, and artillery could not work together, could not combine their efforts for the achievement of the object fixed by the tactical situation.

Our autumn manœuvres have many enemies. Every year certain writers, who do not rate their own tactical judgment sufficiently modestly, proclaim that these manœuvres serve no good end, and only give a false idea of war.

Armies that do not have autumn manœuvres content themselves with drill-ground evolutions, ceremonial parades, and kit inspections. The energy of the leaders, not being directed towards matters of war by the work of preparing and carrying out manœuvres on a large scale, soon begins to expend itself solely on matters of detail. Their subordinates, naturally taking the line of least resistance, stay in barracks and forget that their chief business is to be men of war.

It was thus in France before 1870. The sons of the incomparable soldiers of the First Empire had forgotten what war is, and it needed that hard lesson to shake us out of our torpor. It was in a similar frame of mind that the East Siberian troops presented themselves on the field of battle in Manchuria; more fortunate than ourselves, they had not to lose a part of their motherland as the price of their blunders.

The higher leading.—The Russian generals were ignorant of the virtues of the offensive, although Dragomirov had proclaimed them with his powerful voice and Skobelev had practised them.

The offensive is not within the capacity of all troops, nor within that of every general.

As regards the troops, it requires ease of movement, handiness of manœuvre, and co-operation amongst all concerned. In the chief it demands a force of character which, as events were to show, General Kuropatkin did not possess.

In his orders Kuropatkin constantly talks of the offensive. But he never seriously took it, as the Sha-ho irrefutably proves. It is not with words, it is not with a policy of "no risks," that one takes the offensive, but with powerful means violently flung into the battle by a chief who stakes everything on the issue.

The Russian general kept his "powerful means" in the background for show. In so far as he sent them to the front he distributed them by dribbets, not to attack, but to pacify his own and his subordinates' anxieties. He delegated to his subordinates the offensive which he himself never assumed. The moment a move was begun his imaginative spirit saw its dangers, and his character did not enable him to override his scruples. And thus it came about that no manœuvre was ever pushed to extremes.

In his hands the Russian army would avoid anything worse than semi-defeats, and could never be victorious.

A further aggravation of the state of ataxia produced in the army by its incapacity to manœuvre was the division of the command amongst several heads.

The proper commander-in-chief of the Army of Manchuria, upon whom rested the responsibility and in whom centred all hopes, was Kuropatkin. To carry out his difficult task he had need of an entirely free hand in the formation and execution of his projects. The entire control of the troops quartered in the Far East should have been given to him.

But it was not given to him. Kuropatkin was placed under the control of Admiral Alexeiev, the Namyestnik, or Viceroy, of the Far East; and this Viceroy, in order to avoid being ruled by one powerful subordinate, distributed the command amongst several.

Kuropatkin had the Army of Manchuria under his orders, Linevich commanded the Ussuri Corps, Volkov the Ussuri coast defences, Makárov the fleet. Stessel had under his orders the governor of Port Arthur and the commander of the Mobile Defence Corps of Kuantung, and himself reported both to Kuropatkin and to the Viceroy.

This diffusion of authority was destined to lead to friction and ill-defined limits of responsibility, and these in turn exercised the worst possible influence upon the conduct of operations.

It must be added that all these authorities were connected with St. Petersburg by a telegraph that was rarely silent and sometimes imperative.

All these things deprived the Russian army of a great part of its powers.

Effective Strength.—We turn now from considerations of quality to those of quantity. We have already seen (p. 34) that at the moment of opening hostilities the Russians had in the Far East * some 80,000 men. These formed eight East Siberian brigades, and two brigades belonging to the European establishment.† A ninth East Siberian brigade was about to arrive at the front.‡

But these 80,000 men were far from being all available, for—

(a) At Port Arthur the garrison of the fortress was formed by the 7th East Siberian Brigade, the Mobile Defence Corps by the 4th E.S. Brigade.

(b) At Vladivostok the 8th E.S. Brigade formed the garrison, the 2nd E.S. Brigade the outer de-

* See Map I.

† 2/31st of the X Corps, 2/35th of the XVII.—Tu.

‡ The *East Siberian* troops were called "Rifles," "Rifle Brigades," and "Rifle Divisions," and numbered separately from the line of the army. Their organization differed in details—especially in the fact that the regiments were of three battalions instead of four. An East Siberian division, therefore, was one-quarter weaker in infantry than a Siberian or European.

The *Siberian* (that is, practically, West Siberian) troops were also numbered in a separate series, but organized exactly as European units.

The *European* troops went out to the Far East by brigades, divisions, and corps, keeping their original numbering.

In this volume, East Siberian troops are designated by the abbreviation *E.S.* ; Siberian troops by that of *Sib.* ; European units simply by their numbers.

It is to be noted that whether composed of East or West Siberians or both, and even if it contains a European admixture, the *Army Corps* is always "*Siberian*"—unless, of course, it is one of the European corps brought over complete.—Tu.

fence (one regiment of the latter, the 5th E.S.,* was at Port Arthur, where it stayed, distinguishing itself at Nanshan).

(c) To guard the Trans-Siberian and the Harbin district the 5th E.S. Brigade was still required; its 17th E.S. regiment was quartered at Harbin, 18th at Ninguta, 19th at Iman, 20th at Tsi-tsi-har.

The mobile field army, therefore, could at the outset be made up only of the six remaining brigades:

(a) The 3rd E.S. Brigade: In the second half of 1903 this had been in garrison in the Kuantung; in January 1904 it had been moved to the Yalu, where it was when the campaign opened. The Trans-Baikal Cossack Brigade (General Mishchenko) had been sent to the Yalu at the same time, to watch Korea.

(b) The 9th E.S. Brigade: This, still incompletely organized, was in the Niuchwang—Mukden region, watching the coast about Niuchwang.

(c) The 6th E.S. Brigade: This was available, but two of its regiments, 21st E.S., Blagoveshensk, and 24th, E.S., Khabarovsk, were quartered on the Amur, far from the Harbin—Vladivostok line; the 21st had to march 360 miles by road to reach the railway. The 22nd and 23rd were at Vladivostok.

(d) The 1st E.S. Brigade: Available, and concentrated complete at Vladivostok.

(e) The two European brigades: These were, in

* This is the regiment whose experiences are told by its Colonel, General Tretyakov, in *Port Arthur and Nanshan* (London: Hugh Rees, Ltd., 1911).—Tr.

the first instance, detailed by Admiral Alexeiev to guard the Vladivostok region. This port was not in a state of defence; it was part of Russia's own territory, and, moreover, it was the only port in the Far East which could be entered by a fleet at low tide. Hence its preservation was imperative, and it was necessary to give it a very strong garrison until its fortifications should have been placed in a condition to resist attack.

(f) The Ussuri Cossack Brigade was available, and quartered in the Vladivostok region.

So long as the 5th E.S. Brigade was not relieved of its railway-guarding duties, Kuropatkin could only put in the field four East Siberian and perhaps two European brigades.

These East Siberian "rifle brigades" each included four regiments of two battalions. At the outbreak of war it was decided that each brigade should expand into a division, the regiments receiving third battalions.* It became necessary, therefore, to bring up the eight battalions of each brigade or division to war strength by bringing up reservists, and these had to come from great distances and, in many cases, lived far from the railway. It was necessary, moreover, to make up four new battalions per division, and these, formed in Europe, had to be slowly brought over by the Trans-Siberian, which, as we have seen, could not deal with more than 20,000 to 30,000 men a month at this early stage of the war.

Lastly, as the outbreak of war caught the East Siberian troops in the act of rearming their

* See footnote above (p. 82).

artillery and bringing up the guns for the Port Arthur forts, the output of the railway in men was still further limited by the demands made on it for the transport of *matériel*.

If the dispersion of the squadron between Port Arthur, Vladivostok, and Chemulpo was a grave mistake from the point of view of naval operations, its effects upon the strength of the field army on land were equally deplorable.

Two naval bases had to be fortified, armed, and guarded—hence the strain on the railway was doubled, and two garrisons had to be found at the expense of the field force.

The forces as they existed in peace had been distributed in two main groups—7th, 4th, and 3rd E.S. Brigades at Port Arthur; 8th, 2nd, 1st E.S. and the two European Brigades at Vladivostok.

Well might Kuropatkin write in his memoirs, “we were scattered everywhere and powerful nowhere.”

Organization.—On March 28, 1904, Kuropatkin arrived at Mukden. The various corps had not completed their mobilization, but Manchuria had not been, and was not as yet likely to be, invaded by the Japanese. The only hindrance to the transport of troops, therefore, was the smallness of the railway's capacity. The protection of the Trans-Siberian being assured, the European reinforcements could be counted upon in full, without deductions.

As the source of these reinforcements was inexhaustible, and as the government had fully decided to send to Manchuria all the troops that might be required, an unstinted supply of men could be reckoned upon, while, on the contrary, Japan's effective was strictly limited by the smallness of her resources in trained men.

For the present, all that was necessary was to allow the mobilization to proceed, and to organize the troops as they were mobilized.

By the end of April the 7th and 4th E.S. Brigades had evolved into divisions, and formed the Port Arthur Corps, under General Stessel. The 9th Brigade, now the 9th E.S. Division, had been joined by the old 1st Brigade, now 1st Division, from Vladivostok, and became the Southern Group, or 1 Siberian Corps (General Stackelberg). On and after April 22 the 3rd and 6th E.S. Divisions formed the Eastern Detachment, under General Zasulich.

From the European brigades (which, not without difficulty, Kuropatkin managed to get placed at his disposal) and from the former 5th Brigade (5th E.S. Division) he made up the II Sib. Corps, commanded at the outset by General Vassiliyev. The 2nd and 8th E.S. Divisions formed the Vladivostok garrison.

By thus utilizing his whole force, Kuropatkin was able, after deducting garrisons, to put into field three army corps, but no more.

Numerical Superiority.—By the end of April the Russian general had arranged his cards in the

Far East. Additional cards had been promised him, and it was now his business to consider the lines of action which would enable him, on some future day, to play his hand with the certainty of winning that numerical superiority would give him.

"It is an axiom accepted in all ages, that the chief problem of the art of war—in which what we call chance has a part—consists in being the stronger at the decisive point.

"All means employed aim at this object.

"The complete victory of the numerically weaker side is not indeed an impossibility, but it is rare, and in most cases, especially when the strengths are very disproportionate, falls to the lot only of a very great genius who can handle the implements of war in an especially brilliant fashion.

"Numerical preponderance does not simply act by superior physical weight. It influences in advance the freedom of manœuvre and the resolution of the commander who has it, while it produces a paralysing effect on the other side unless the leader thereof, in virtue of pre-eminent force of character, can put out of his mind the anxieties it engenders."*

Kuropatkin believed himself to be in a position to choose between two strategies—the one suggesting that he should, with the small force at his disposal, attack each of the Japanese armies as it disembarked on the mainland, the other that he

* General v. Falkenhause, *The Strategy and Tactics of the Armed Masses of the Twentieth Century*.

should avoid taking the field until the arrival of army corps from Russia assured him numerical superiority.

He chose the latter, and with good reason. "No operations will be undertaken before we have an assured superiority in numbers," he declared.

To the question, "What will be the strength of the Russian army at the moment of battle?" Kuropatkin's reply is of course "The settlement of the number of men to be given me is not my affair; but I shall not fight until I have an assured preponderance."

The commander-in-chief cannot demand quality. Quality is the product of peace-time, and when war comes he must fight with what he has. But he can have quantity on his side, and quantity he demands.

C. THE FACTOR OF SPACE

The theatre of war in the Far East was not part of Russian national territory. The interests that would suffer in an invasion of it by the Japanese were chiefly Chinese interests. There was no risk of the Russian people being downtrodden by a conqueror.

If Kuropatkin put back the point of concentration for his army to the northward, Russian public opinion could not allege any particular grievance.

In 1870, upon learning that the French army had been despatched to the frontier without waiting for mobilization, Moltke believed that it was about to take the offensive, and he put back the points of concentration of the main Prussian

armies towards Mainz, in order not to have to fight before he was in a numerical superiority.

It was much easier for Kuropatkin to step back than for Moltke to do so, for the Russian general could choose the concentration point of his army as he pleased—Mukden or Harbin—without in any event risking the violation of Russian territory.

At Harbin, moreover, he would have been quite free to use the two European brigades; he would have found himself in the midst of the 5th E.S. Division and the reinforcements that the railway was bringing from Europe would have joined him all the sooner.

Lastly, a concentration there, more than 600 miles from the Liao-Tung, Niuchwang, Takushan, and the Yalu, could not possibly have been interfered with by the Japanese for many months.

In short, it was absolutely safe.

Distance is the best means of protection. No breakdown of covering troops, no sudden attack in overpowering force on frontier fortresses, impairs its effectiveness.

When Moltke, in 1870, feared an irruption of the French army into the Palatinate, it was distance that he summoned to his aid to protect the concentration of his armies.

He has been criticized for not having had recourse to protective troops. But what a mass of protective troops he would have had to station on the frontier to cover the Palatinate against the whole French army assembled at Metz and Strass-

burg! The entire peace strength of the Prussian army would not have been over-large for the task.

To-day, if the French army were to move on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier without mobilizing, hence with an advantage over its adversary of the several days that mobilization requires, the Germans would still have recourse to distance for the protection of their concentration zone. As in 1870, it would be behind the Rhine that they would mass the numerous active and reserve corps of their field army. The study of German publications leaves no doubts on the point.

One would therefore imagine that General Kuropatkin would call upon distance to aid him in assembling his forces, and would begin his southward march only when the assembled forces reached the required figure.

An adequate railway engineer corps following the army could, with the aid of *matériel* prepared beforehand, easily make good the damage that in the interval the Japanese might have done to the railway.

In this roadless region the Japanese army would inevitably be placed astride the Port Arthur—Harbin railway. There it would be found, and the weight of Russia's unlimited numbers would have crushed it.

Every month that distance enabled him to gain gave Kuropatkin 30,000 fresh men—this figure, in fact, improved to 40,000 in September and 100,000 in January. Now, many months must have elapsed ere the Japanese army could have compelled an army at Harbin to give battle.

Why, then, as he did not wish to fight until he was in superior force, did not Kuropatkin fix Harbin as the point of assembly for the army?

In this amphibious war, naval considerations of great weight handicapped the armies, of both sides alike, at the outset.

The Japanese army had to see the war begin at a moment when the coast-line of Manchuria was unapproachable.

On the Russian side, it was the squadron that prevented Kuropatkin from using distance to enable him to concentrate and augment his mass of manœuvre in security. It was to be the squadron that produced the escapade of Te-li-ssu, where the I Sib. Corps barely escaped destruction.

For the squadron had taken refuge in a very bad harbour, where ingress and egress were only possible at high tide, one too which possessed no docks or equipment to deal with large repairs. And above all, it had sheltered in a fortress which was not in a condition to afford it shelter.

Money had been lavished on Dalny, the commercial port. At Port Arthur only the coast batteries were completed. The landward defences were utterly inadequate; one only of the forts had been finished, another was in progress, and the rest were in the drawing-office. A Russian staff-officer, as Kuropatkin himself tells us, affirmed that the place could be stormed without firing a shot. Admiral Alexeiev, who journeyed to and fro between Port Arthur and Mukden, declared that

the place was in a very bad condition. Stessel rang the alarm bell incessantly.

The fall of Port Arthur would, *ipso facto*, involve the almost certain destruction of the squadron, the damage that it had already sustained having placed it in a position of great inferiority to Admiral Togo's fleet.

Thus, to the mistake of separating the Russian Far Eastern squadron into two portions—a mistake that tied up four divisions of the land army—there was added another and a not less serious error, that of neglecting to assure the inviolability of the ports by building the necessary defences.

Thanks, then, to peace-time improvidence, the military strategy was confronted with a problem of extraordinary difficulty.

To concentrate in security, it was advisable to put the area of concentration farther back. To assist the squadron in its place of refuge, the army had to be placed farther forward.

Thus it came about that Liao-Yang was chosen as the point of concentration.

It was impossible to be nearer to Port Arthur—*i.e.* farther forward—since the command of the sea allowed Japan to disembark her armies at Niuchwang and the Yalu. On the other hand, it was dangerous to be farther back, for even Liao-Yang was about 300 miles from the fortress by which the army had to regulate its operations.

D. THE FACTOR OF TIME

Kuropatkin, further, was condemned to endure the slowness of the Trans-Siberian.

Here was another heavy handicap on strategy—the peace-time error of not giving the railway a working capacity commensurate with the military demands that general policy might have to make upon it.

Deprived of his 4th E.S. Division, which had to be left at Port Arthur to supplement the normal garrison (7th E.S. Division) owing to the weakness of the defences ; deprived of the 2nd E.S. Division, which had to stay with the 8th E.S. Division at Vladivostok for the same reason, Kuropatkin could reckon that, with the given output of the Trans-Siberian railway, it would not be until August that he would have the numerical superiority for which his strategy asked.

He said so explicitly. “No operations will be undertaken without an assured numerical superiority. Nothing must take place before August.”

It would therefore be necessary to wait some months before being able to accept or to compel a battle. It was March, and nothing was to happen till August—five months to be gained.

The enemy would not give these five months gratis, for he would know perfectly well what the Russians stood to gain by delay. It would be necessary to impose this delay.

Now, as we have seen, the weakness of the field army suggested that its concentration point should be put back, while the weakness of Port Arthur

compelled the army to go no farther away than Liao-Yang. The small available *space*, in these conditions, did not ensure the necessary time for the concentration of the forces that Strategy desired to use.

As space could not give this time, it was for force—*i.e.* the immediately available troops—to gain it.

“When the enemy has the strategic initiative,” says General Bonnal, “the principle of protective manœuvre—of operating in one position after another without ever allowing one’s self to be gripped or outflanked—is the only one which allows of a subsequent offensive with superior forces at the chosen time and place.”

The chosen place—it was Hobson’s choice—was Liao-Yang, the chosen time was August. The need of gaining time imposed a shifting resistance in one position after another—*i.e.* “protective manœuvre.”

E. ORGANIZATION OF THE PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS

How to avoid battle is a problem that has very often been solved in military history.

It was by avoiding battle in 1812 that Russia conquered the “God of War.”

Had not Port Arthur riveted Kuropatkin to Liao-Yang it would have been by avoiding an engagement that he would have gained his respite, and in August he would have taken the field with an army superior in numbers, whose ardour had not been damped by previous reverses.

Battle is the normal thing for an army, its *raison*

d'être, the end to which all its training is directed. It is simple enough to deliver battle, therefore, the difficulty lies in winning it. In August the Russians had reason to hope that the chances would be distinctly in their favour owing to their numerical preponderance.

But avoiding battle while at the same time giving it, entering upon an action with the fixed purpose of evading its consequences, is no light matter. A shifting resistance is so dangerous a business that many soldiers, amongst them some of the most thoughtful, refuse to consider it, and declare it to be an impossibility.

To many it seems as if nothing can be worse than to curb the combative energy of the troops. Long ago, at Pharsalia, Pompey forfeited his chances of victory by restraining the ardour of his men. "Pompey damped the vigour that the onward rush lends to the soldiers' blows. He extinguished the ardour whence springs the enthusiasm and warlike fire of the combatants' soul; for the shock of engagement inflames more and more the courage set alight by the charge and the cheers. In a word, he deadened and chilled the hearts of his soldiers." Such was Cæsar's judgment, as handed down to us by Plutarch.

The temptation is strong, therefore, to admit but two forms of battle, the offensive battle and the defensive battle. The only resource of the beaten side in either case is to try to gain a long start to the rear by a smart and well-organized retreat.

These straightforward forms must, indeed, be adopted wherever it is possible to do so.

But protective troops, upon whom devolves the responsibility of covering the concentration area of the main armies, and of restricting as much as possible the loss of national territory when the invaders advance in superior force—these can by no means confine themselves to the downright defence of positions. They would be crushed on the positions they defended, or else the main army would have to advance to disengage them before it was fully assembled.

When Napoleon turned to crush Blücher's army at Montmirail, Vauchamps, and Champaubert, he left a minimum containing force opposite Schwarzenberg's army on the Paris road, with the mission of retarding the enemy's advance without allowing itself to be crushed. He repeated this procedure a little later, when he pushed on against Blücher as far as Laon.

In March 1904—not from choice, but owing to the errors of policy—Kuropatkin was driven to employ a protective force to gain time till August.

This meant that the Eastern Detachment towards the Yalu, the Southern towards Yingkou, were to be called upon to manœuvre protectively in advance of the main mass assembling at Liao-Yang. These detachments would have to feign battle and then evade it. Leaders and soldiers alike would be called upon for their maximum effort during a given time, only to be told, when time was up, "That's enough, let us be off." On the next day, possibly on the same day, it would be necessary to make a fresh call upon them for the efforts that had just been declared futile.

Such a procedure requires troops of unusual *moral*, leaders of rare manœuvring skill. It is easy to understand why France has sacrificed so much for the benefit of the protective troops on her eastern frontier.

The excellent troops that Russia kept on her western frontier, in view of a possible conflict with the Power whose sword-point is always sharp and threatening, might have solved the protective problem.

The garrison corps of Siberia would have required chiefs of the very first quality to direct them in their manœuvres, instead of which they had Zasulich, the stout soldier for whom retreat was dishonourable—Zasulich, who for years had been a provincial governor, far from the camps where manœuvres are practised, and the libraries of military history where the lessons of the masters can be studied.

It is not the protective manœuvre itself, but the manner of its organization and execution that stands condemned by its deplorable results in Manchuria.

The manœuvre was imposed by the general situation. It had to be accepted, and handled so as to produce the desired effect. And this demanded a knowledge of its principles.

It is better, of course, to learn "how to do it" than "how not to do it," and we should learn much by placing ourselves in the Japanese camp and seeing how General Kuroki prepared and executed the passage of the Yalu.

But the Japanese were never obliged to have recourse to protective manœuvring, and it has to be studied somehow. Above all, it has to be studied in connection with modern armament—far-ranging, rapid-firing rifles, and quick-firing guns, or at any rate semi-quickfirers, capable of indirect laying. These characteristics of present-day weapons open up to “manœuvring in retreat” possibilities that were formerly wanting.

The manœuvre of the Yalu, seen from the Russian camp, may therefore be extremely instructive, and we shall study it.

Protective Troops and Mass of Manœuvre.—On April 18 neither Port Arthur nor Vladivostok had yet been attacked by land or by sea. The defence works under construction were becoming formidable, their arming went on day by day. The garrison of each comprised two divisions.

Kuropatkin had been deprived of four of his divisions to assure the safety of these places, and he thought that this sacrifice was sufficient. But other personages did not think so—in particular Admiral Alexeiev, and still more General Stessel.

To ensure the safety of his manœuvre should be every general's first care, whatever the problem he is dealing with and whatever the force at his disposal. An insufficiently organized protective system brings about the collapse of even the most skilfully framed manœuvre, while a protective system that absorbs too much of the available force paralyses the mass of manœuvre and so foredooms it to failure.

General Stessel was wanting in confidence, and

did not believe that Port Arthur could endure a siege that would be prolonged until August at the earliest. On his demand, therefore, the 4th E.S. Division and the 5th E.S. Rifle Regiment were retained at Port Arthur, in addition to the normal garrison (7th E.S. Division). But this was not all. Time after time he called for help, and his cries had to be heeded.

This is very frequently met with in military history, and falls within the domain of psychology rather than in that of tactics. Each one desires laurels for himself infinitely more than he desires to share the laurels that reward an effort in common. The stronger one's force, the better one's chance of winning these individual laurels.

The commander of the mass is prone to give up as little as possible of it, and so to assign inadequate forces to the protective detachments, while the leader of a protective corps never believes that he is strong enough.

Economy of force consists, in practice, of allotting to each his fair share and no more than his fair share. Put in another way, it is a just combination of the factors of space, time, and forces.

In this particular case, Kuropatkin's judgment was that, so far as Vladivostok and Port Arthur were concerned, the state of the fortifications and the strength of the garrisons were sufficient to guarantee the security of his operations up to August or September, the date at which Fate would have delivered its definitive judgment.

Reassured on this score, he next took measures to

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assure the unchecked inflow of his own reinforcements. To this he told off the 1st E.S. Division, which (relieving the 5th) was écheloned along the railway to give absolute protection against Chunchuses, or pseudo-Chunchuses—Japanese officers and soldiers in disguise, so says rumour.

The security of the theatre of operations being assured, it remained to form the operative mass and to bar the ways of access to it by protective detachments.

Liao-Yang, the point chosen for the assembly of the coming troops, is about 125 miles from the Yalu and Takushan, and 75 from Yingkou, the most likely points for the Japanese landing.

The II Sib. Corps was concentrated there, prepared the necessary quarters and establishments for the troops to follow, and organized the town defensively against the emergency of a sudden Japanese attack.

Liao-Yang is at the fork of the two principal routes upon which the protective forces were placed, and this would enable the mass of manœuvre rapidly to close up on whichever of these forces might have the decisive part to play.

On this date,* April 18, the Southern Detachment was in the Kaiping—Niuchwang—Ta-shih-chiao region. Its strength was about two divisions, and its mobilization was very little short of complete.

The Eastern Detachment (General Kashtalinski) was on the Yalu. At present it consisted only of

* Map II.

the 3rd E.S. Division (late 3rd Brigade), and its four regiments had only two battalions each, the third battalions having only left Liao-Yang between April 10 and 16. The 6th E.S. Division, called up from Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveschenk,* only came to Feng-huang-cheng with two of its regiments (22nd and 24th E.S.). The 23rd was watching the road Liao-Yang—Chyang-syang at Sai-ma-chi.† The 21st was with General Mishchenko, whose four regiments of Cossacks watched the front of the Yalu.

When complete in all arms the Eastern Protective Detachment was to comprise two infantry divisions and four regiments of mounted troops (Cossacks).

Its zone of manœuvre, the space from the Yalu to Liao-Yang, we have seen, was 125 miles, and included, besides numerous other lines of defence, two great barrages, the Yalu and the crest of the Fen-shui-ling mountains.

The time still to be gained was between three and four months.

Mission of the Eastern Protective Detachment.—On April 18 Kashtalinski received from headquarters at Liao-Yang the following telegram :

“The hostile army reported towards Wiju comprises the Guard, the 2nd, the 12th, and perhaps the 6th Division. Further, the 1st and 3rd Divisions, which are known to have left Japan, will very likely disembark at the mouth of the Yalu.

“The mission of the Eastern Detachment is to

* Map I.

† Map II.

make use of the advantages of the ground to check the enemy in his passage of the Yalu, and again on the Fen-shui-ling chain, and also to determine his strength, dispositions, and lines of march.

“ Avoid any decisive engagement against superior forces, so as not to risk defeat before the junction of the Detachment and the main army.

“ In the event of its falling back from the Yalu, the principal group of the Detachment will retire on the Mo-tien-ling and Fen-shui-ling West passes, taking care to bar the flanking passes against turning movements, especially towards the south.”

According to this document, then, Kuropatkin intended to make use of the force of the Eastern Detachment, for he desired it to “check” the enemy’s passage of the Yalu and the passes. It may engage, on condition that it does not become committed to a decisive action against superior forces.

Long ago Clausewitz had observed : “ In a *daily measured resistance*, the action ought only to be sustained for so long as the decision still wavers. One preserves one’s self from defeat by giving up the contest at the right moment.”

Blume, in his book on strategy, says similarly : “ Although in the *defensive in retreat* our object is to avoid the decision until the situation has changed in our favour, we must not neglect to employ the combat as a means of weakening the enemy’s forces.”

For General Bonnal, the principle is to “take up one position after another without ever allowing one’s self to be gripped or enveloped.”

Kuropatkin's order of April 18 and the theories of Clausewitz, Blume, and Bonnal are thus at one.

The necessity for resistance is felt the more in proportion as the *space* at the disposal of the protective force is smaller, and the *time* it has to gain longer.

The Eastern Detachment disposed of 120 miles to retreat over, but it had to gain three or four months, *i.e.* to reduce the enemy's average rate of progress to about a mile a day.

If the enemy is reckless, and attacks without taking the necessary time to arrange the combination of all his troops on the battlefield—that is, in the spirit of a victor who has only to beat an already shaken enemy—one must not “neglect to employ fighting,” as Blume observes, to make him pay for his imprudence.

If, on the other hand, the enemy, wishing to eliminate the factor of luck, begins with long and careful reconnaissances, and then proceeds to group all his forces so as to deploy them for a great envelopment, it is the decisive battle that he intends and is preparing to bring about. Such a battle, Kuropatkin, Clausewitz, Blume, Bonnal tell us, must be avoided. Kuropatkin's despatch of April 18 says explicitly, “Avoid any decisive engagement against superior forces.”

The capacity for resistance becomes the greater in proportion as the ground presents more barriers and lines of defence.

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In this regard General Kuropatkin was very fortunately situated. The Yalu was a considerable obstacle; behind it at frequent intervals were defensible barriers; and farther back still the Fen-shui-ling chain enabled the defenders to gain time without having to deliver battle against very much larger numbers, for in mountain country it is difficult for numbers to find effective employment.

Further, it goes without saying that the capacity of resistance varies with the strength of the protective force employed. The danger of being turned becomes less and less in proportion as one has more troops, and so can extend the front and cover the flanks without at the same time unduly dispersing the means at one's disposal.

So long as Kashtalinski had with him on the Yalu but the 3rd E.S. Brigade (8 battalions), the situation was perilous. But when the brigade had expanded into a division of 12 battalions, and when Mishchenko's cavalry and the 6th E.S. Infantry Division had arrived, the task of the Eastern Detachment became more and more easy. If the enemy had only the Guard, 2nd, and 12th Divisions the odds against it would only be three to two. If, as seemed probable, the 6th Japanese Division joined the other three, the task became rather more difficult; while if the worst case befell and the two other divisions (1st and 3rd) joined the first four, then it would be unsafe to count on a thoroughly effective resistance on each of the barrier-lines between the Yalu and Liao-Yang.

The leader of a protective force, therefore, has to

base his decisions on the distance that he can afford to lose, the time that he is obliged to gain, the character of the country which he has to manœuvre, the forces at his disposal and the forces at the enemy's. Every advantage and disadvantage has to be weighed exactly for the given case, and only he can do so who is a tactician of the first water, and moreover has thoroughly familiarized himself with the principle and its workings.

Zasulich on the Yalu.—General Zasulich, appointed to the command of the Eastern Detachment on April 12, arrived at Tien-tzu * on the 22nd. He came direct from Warsaw, with no knowledge whatever of the situation or of the troops placed under his orders. Like nearly all Russian officers at the outset of the war, he had a low opinion of the enemy's army.

He had been away from military duty for some years as a provincial governor, and his tactical ideas had become somewhat confused.

At the moment of his taking up the command the Japanese had been along the opposite bank of the river for a fortnight.

The composition and distribution of the Eastern Detachment was as follows: †

(a) The 3rd and 6th E.S. Divisions formed a curtain about 14 miles in length, supported by a strong reserve. The right of the curtain was near Antung, the left between the Yalu and the Ai-ho, the reserve at Tien-tzu, about 4 miles to

* Three and a half miles north-west of Antung. Map IV.

† See Map II.

the rear. One battalion 24th E.S. Regiment was écheloned along the Antung—Liao-Yang road, patrolling and mending it.

(b) On the right flank, General Mishchenko, with the 1st Verkhne-Udinsk (less 1 sotnia) and Chita Cossack regiments, the 21st E.S. Regiment, and two batteries (1st Trans-Baikal H.A., 1st Battery 6th E.S. Artillery *)—total $2\frac{3}{4}$ —11—2 † was watching the coast-line from Pi-tzu-wo to the Yalu, with instructions to fall back if necessary towards Feng-huang-cheng. He was to report any Japanese disembarkation within his zone of surveillance, and to hinder the enemy's advance on and after disembarkation so as to give the Yalu troops time to withdraw.

(c) On the left flank, Colonel Trukhin, with the 1st Argun and the Ussuri (less 1 sotnia) Cossacks, one battalion 24th E.S. Regiment, one mountain battery (total 1—11—1), watched the Yalu from An-ping-ho ‡ to Chyang-syang § and beyond, connecting on his right with the main body and on his left with Lieutenant-Colonel Madritov's detachment, which was towards Cho-san. ||

(d) The 23rd E.S. Regiment was at Sai-ma-chi barring the (ill-conditioned) road which from Chyang-syang leads towards Liao-Yang.

(e) Two companies 24th E.S. Regiment main-

* Except when otherwise stated, the Russian field or mountain battery has 8 guns, the horse battery 6.

† Whenever this abbreviated notation appears, it implies battalions—squadrons or sotnias—batteries in this order.—Tr.

‡ Eight and a half miles above Wiju.

§ Where the Liao-Yang—Sai-ma-chi road crosses the Yalu, 35 miles above Wiju.—Tr.

|| On the Yalu, about 45 miles above Chyang-syang.—Tr.

tained communication between Mishchenko's force and Hai-cheng.

All these forces—horse, foot, and guns, divisions, brigades, and regiments—were practically under the direct control of General Kuropatkin, who placed every one by telegraph. It was he who posted the general reserve of the Detachment at Tien-tzu * and fixed its composition (6-0-2); placed at Antung $3\frac{1}{2}$ battalions and 1 battery (10th E.S. Regiment, 2 companies / 24th E.S. Regiment, 2nd battery / 6th E.S. Artillery) under Colonel Schwerin, and gave Kashtalinski, for the defence of the Chiu-lien-cheng—Telegraph Hill region, 4 battalions and 1 battery (12th E.S. Regiment, II/11th E.S. Regiment, 2/6th E.S. Artillery). He allowed General Trusov, the commander of the 6th E.S. Division, only the 22nd E.S. Regiment and the 3/6th E.S. Artillery, for the defence of the Ma-kou—Ching-kou region.

The general scheme of these dispositions was sound.

The main body of the protective force was astride the line of communication between the Yalu and Liao-Yang, on which the enemy's attack must inevitably be delivered.

A support was posted at Tien-tzu, four to six miles behind the first line of resistance. The flanks were well protected and the country watched for a great distance beyond them.

A protective detachment 120 miles from the main body of the army had to be particularly

* See Map IV.

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careful to ensure the safety of its flanks, and it was very natural for the main protective group to give up the whole of one of its infantry regiments to support the cavalry brigades out on the flanks. "Do not let the enemy outflank you" is General Bonnal's recommendation. It was followed at the Yalu.

But if, instead of contenting ourselves with a bird's-eye view, we examine the details, the impression we receive is less favourable.

The principal group of the protective force, that between Antung and Ching-kou, is absolutely destitute of cavalry. Now, cavalry is quite indispensable upon so extended a battlefield as this.

The 23rd E.S. Regiment, too, is isolated at Saima-chi, where it cannot give the least assistance to General Trusov's command.*

Thus early in the campaign we may observe the tendency to disperse the forces, the divorce of the three arms, and the interference of the supreme command in details—vices that events were soon to chastise.

The Japanese 1st Army in Korea (Summary).—On February 8, 1904, four battalions of the 12th Japanese Division, at peace strength, disembarked at Chemulpo.† Two of them at once took train for Seoul; the other two, requisitioning local labour to assist them, set to work to make piers for the future disembarkation of the rest of their division.

* Left wing of main group.—Tr.

† See Map III.

Between February 17 and 21 the 12th Division, mobilized and on its war footing, landed at Chemulpo and set out by the Peking—Seoul (or Mandarin) Road, a track which the thaw soon broke up to such an extent that even the lightest vehicle stuck fast.

It took the 12th Division a month's painful marching to cover the 150 miles between Chemulpo and Ping-Yang (see Sketch Map III).

On March 10 the ice broke up, and it became possible to approach the Korean coast. On the 14th the Guard left Japan, landing at Chinampo. On the 29th the whole 1st Army was on Korean soil, 120 miles from the Yalu. General Kuroki was in command.

A cavalry engagement had taken place on the 28th, at the passage of the 'Ta-ing-kang.* The intervention of Japanese infantry caused the Cossacks to retire to the Yalu.

On April 5 the Japanese cavalry reached the left bank of the Yalu at Wiju; on the 8th the advanced guard arrived there in its turn; and on the 14th the whole 12th Division was up.

The march of the Japanese 1st Army had been watched since March 20 by Mishchenko's horsemen. On the 28th contact was sharply broken off, but on April 5 it was regained.

A flotilla showed itself at the mouth of the Yalu. Other forces had left Japan. Kuropatkin, in his despatch of April 18, notified the presence of three Japanese divisions, and perhaps a fourth, on the Yalu; stating, further, that the 1st and 3rd Divisions,

* A river crossing the Mandarin Road, five miles west of Anju.—Ta.

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which had left Japan, might be added to these forces.

F. THE MOMENT TO RETIRE

General Zasulich arrived at Tien-tzu on April 22. He was placed *au courant* with the mission of his detachment. He was informed of the directive of the 18th, given to Kashtalinski. The telegraph incessantly told him of Kuropatkin's wishes. In particular, two telegrams sent from headquarters on the 22nd dealt with the task of the protective corps.

On the 25th General Sakhárov, chief of staff to Kuropatkin, repeated his chief's injunctions thus :

"Supplementary to the directives already sent you regarding your rôle, viz. : to retard the enemy in his passage ; to determine his form, dispositions, and lines of march ; to retreat as slowly as possible on the mountains ; and to renew there the most obstinate resistance that your numbers admit of before you retreat,—the commander-in-chief orders," etc.

This conception of his rôle did not please General Zasulich, who answered to the order to manœuvre in retreat in this fashion :

"His Majesty has made me a Knight of the Order of St. George, and I do not retreat." *

Kuropatkin and Zasulich did not speak in the same tongue, and the collision of their antagonistic doctrines produced inconceivable confusion. Kuropatkin disposed the troops by telegraph, in view of a shifting rearguard-wise resistance. Zasulich

* *Revue militaire des Armées étrangères.*

employed the troops, disposed as they were, in a fixed and obstinate defensive battle.

As for Zasulich, not even the defeat of his brave troops enlightened him. After the battle of the Yalu he said * :

“I deplore these losses personally, but I do not repent of having thought it my duty to decide upon fighting against a superior adversary, so as to show him that we were not afraid of him, and to make him meditate seriously on what would happen to him when we should have assembled our forces.”

On the 14th the whole of the Japanese 12th Division was concentrated about Wiju. On the 21st the rest of the army began to come in; on the 25th the whole 1st Army was assembled on the left bank of the Yalu, resting after its march.†

The Russians, from the amphitheatre formed by the Chiu-lien-cheng—Ma-kou hills and the Hushan ranges, could see this ant-heap growing and growing, yet unable, it seemed, to bring itself to attack. The Russian guns from time to time opened fire from Telegraph Hill (Suribachiyama) on those groups of the Japanese which showed themselves. The Japanese made no reply. They lay low, doing at night such work as it was unsafe to do by day.

But on the 26th the 12th Division sent out

* *Lectures at the Nikolai Staff College* (French translation, *Conférences faites*, etc. H. C. Lavauzelle et Cie).

† See Map IV.

a detachment to An-ping-ho. Colonel Trukhin, higher up stream, notified Kuropatkin, saying that his connection with Zasulich was endangered, and that he could no longer, therefore, both bar the Sai-ma-chi road (road from Chyang-syang to Liao-Yang) and keep in touch with the Eastern Detachment. Kuropatkin replied that he was to confine himself to the direct protection of the road Chyang-syang—Sai-ma-chi—Liao-Yang.*

Thus the left flank of the Eastern Detachment was about to be laid bare, and with the main body of the Detachment, the infantry and artillery, there was not one single cavalryman.†

The commander of the 6th E.S. Division, Trusov, one of whose regiments (the 22nd E.S., Col. Gromov) was on the Hu-shan mountains,‡ realized the danger and reported it to Zasulich. His message of 11 p.m., April 26, ran as follows: "The enemy is about to force the passage in superior strength by means of an enveloping movement against my front and left flank. I desire either reinforcements or permission to retire at the proper time."

The discretionary power thus asked for by General Trusov could hardly be delegated to a subordinate. It was for the officer commanding the protective force as a whole to decide when it was time to slip away.

The choice of the moment for retreat is the very crux of problems of this kind. The commander alone must take the responsibility for the decision.

* Map IV.

† Only the infantry mounted scout parties (see footnote below, p. 113) were available.—Tr.

‡ In the fork of the Yalu and Ai-Ho (Map IV).—Tr.

Already the result achieved, as regards containing effect, had been considerable. General Asada, with the Japanese advanced guard, had reached the Yalu on the 8th, and thus the mere presence of the Eastern Detachment had gained eighteen days. If General Zasulich wished to stay longer, to utilize the river barrier to its full extent, he must take thought for the protection of his left flank.

This could have been effected by calling in one of Colonel Trukhin's Cossack regiments, or by summoning a few sotnias of Mishchenko's command on the other flank. The course actually adopted was to swing back the left wing to the west bank of the Ai-ho. Colonel Gromov fell back, leaving only Lieut.-Colonel Linda with some infantry and mounted scouts* on the Hu-shan mountains.

On April 30, consequently, the Eastern Detachment was disposed as follows :

Of the *3rd E.S. Division*, the 9th E.S. Regiment, I, III/11th E.S., 2, 3/3rd E.S. Artillery were posted as general reserve, or rather as a support to cover the first line's retirement, at T'ien-tzu; the 10th E.S. Regiment and 1/3rd E.S. Art., under the orders of Colonel Schwerin of the Artillery, at Antung.

The 12th E.S. Regiment and II/11th E.S. Regiment were about Chiu-lien-cheng and Yao-kou

* These infantry mounted scouts (*Okhotniki*) are a speciality of the Russian army, and, being by degrees augmented considerably above the normal establishment, they played a great part in the war. See *British Official Reports*, vol. iii. p. 242.—Ta.

with the 2/6th E.S. Art. and a machine gun detachment.

Two companies 24th E.S. Regiment connected the Chiu-lien-cheng group, which Kashtalinski commanded, with Schwerin's Antung group.

The 6th *E.S. Division* was reduced to the 22nd E.S. Regiment, which occupied Ma-kou, Po-tien-tzu, and Ching-kou, one battalion at each place. The rest of the infantry was distributed in small portions here and there—21st E.S. with Mishchenko; 23rd at Sai-ma-chi; of the 24th half a battalion behind Mishchenko on the Taku-shan—Hai-cheng road, one battalion far back on the Liao-Yang road, half a battalion between Antung and Chiu-lien-cheng, as above mentioned, and the remaining battalion with Trukhin.

Of the divisional artillery (6th E.S. Art.), one battery was with Mishchenko, another with Kashtalinski, and General Trusov had only the 3/6th E.S. Art. at his disposal. This was posted, six guns at Ma-kou (Lieut.-Colonel Pokotilo), two at Ching-kou.

(N.B.—The fourth batteries of both divisions—newly formed on mobilization—had not yet joined.)

There were thus in all, on the riverside between Chiu-lien-cheng and Ching-kou, seven and a quarter battalions, two batteries, one machine gun detachment, and not a single sotnia.

On this day (30th), early in the morning, the Japanese 12th Division passed the Yalu on the side of the Hu-shan mountains (bridges about Sui-kuchin and An-ping-ho), pushing before them Lieut.-

Colonel Linda's scouts, who retired reporting the Japanese move.

At 10 a.m. the Telegraph Hill and Ma-kou batteries opened fire upon the groups of Japanese who were seen in the islands below. This cannonade was the daily amusement of the Russian infantryman, who delighted to watch his gunner comrade aim at one or another group of the busy ants in the islands, and cheered when a shell drove the Japanese to cover.

But to-day the boot was on the other leg. Scarcely had the two Russian batteries spoken when a sudden tornado of fire opened upon them.

Sheltered by their entrenchments, the latter continued their fire, but it was quite wild, and at 11.30 they were reduced to silence. At 1 p.m. they reopened fire. But in fifteen minutes they were again silenced, the battery on Telegraph Hill having one gun disabled.

By provoking this hurricane, however, the Russian batteries had gained a precious piece of information. The moment had come to retire.

The same evening Kashtalinski telegraphed to Zasulich to the following effect: "The bombardment of our position to-day by six siege guns and at least six field batteries went on from 2 a.m. to 5.30 p.m. No serious losses on our side. . . . It is to be presumed that their batteries will advance into the islands to-night, and they will then be able to deliver an effective fire on our trenches to-morrow.

"In these conditions we can only remain passive, exposed to losses the extent of which cannot easily

be guessed. In agreement with one of the commanders of sections of the line of defence, I think that we ought to occupy this evening, while there is yet time, the heights behind Chiu-lien-cheng, leaving on the present line of defence only outposts, which should retire at daybreak.

"I abstain from any comments on the strategical situation, which is better known to your Excellency than to me.

"The 2/6th E.S. Art. has had heavy losses. It was silenced in sixteen minutes." *

In war it is rarely indeed that an operation can be carried out in complete security and without any risks whatever. There is hardly a battle of which luck cannot turn the issue.

The skill of the commander consists in diminishing the unfavourable chances while augmenting those of success, in regulating the risks by the conditions of the moment.

In the given case, Zasulich might have asked himself on the 26th—the day on which the 12th Division, having forced the Yalu passage at An-ping-ho, separated him from Trukhin—whether the moment had not come to retire and find another opportunity for gaining time farther back.

On this day, the 26th, he could have retired without the slightest risk, and the results obtained, even at that time, were considerable. Since the 5th the Japanese cavalry, since the 8th General Asada's advanced guard, and since the 14th the whole 12th Division had been checked and forced

* *Rev. militaire des Armées étrangères*, Jan. 1903.

to concentrate. On the 14th the forces on each side were about equal. But by the 16th the Japanese were superior, and on the 21st they were overpoweringly superior, in numbers. From this time the situation of the protective force became critical.

When on the 26th an advanced guard of the 12th Division had mastered the passage of the river at An-ping-ho, the maintenance of the Detachment in immediate contact with forces so superior was perilous.

If the space available between the protective force and the main body's concentration point is very large, if it presents numerous natural lines of defence wherein temporary stands may be made, to remain too long on the initial position is a blunder, for it needlessly augments the risks.

If the time to be gained is great and there is little space to lose, then to stay a few days longer on the first barrage is perfectly justifiable, in that the risks, though increased, are only increased proportionately to the situation.

Before giving a definite opinion one would need to know the country between Liao-Yang and the Yalu—as Zasulich, who had just traversed it, might have known it. But it is fair to assume that in this broken and roadless country possible blocking positions were numerous.

In the present case we may take it that, in electing to stay on the Yalu after April 26, Zasulich augmented the risks.

But nevertheless it is established at the outset that, up to a point, a protective force manœuvring

in retreat can gain time at no risk whatever to itself, by the mere fact that it checks first the cavalry and then the infantry advanced guards, and, lastly, induces the main body to close up for action. By abandoning its position and taking up another sufficiently far behind, the protective force may employ the same factors of delay without increasing the factors of risk—and so on *du capo* each time.

If the enemy, harassed by this manœuvre, will not wait to concentrate, but attacks “just as he stands,” the protective force will have its opportunity of calling him sharply to order.

In the least favourable case, that in which the protective corps has much time to win and little space to lose, the risks incurred are naturally increased by the necessity of exploiting to the utmost the capacity of the ground one has.

If this was so in the present case, resistance beyond April 26 was justifiable. In that event it was essential that the greatest possible precautions should be taken against surprise. The preparation of a supporting line of resistance behind the first was of the first urgency, and the details of the change of position must be thoroughly worked out. The fact must be faced that the least negligence would mean disaster.

But when on April 30 the Japanese guns gave the signal of battle, when the 12th Division, marching upon the Hu-shan mountains, indicated that the enveloping movement was in progress, when, lastly, Kashtalinski gave his chief the tactical and suggested the strategical reasons for

immediate departure, then and no later ought Zasulich to have given the order to retreat.

If, as Kashtalinski wished, the Eastern Detachment had begun, at nightfall on the 30th, to fall back upon "the heights in rear of Chiu-lien-cheng, leaving only outposts on the present line of defence," then the retirement could have been executed without loss, whilst at the same time the Eastern Detachment could have prided itself upon having gained more than three weeks for its side.

Kashtalinski was not the only one who correctly appreciated the situation. Colonel Oranovski, Zasulich's chief staff officer, had been present at the bombardment of the Russian position. Returning to his chief later in the evening, he reported that not only Kashtalinski but every senior officer on the ground had asked for authority to retire from the bank of the Yalu under cover of the night. Thus the moment for the retirement to a second position had been correctly judged by every one.

In this instance, then, resistance to the eleventh hour involved no evil consequences. We cannot, therefore, regard the "manœuvre in retreat," *a priori*, as either impracticable or over-hazardous.

To the demand of his subordinates, however, Zasulich replied, "The General commanding the Detachment forbids the troops to abandon their positions on any pretext whatsoever." The only effect of Colonel Oranovski's report was to convince him that the troops were wanting in *moral*, and he decided to go himself to Chiu-lien-cheng in the

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early morning in order to stimulate their courage by his presence.

The "doctrine" was beyond this general's ken.

G. BREAKING OFF THE ACTION

Breaking off the action is the corollary of manœuvre in retreat.

The Eastern Detachment, which might have evaded the carefully prepared blow that was about to fall upon it, was kept in its positions by order of General Zasulich.

The commander of the Detachment, thinking himself in honour bound to show the Japanese that he was not afraid of them, and to "give them cause to meditate on what would happen to them when . . ." etc., had decided to offer an energetic resistance at the outset and then to break off the fight and retire.

The point that we are now discussing, therefore, was one that figured in Zasulich's proposed combinations. These combinations, however, had so little relation to the general situation as the Commander-in-Chief had arranged it, that if the breaking off of a fight were simply one of the peculiarities of the Zasulich manner of making war, it would be unprofitable to study it.

But supposing that General Kuroki's army, instead of assembling *en bloc* before attempting to attack, had tried to force the Yalu on the 8th (advanced guard) or 14th (12th Division), Zasulich would have done well to accept battle with the chances in his favour, and to teach the Japanese a lesson in prudence.

To oppose the turning movement of an enemy who, desirous of avoiding the direct forcing of a great frontal obstacle such as the Yalu, would try to seize the Eastern Detachment's line of retreat, it would have been necessary to fight, to check, and perhaps to punish the turning force. There is always the chance, too, that in seeking to attack an imprudent advanced guard or a detached wing, one may encounter very superior forces. Further, while the advanced troops are fighting the main body may intervene.

To extricate one's self from such difficult situations, one must be able to break off the engagement and to put distance between one's self and the enemy.

The moment at which a protective force should begin to retire is not always easy to determine. The enemy's artillery will not always be so obliging as that of the Japanese 1st Army on April 30. The protective force which lingers too long may easily find itself forced to fight by an unforeseen attack, and this fight it must be able to break off.

Obstacles as serious as the Yalu are rare; in most cases barrier positions, in themselves, offer little resistance. When this is the case, in order to gain our time and to economize our space, we have to reinforce the barrier of nature with that of fire, and then, when the enemy has brought his superior means into play, to break off the engagement. The *menace* of combat will not always suffice, as it sufficed on the Yalu between April 8 and 30, 1904, to gain the time that strategy demands of the protective force. A

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menace that is never followed by action loses in time all its efficacy. We must have the judgment and the power to sound the "advance" at one moment, the "dismiss" at another.

Almost all the dangers of rearguard-wise manœuvring would disappear if it were a simple and easy matter to break off a fight.

If its past disadvantages on the material side are tending to disappear, the future will see it more freely employed than it has been in the past. And if, in addition, it could be executed by troops whose *moral* was practically proof against dangerous emotions, the drawbacks to the rearguard manœuvre, material and moral alike, would vanish, and with them nearly all its difficulty.

The problem of breaking off a fight, under modern conditions of armament, is therefore one of the very highest importance. For upon our conclusions on this point an exact estimate of the value of the "manœuvre in retreat" necessarily depends.

The breaking off of an engagement is greatly favoured by the night.

If on April 30 General Zasulich, impressed by the day's cannonading of his defences by the Japanese batteries, but desirous of holding on behind the Yalu as long as possible without becoming involved in a decisive struggle, had desired to settle his last doubts, he could have tried an offensive return towards the Hu-shan mountains so as to judge whether the threat of envelopment was real.

By beginning it about 5.30 or 6 p.m., when

there was only an hour or an hour and a half of daylight left, he could have made this bold sortie with impunity.

It is easy to break off a fight at night: that is, when the enemy cannot use his means of fire, the massed guns, the massed rifles; when he cannot use his means of pursuit, the massed sabres.

If, then, the side manœuvring in retreat could always choose its own time, it would invariably deliver its attacks just before nightfall; for night would be at hand to cover the breaking-off of the engagement, and no means of protection can vie in efficacy with the screen of darkness.

But as the manœuvre in retreat is a form of the defensive, the initiative of attacking belongs to the stronger and offensive party. On the Yalu it was Kuroki, and not Zasulich, that was the "master of the hour," and could choose the moment of action. Now, it was to Kuroki's interest on May 1 to start early: 5 a.m. was the time he chose for beginning the action that it was his purpose to make a decisive battle.

It would be necessary, therefore, for Zasulich, who had decided to accept the combat before retiring, to break it off in open daylight.

The protection that night could not give he sought, or rather should have sought, to find in tactics.

An eventual breaking-off of the fight being therefore implicit in his scheme of "giving the Japanese a lesson and then retiring," the next

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question is, was the Eastern Detachment suitably posted for the purpose? And if not, what should have been its dispositions?

At dawn on May 1 it was arrayed as follows:

Mishchenko, with 2 $\frac{3}{4}$ -11-2, watched the coast from Antung to the west of Takushan, and protected the right flank of the principal group against any troops that the Japanese fleet, concentrated off Sin-mi-do island,* might be tempted to land. Colonel Schwerin, with the 10th E.S. Regiment and the 1/3rd E.S. Art., was charged with the defence of Antung, and was to prevent any Japanese landing on this side.

The right flank of the principal group was thus thoroughly, even excessively, protected.

At Ching-kou, similarly, Zasulich had posted 1/22nd E.S. Regiment and two guns borrowed from the battery at Ma-kou. But, as at Antung, so here there was no cavalry to inform the main body of what was going on, or to keep the wings posted as to affairs in the centre.

At Tien-tzu, near the junction of the roads from Chiu-lien-cheng and Antung to Feng-huang-cheng, was the strong general reserve, 4,000 strong (I, III/11th E.S. Regiment, 9th E.S. Regiment, 2 and 3/3rd E.S. Art.).

The position of this group calls for special notice.

It was about four miles from Antung, seven from Chiu-lien-cheng, nine from Ching-kou.

If its object was to feed the line of battle, to the front or the flanks, it was badly placed, being far too far back—a defect which was the more serious

* Off the mouth of the Che-chen river, west of Anju. —Tr.

as the left wing, farthest from the reserve, was also the weakest, and therefore the least capable of gaining time for the reserve to come up.

If, on the other hand, it was intended to form a support to cover the retirement of the first-line groups from Ching-kou, Chiu-lien-cheng, and Antung, and to enable them to sort themselves into column of route on the single main road to Feng-huang-cheng, then this reserve was well placed, and could at any moment occupy the Tien-tzu and Ha-ma-tang positions. Moreover, the supporting position was far enough back to be independent of the first line. It would be outside the sweep of an enveloping movement against the Chiu-lien-cheng position, and the fall of the latter would by no means involve its evacuation.

With modifications of detail, to wit :

(a) the reinforcement of the left wing of the Detachment had been reinforced by a battalion and a battery of the reserve—

(b) the despatch of the other battery of the reserve had been sent to Chiu-lien-cheng and Ma-kou—

(c) A sprinkling of cavalry everywhere, and above all on the left flank *—

The general scheme of the dispositions would have conformed to the accepted ideas of how a position should be organized in view of an eventual retirement.

* Colonel Trukhin's Cossacks, it will be remembered, had drawn away to the Chyang-syang—Sai-ma-chi road after the Japanese capture of An-ping-ho (p. 112). The greater part of the mounted scouts of the Detachment seem to have been with Colonel Schwerin at Antung (see British *Official History*, 1906 edition, i. p. 55).—Tr.

The obvious deduction, which is unaffected by these criticisms of detail, is that the dispositions were made by a leader who intended to manœuvre in retreat.

This officer was Kuropatkin, who moved all the units about by telegraph, and these dispositions were framed to suit his own purpose—that of having no engagement until he had completed the assembly of his main army at Liao-Yang.

It may be said, therefore, that the strategic disposition of the Detachment, at any rate in its general outlines, was well suited to the projected manœuvre.

Can we say the same as regards the tactical dispositions ? *

Astride the Mandarin Road was the main body of the Eastern Detachment—half battalion 24th E.S., II/11th E.S., 12th E.S., II, III/22nd E.S. On Telegraph Hill was the 2/6th E.S.A., at Ma-kou the 3/6th E.S.A. (less two guns at Ching-kou).

Four companies of infantry and the machine gun company were under cover west of Telegraph Hill. The other eight companies of the 12th, the II/11th, and the half battalion 24th E.S. were deployed low down on the slopes facing the river, except for four companies placed as supports half-way up the hillsides—two behind the centre, one behind each flank.

At Ma-kou and Po-te-tien-tzu Colonel Gromov (22nd E.S. Regiment) had nine companies under him (his own II and III battalions and 7/II/11th

* Maps IV and V.

E.S.R. Four of these bordered the river, a fifth was in support, and the rest under cover behind Ma-kou Hill.

Except the eight companies which formed the local reserves—or perhaps second échelon of resistance would be a better phrase—the infantry had behind it bare forward slopes that it would have to ascend, if the order to retreat were given, under fire from the guns that had showed themselves on the 30th, and almost certainly under infantry fire as well.

The two batteries on Telegraph and Ma-kou hills were posted only about 1,000 yards from the Yalu, not behind the crest for indirect fire, but in front of it so as to have a clear view of the foreground.

Troops that mean to fight a battle, whether this be offensive or (initially) defensive, must be posted in the best conditions for the effective use of their weapons, which means at easy ranges.

In the present case infantry and gunners alike were placed as near the river as possible. Moreover, the moment that the Japanese infantry opened fire, not only the supports, but also the whole of Kashtalinski's local reserve except the colour company, dashed forward and merged themselves in the firing line.

This is indeed the characteristic act of troops who have thoroughly resolved to fight it out, who have burnt their boats. No supporting échelon is behind them, but a deadly zone of death upon which the enemy's batteries, known to be numerous, able to see every portion of the amphitheatre of hills, will certainly pour their fire.

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These are the tactics of victory or death.

They might also be the appropriate tactics for a force which proposes to inflict a terrible punishment on a rash and hasty opponent who attempts an attack at 5 or 6 p.m. For a struggle of brief duration against very superior forces—an hour's battle and then the veil of night—the defence as it stands is well organized.

But as the tactics of a force which, foreseeing that the action will begin at dawn, could foresee that it might have to be broken off in broad daylight—they are impossible.

But if, then, a really serious fight was within Zasulich's intentions, he should have called in all his force—brought up Mishchenko with his Cossacks, his guns, and his infantry regiment, leaving only a few patrols on the coast, summoned the whole of his reserve, and disposed Schwerin's 10th E.S. Regiment so that it could either defend Antung, if Antung were attacked, or go to Chiulien-cheng should it be there that the guns and rifles were needed.

And lastly, if a *battle* of the Yalu was intended, why was the II Sib. Army Corps idle at Liao-Yang? For when one intends to fight a battle, one presumably aims at winning it, and for that purpose the means of winning must be accumulated on the ground.

II. MAY 1

At 5 a.m. on May 1, 1904, five howitzer batteries, six divisional batteries of the Japanese 2nd Division,

and six of the Guard,* smothered Telegraph and Ma-kou hills, Chiu-lien-cheng, Ma-kou, Yao-kou, and Po-te-tien-tzu with shells.†

The Russian lines were as still as the grave. Not a shot from gun or rifle answered the cannonade, and one might have imagined that the position had been evacuated in the night. For two hours the shelling went on without result, for gunners and riflemen kept well under cover in their trenches.

The Japanese artillery, in thus beginning an isolated engagement, committed a blunder. Artillery only wastes ammunition by throwing itself into a fight in which the infantry does not share. The guns are just as useless when they play for their own hand alone and forget the infantry, as they are helpful and powerful when working in concert and combination with the comrade arm.

At 7 a.m. the Japanese infantry came into action, the artillery began to work for the infantry's benefit, and things soon took on a different aspect.

At 7 a.m. the Russians on Telegraph Hill saw a thick firing line advance into Oseki Island. At once the 2/6th E.S.A., hitherto silent, opened fire upon the Japanese skirmishers. Then "the artillery of the Guards was upon the battery like a cat springing on a mouse."‡ In less than five minutes it was reduced to silence, and it never succeeded in reopening fire.

Thus we see the advance of the Japanese infantry

* It is possible that some of the mountain batteries of the 12th Division took part in this bombardment as well.

† Map V.

‡ Sir Ian Hamilton, *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book*, vol. i. p. 111.

drawing the fire of the Russian guns. The Japanese artillery, to cover its infantry, engages them in a duel and neutralizes them.

Similarly the infantry advance led the defending riflemen to show themselves to fire. The Japanese artillery had now a vulnerable target, and its fire became destructive.

The Japanese 2nd Division advanced across the islands with three regiments abreast (the fourth being general reserve), the left directed upon Chiu-lien-cheng, the centre on Telegraph Hill, the right on Ma-kou. As soon as the zone of infantry fire was entered, firing line, supports, and reserves broke up into a dense chain. On the other side it was the same: the supports joined the firing line; Kashtalinski sent up three companies of his local reserve to his right flank, which he deemed to be weak, and kept with him only the colour company.

The supports and reserves, in fact, receiving as many bullets as the first line, and unable to reply to them, dashed forward and thrust themselves into the fighting line, to return the enemy's fire and to silence it if they might.

The Guard advanced on the same alignment as the 2nd Division. Like the latter it had three regiments in first line, and these soon melted into a similar dense swarm of skirmishers. Meanwhile the divisional batteries silenced Pokotilo's six guns at Ma-kou (3/6th E.S.A. less 2 guns).

It was this moment that General Zasulich chose for giving the order to break off the fight and to retreat on Feng-huang-cheng. Directly he had

given it, he rode away towards Tien-tzu to organize the supporting échelon there.

And yet, if ever the personal intervention of a commander is useful and necessary on the field of battle it is just at such a moment as this, when the operation of breaking off the fight has to be improvised. It is for the commander to give the various corps their rôles, to regulate the departure of each, and to order, if need be, that this corps or that shall sacrifice itself for its comrades.

If there is no one to organize the operation, every one leaves the field when and how he pleases, the less exposed units—*i.e.* those which can most easily disengage themselves—making off first and leaving those that are more deeply involved to bear the full force of the enemy's attack.

The company 6/III/12th E.S. Regiment had to retire up the exposed face of Telegraph Hill. The battery here had already departed, and the pursuers crowded upon the company. Closely pressed it turned to the front and, flinging itself upon the enemy with the bayonet, had the satisfaction of seeing them flee before it perished, almost to a man.

It was then that squadrons were sorely needed to check the pursuit and to give the brave infantry a brief respite, like the Prussian Guard Dragoons on August 16, 1870.* It was then that batteries, in a condition to fight, should have been on the spot to stop the assailants for an instant.

* Defeat of the 38th Infantry Brigade, Mars-la-Tour, by De Cisse's French Division. —TR.

Colonel Gromov, who was on the left wing with two battalions of the 22nd E.S. Regiment, ordered a retreat on Liu-chia-kou.* But Lieut.-Col. Pokotilo, leaving his battery (six guns, 3/6th E.S.A.) on Ma-kou hill, went in search of orders, and met Gromov, who proposed that they should retire in company. Pokotilo thereupon regained his battery, which he found *en route* for Ha-ma tang, and turned it back towards Ching-kou. Meanwhile the Japanese had debouched from Po-te-tien-tzu. The battery was fired into and forced to turn southward again, and presently it came under the fire of the Japanese 3rd Guards. The traces were cut, the guns and vehicles abandoned, and only a few of the men were lucky enough to get away.

Gromov found that his battalion (I/22nd E.S. Regiment) at Ching-kou had been put to flight by the oncoming 12th Division, and his line of retreat on Liu-chia-kou cut. He was isolated; he had no cavalry to aid him in regaining touch with the rest of the Detachment; he had no orders and no notion of his commander's intentions. His sole idea was to extricate his regiment from its predicament, and he retired directly over the hills via 'Ta-lung-fang to the Feng-huang-cheng main road. But, all unknown to Gromov, this uncovered the flank of the supporting position at Ha-ma-tang and brought about the practical annihilation of the two batteries and two battalions that held it.

It was not long before the unhappy Gromov realized the result of his haphazard retirement. Unable to endure the reproaches of his comrades

* Near the Ai-ho, four miles west of Ching-kou.—TR.

he blew out his brains, thus expiating a fault which was no more his than any other's.

To our question, "Was the tactical disposition of the Eastern Detachment suited to the projected manœuvre?" there is but one answer: "No! a thousand times, no!" The breaking off of the combat, which could not be covered in this case by night, should have been covered by tactical means.

What are these tactical means?

The Russians desired to check the passage of the Yalu by the Japanese, who desired to pass with as little loss as might be.

The Russians wished to avoid a decisive engagement against superior forces; the Japanese, who had means in plenty, wanted a victory.

At 7 a.m. on May 1 the Japanese divisions, with practically every man either in the firing line or in immediate support behind it, moved swiftly forward and soon opened fire with nearly every rifle.

Their aim was to gain at the very outset an incontestable superiority of fire, so as to reduce the possible obstacles to their progress—*i.e.* the Russian infantry fire—to the lowest dimensions. The Japanese infantry demanded of its artillery, moreover—(a) the destruction, or at least the neutralization, of the Russian artillery that could fire upon it; and (b) direct assistance in case of a fire-fight with the defending infantry.

The Russian infantry at Chiu-lien-cheng numbered only 7 battalions, while General Kuroki was known to have 36. To venture into a contest of

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5,000 rifles against 36,000 was certain defeat. The Russian infantry, then, must avoid being drawn into the fire-fight which the Japanese sought to bring about.

The Russian artillery numbered 15 guns—1 battery (less the gun disabled on the 30th) on Telegraph Hill, 1 battery (less 2 guns) at Ma-kou, 2 guns at Ching-kou. It was well known, from the previous evening's bombardment, that the enemy had numerous batteries—the total was 12 field, 6 mountain, and 5 howitzer batteries. An artillery contest of 2 batteries against 23, 15 guns against about 130, was certain defeat.

Evidently the Russian artillery could not in any way assist its infantry. The infantry was doomed to destruction if it accepted the fire-fight.

The Russians' problem, therefore, was how to reinforce the obstacle by their fire, and withal to avoid any duel with the means of fire at the disposal of the Japanese.

The batteries on Telegraph and Ma-kou, having no intention of engaging the Japanese guns, were not compelled to regulate their emplacements according to the probable positions of the latter. There was no advantage whatever in placing them within effective range of Tiger Hill and Kin-tei Island.

What was wanted was to keep the *obstacle*, the Yalu, under shell fire. The Russian batteries were free, then, to choose positions as far back as their own thoroughly effective shrapnel range (say 4,000 yards). The farther back they could place themselves, the less damage they would be liable

to suffer from the enemy and the easier it would be for them at any given moment to break off the engagement.

In the days of short-range artillery it was not possible to sweep a particular barrier or belt of ground from a great distance. Nowadays, therefore, the breaking-off of a combat is much more practicable for artillery than of old, and in so far the manœuvre in retreat has become less dangerous.

The Russian batteries had, on pain of death, to evade the blows of the Japanese artillery. The best way of doing this was to keep out of range. But the Japanese batteries would in due course advance, while the farthest position of the Russians was limited by the fact that it had to sweep the Yalu valley. In the end, then, the rival artilleries would necessarily come into contact.*

But a quick-firing artillery, trained to work with indirect laying as the normal method, is not very vulnerable when in action under cover behind a ridge, whereas it is very vulnerable indeed when fighting in the open. The long range of our Q.-F. gun gives such freedom in the choice of positions that, armed with it, the Russians could easily have combined the two desiderata—it could have swept the Yalu zone while posted itself behind a covering crest.

In the particular case, supposing that the Russian artillery, instead of placing itself a thousand yards or so from the river, had been posted behind

* The argument is based on the properties of the long-recoil quick-firer, not on the Russian gun actually employed. It should be remembered that we are concerned more with the discussion of a principle than with historical criticism of the particular case.

the ridge Ching-kou—pt. 927—pt. 1,178—spurs west of Ma-kou, it would have been 6,700 yards from the Japanese howitzers, 3,300 from the Yalu, and 6,000 from the guns of the 2nd and Guard Divisions (positions west of Ma-kou); 4,400 from the river and 4,700 from the guns of the 12th Division (hill 1,178)—*i.e.* out of range of everything but the mountain batteries of the 12th Division.

If these seventeen Japanese batteries had approached nearer, they would have had to abandon their stage-properties and well-watered gun positions, and the Guard batteries would have had to descend into the flats like those of the 12th Division. The contest would have borne a totally different complexion.

The Russian infantry could have stood back from the Yalu, for its rifle could beat the zone of the obstacle effectively at 1,300 or 1,600 yards, neutralizing the want of accuracy, of course, by an increased expenditure of ammunition.

But at 1,600 yards from the Yalu the infantry would necessarily be under the fire of the Japanese guns. As soon as the Japanese infantry attempted the passage of the Yalu, the defenders must show themselves to fire, and so subject themselves to the powerful fire of the Japanese "infantry batteries,"* which in this case, as the Russian artillery has drawn back, means every battery on the ground.

* Infantry batteries are those told off in advance to support the infantry attack, as distinct from counter-batteries which engage and neutralize the enemy's guns. This initial subdivision of tasks, with reservation and re-allotment of available batteries as the situation develops, is the characteristic feature of modern French artillery tactics.—*Ta.*

These batteries would have fired with practice-camp precision ; and practice-camp results, with modern artillery, are absolutely crushing.

To employ much infantry in a combat that one intends to break off is therefore an error.

It was not with infantry fire, but with artillery fire almost exclusively, that the Russians should have enhanced the difficulties of passing the Yalu barrier.

Artillery, however, despite its power, has many weaknesses. It only works well when the other arms give it an atmosphere of security. When it is actually in action, it is the infantry's task to guard it. Infantry, therefore, would have been required in the present instance to deny to the enemy's infantry (and perhaps his cavalry) the long covered ways, the folds of ground, into which the hostile infantry, advancing upon the batteries by rushes, would naturally stream.

This protective infantry, if numerous, would be exposed to serious losses at the moment of breaking off the action, and to diminish the dangers of this critical moment some of the batteries should stand their ground, even at the risk of being overrun.

What is required, then, is—little vulnerable infantry but considerable power of rifle fire.

Improvements in the rate of fire of infantry weapons during the past century enable us to use many cartridges and few rifles, many bullets and few men. The development of the modern

rifle, and especially of its rate of fire, thus favours the operation of breaking off the combat, and, *ipso facto*, the manœuvre in retreat.

At the Yalu the Russians were armed with a good rapid-loading weapon, of much the same quality as our own Lebel. But its fire is too slow, while at the same time the machine gun is too much of an encumbrance and too vulnerable to manœuvre side by side with the infantryman and follow his every movement.

Towards the end of the war a "machine rifle" came into use.* The ideal weapon of the infantry man is a machine rifle or an automatic rifle—one that can fire away many cartridges for few men and yet move swiftly hither and thither.

The Russians had no cavalry on the Yalu. It is to this deficiency that the loss of Pokotilo's battery and Gromov's ignorance of the presence of troops at Ha-ma-tang must be set down.

It was the want of training to some extent, but much more the want of cavalry which prevented proper communication being maintained between the Ching-kou, Ma-kou, Chiu-lien-cheng, and Antung groups—and so left every one in ignorance of the existence of the supporting position of Ha-ma-tang.

It was, further, the want of cavalry which made the disengagement of the infantry so murderous a business.

* By a "machine rifle" (*fusil mitrailleur*) is implied something between a machine gun and an automatic rifle, such as the Madsen (Rexer) weapon.—Tr.

Little infantry, much cavalry, many batteries—such is the proportion of the three arms in the composition of a protective corps whose mission requires it persistently to manœuvre in retreat and to be expert in disengaging itself.

The cavalry scouts ahead, and far to the flanks. It escorts the batteries in their changes of position, it establishes communication between the different groups of a line and between a first line and a supporting position. With its carbines it disputes the ground on the flanks of the line of battle, and defends the crests from which the batteries are withdrawing, so as to give them a long start. With its swords it disengages the last batteries, the last companies on the battlefield, ever shoulder to shoulder with those of its comrades who are the most seriously compromised.

The quick-firing batteries take advantage of their long range to shell the defended barrier from masked positions. With their powers of rapid fire they can do the work of more numerous batteries, and deluge the front of the attack with projectiles. They need not economize ammunition, for they are falling back towards the ammunition columns. Using indirect laying, they are far from vulnerable, while their opponents, obliged to gain ground and therefore to show themselves, ought to be made to pay dearly for every forward movement.

The infantry, giving up to the dismounted cavalry the rôle of escort to guns, giving up to the guns the task of barring the way to the enemy, has only to hold localities and points of support, and to search the broken ground and defiles in

which the enemy's infantry may find covered ways that the shells cannot get at. With an automatic rifle they can do this and yet present the fewest possible human targets.

As regards technical factors, then, a fight can be broken off nowadays in a way that was impossible with the old slow-firing, short-ranging weapons, and was very difficult indeed with artillery that could only employ direct laying.

From the moral point of view, the difference between the conditions of to-day and those of old is wider still.

The cavalryman, in his well-closed ranks, has always shown himself capable of carrying out the most deadly tasks, as our cuirassiers gloriously demonstrated at Wörth.

The gunner, when his gun is in position and his wagons full, does not think of flight. On August 18, 1870, the Prussian cavalry and the infantry of the III and X Corps, that had fought at Rezonville two days before, were incapable of taking part in the battle. They dragged themselves along behind the II Army, but did not fight in its ranks. The conduct of the batteries of these corps, on the other hand, although they had been engaged all day on the 16th, and had suffered considerably, was very good. The gunner's *moral*, in fact, is in his limbers and wagons. When they are full, it is excellent. Now, in the manœuvre in retreat replenishment is quick and easy.

The infantryman, armed with a weapon of no great power, exposed to the enemy's guns without the opportunity of replying, unable to evade a

sudden danger by rapid movement as a cavalryman can do, is pre-eminently liable to panic. But to-day, only a few infantry being employed in this form of combat, the risk of panic is correspondingly less. Moreover, as a smaller proportion of the available infantry is required for each supporting position, the same men will not be called upon to occupy several positions one after the other, to rekindle immediately the courage that has been quenched by the order to retreat.

The manœuvre in retreat, therefore, will consist in occupying in advance several successive positions with the irreducible minimum of infantry, and placing the whole of the cavalry and artillery of the protective force in the first of these positions. When the first position has been evacuated, the infantry in it will retire rapidly in small groups, without stopping to rally. The rally will be made under cover of the second position, but the rallied infantry will continue to retreat, while the cavalry and artillery, in conjunction with the infantry originally posted on the second line of resistance, will offer a fresh defence there, and so on for the third position.

CHAPTER IV

FALSE MANŒUVRES DURING THE RUSSIAN CONCENTRATION

A. THE RETREAT FROM THE YALU

AFTER forcing the passage of the Yalu the Japanese Guard and 2nd Division halted for a long time, and the 12th Division was behindhand in its advance. The Russians on the right bank of the Yalu and Ai-ho were therefore able to escape complete destruction.

General Kashtalinski had organized a first supporting position north of the Han-tu-ho-tzu, about a mile and a quarter behind Telegraph Hill, and placed Lieutenant-Colonel Linda in command there. Farther back a second supporting position was established, near the position of the general reserve, at Ha-ma-tang, under Colonel Laiming. Still farther back, Colonel Schwerin, with the troops he had brought back from Antung, took up a defensive position at Lao-chou-tun at 3 p.m.

The troops on the river's edge on this day should therefore have been able to break off the combat under the protection of Lieutenant-Colonel Linda's supporting line, and to have gained ground to the

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rear without being pressed by the enemy. Linda, after affording the first-line group (Antung troops included) the opportunity to reorganize and get clear of the field, would himself have had to go through a critical phase in disengaging; but his retreat would soon have come under the protection of Colonel Laiming's group, and he too would have been free to evacuate the field and to reorganize. Last of all, Laiming would have been able to retreat under cover of Schwerin's group at Lao-chou-tun.

Thus the night would have been gained.

In each position, a breaking-off operation being a foreseen necessity of the case, the infantry and artillery would have chosen their positions in accordance with this requirement. While the infantry, after disengaging, retired completely behind Lao-chou-tun, all or nearly all the artillery might fight at the Yalu, at the Hantu-ho-tzu, at Ha-ma-tang, and lastly at Lao-chou-tun. The scheme of such a manœuvre from each supporting position to the next in rear, in which each retiring échelon was to meet fresh or reorganized troops, was eminently suited to the circumstances, and if the execution had equalled the conception there would have been no disaster.

There was no need or occasion for Linda to fight on the first supporting position. His object was not to hold the ground, but to gain the necessary time for the troops engaged, and also for Schwerin's group to fall back. As, in fact, the Japanese did not push forward, this time was gained without firing a shot, and this done, Linda had taken the

wise decision not to stay in his position any longer than was necessary. Colonel Laiming on the Ha-ma-tang heights was perfectly placed for barring the Chiu-lien-cheng — Feng-huang-cheng road, and for assisting Schwerin's retirement from Antung.

But, though strong in front, the Ha-ma tang position needed to be protected on the flanks. A blunder of the commander left Colonel Gromov in ignorance of the service that he could render to the Ha-ma-tang rearguard, the faulty distribution of the Russian cavalry prevented any intercommunication between Gromov and Laiming—and the result was a disaster.

In this disaster the 11th East Siberian Regiment found a glorious end. "Turned on both flanks and taken in reverse by the Japanese, the battalions of the 11th, to break their way out, charged with the bayonet. . . . In the course of the attack the regimental commander, Colonel Laiming, fell, and almost the whole of the III battalion, newly arrived from Russia, was destroyed."* Well indeed may this writer speak of the "undying fame that our troops won in the battle of Chiu-lien-cheng." At the Yalu, as at Saint Privat in 1870, the soldiers were magnificent; it was the leaders who were at fault.

At Lao-chou-tun Schwerin stopped the attempted pursuit of Kigoshi's brigade (23rd of 12th Division) without having to commit himself to any serious fight.

From this rapid survey of the events of May 1,

* Nikolai Staff College Lectures (Colonel Danilov).

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1904, we may conclude that by posting his troops so as to be able to disengage them, and by combining the retirement of Gromov with that of Laiming, Zasulich could easily have escaped from the embrace of the Japanese army.

Faulty, and deplorably faulty, as was the execution of the manœuvre in retreat, its conception was none the less sound.

Severe as were the losses suffered in the battle, the moral depression into which the commander of the Eastern Detachment fell had even graver consequences.

General Kuropatkin, on learning the news, sent a part of the forces available at Liao-Yang to hold the barrier of the Fen-shui-ling chain,* behind which the Eastern Detachment could rally if it had not been able to do so already. The mountainous country between Feng-huang-cheng and the environs of Liao-Yang lent itself admirably to a step-by-step defence, in which the assailant should only win his way at the cost of laborious preparations and sanguinary fighting.

The emotion of the General-in-Chief must have been great indeed, to judge by the haste with which he seized all the forces that he could to form a corps under General Romanov for the defence of the passes.

On his arrival at Lien-shan-kuan (between the Mo-tien-ling and East Fen-shui-ling † passes) the

* See Map VI.

† The various Fen-shui-ling passes should be carefully distinguished. The prevalence of the name is due simply to its meaning, "Water-shed Pass."—Tr.

officer had under him: Three companies 139th Regiment (part of the 11/35th Brigade from Europe); one battalion of the 124th (of the 11/31st Brigade, also from Europe); the 4/3rd E.S. Artillery and half the 4/6th E.S. Artillery (of Zasulich's corps *). Out on his flanks were: Colonel Volkov, with two battalions of the 23rd E.S. Regiment † and half the 4/6th E.S. Art. at Sai-ma-chi, and the 18th E.S. Regiment ‡ and one battery, § barring the Taku-shan—Hai-cheng road at Fen-shui-ling West. ||

If Kuropatkin's alarm was great, not less so was that of Zasulich's outlying subordinates. General Mishchenko, abandoning his work of watching the coast, drew back hurriedly to Feng-huang-cheng with all that he could pick up* of his detachment. An order from the Commander-in-Chief was needed to send him forward again to Sha-li-chai to resume his surveillance duties. Colonel Kartzev, ¶ at the news of the Yalu defeat, forgot that his business was to cover the Sai-ma-chi road,** and came in all haste to join Zasulich. The Commander-in-Chief

* These batteries, newly formed on mobilization, had not joined their divisions on the Yalu.—Tr.

† Not present at the Yalu, though belonging to General Trusov's 6th Division.—Tr.

‡ Of the 5th E.S. Division (Stackelberg's 1 Siberian Corps).—Tr.

§ 1/6th E.S.A. of Mishchenko's command (?).—Tr.

|| More generally called Dalin or Ta-ling. The designation used here is that adopted in the *British Official History* (see footnote to Part II. p. 67 of that work).—Tr.

¶ This officer was appointed to command the portion of Mishchenko's mounted troops which had been posted on Zasulich's left flank.—Tr.

** See page 112.—Tr.

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sent him out again to Kuan-tien-cheng, and gave the command of his force to General Rennenkampf.*

The manœuvre not having been in accord with the object, all concerned found themselves completely at a loss when things went badly.

The initiative of the cavalry leaders on the flanks was misplaced. It could not be otherwise. Initiative must be guided, unless it is to degenerate into chaos and even flat insubordination.

In an army in which there is no doctrine initiative can never be followed by happy results. Now, a doctrine can only exist in an army that works. "An army," says General Langlois, "which has regulations but does not work cannot have a doctrine, an army which has no regulations but works may have one." Colonel de Maud'huy defines a "doctrine" as a "way of understanding questions. A sound doctrine means the application, to military problems, of common sense that has been trained in a few fundamental principles," and in order that this common sense shall rest solidly upon these principles they must not merely be read in a book, but also practised, either in war or at manœuvres.

Mishchenko and Kartzev had no chance of understanding the problem set them by the situa-

* Rennenkampf's command comprised Colonel Volkov's detachment above mentioned; Kartzev's 1st Argun Cossacks (less 1 squadron) and half 1st Ussuri Cossacks; and 2nd Brigade Trans-Baikal Cossack Division (2nd Argun, 2nd Nerchinsk, 4/Trans-Baikal H.A.), under Major-General Liubavin, in all 2-20-2, or allowing for three sotnias of the 2nd Brigade distributed as relay posts along the road, 2-17-2 effective.—*Tu.*

tion, for their immediate superior Zasulich had not succeeded in grasping the situation. General Kuropatkin's intervention was required to put every one in his place again.

The study of this war affords plenty of evidence that Kuropatkin's subordinates were not allowed the powers of initiative to which their rank entitled them. But the evidence shows just as conclusively that, as they had not worked together, as they had never learned to comprehend a military problem in a uniform common-sense way, many indeed amongst them would have found a "free hand" an embarrassing possession.

Alarmed by the blunders of his subordinates, Kuropatkin, instead of regarding them as lessons that would bear fruit, took them as evidence of incapacity, and, as we shall see, restricted every one's liberty more and more, until at last at Mukden he gave personal orders to every one about everything.

If initiative is to be useful it is essential that the problem set by events should be seen in the same light by superiors and by subordinates.

Success is the prize of joint efforts in a common direction.

Divergent efforts are pure waste of energy.

In the middle of April Lieut.-Colonel Madritov, with some 500 mounted troops and a battery, was at Cho-san on the Upper Yalu watching the Korean border, and prolonging Colonel Trukhin's line of posts (see p. 106). Isolated from this

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officer, completely out of touch with Kuropatkin, he knew little of the situation and probably nothing of the manœuvre of the Eastern Detachment.

On April 23 he learned through his own emissaries that the Japanese 1st Army had passed Anju, following the Mandarin Road from Seoul to Liao-Yang. He resolved thereupon to march on Anju; there he would be at a focus of information, there he might considerably disturb the rear of the 1st Army, dislocating its arrangements, and perhaps capturing its convoys.

The operation was bold in the extreme. The range of mountains on the left bank of the Yalu had to be crossed, and some 120 miles of roadless and hostile country to be traversed. But nothing stopped Madritov. When his battery could not keep up he sent it back. When the inhabitants showed hostility he forced them to be neutral. When food and forage ran short he sent away part of his troops. At last, on May 9, he arrived within sight of Anju.

There he was on the line of communication followed by the 1st Army in its advance. An army which no longer controls its line of operation—whose replenishments of food and munitions are compromised—would it not hesitate to engage in a battle before the obstructed line had been cleared?

As ill luck would have it, the Japanese had won the battle of the Yalu more than a week before. But, at least, would not their victorious progress be impeded by this destruction of their line of communication?

No. For the line of communication Seoul—Wiju had been abandoned by the 1st Army three weeks before. It had based itself upon the coast at Rikaho, Yongampo, and Antung; its line of communication at this moment was only a few miles in length, and it was at these ports that the Japanese navy landed the supplies, and embarked the wastage of the army. The long Mandarin Road was now traversed only by stragglers and country-carts that had failed to keep up with the troops.

Of all this Colonel Madritov was in ignorance. He attacked the walled town of Anju (held by about 100 Japanese stragglers) with great spirit.

All these Korean and Manchurian villages are encircled by high walls, to demolish which artillery is necessary. Madritov had had to send away his battery owing to the badness of the routes. Now, unable for want of it to do more, he had to beat a retreat.

Madritov's expedition is in many respects greatly to be admired. Countless difficulties were surmounted, and its execution demanded the greatest intelligence, boldness, and resolution. But, while admiring Madritov as a partisan leader, we can only regret that he was employed as a partisan, and could not display this intelligence, activity, and resolution on the Yalu battlefield.

If Madritov and his 500 mounted men had been under Colonel Gromov's orders there is no doubt that the movements of the Japanese 12th Division would have been watched, that the

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retirement of I/22nd E.S. Regiment,* and the cutting of the line of retreat on Liu-chia-kou would have been reported in time to avoid the false manœuvre which ruined Pokotilo's 3 6th E.S. Artillery. Moreover, by opening communication between Gromov and Laiming, Madritov would have enabled the 11th and 22nd E.S. Regiments to co-ordinate their movements, and so to get away in safety.

In short, the presence of this gifted cavalry leader and his 500 men on the field of the Yalu would have been of simply incalculable value.

It should be observed that it was not Madritov, but the Commander-in-Chief, who was responsible for his isolation from the comrades who were destined to fight in such desperate conditions.

When a leader has set an object before him, nothing that does not lead straight to that object should be allowed to assume importance in his eyes. Wide-ranging cavalry operations against the rear of the enemy's armies are a day-dream which often haunts the imagination of our boldest and most enterprising officers. In 1870 our *Francs-Tireurs* cherished similar day-dreams, but all they accomplished was to blow up the bridge of Fontenay and to disturb the quietude of the Prussians.

These manifestations of individualism, admirable as may be the sentiments which inspire them, must be condemned.

To conquer in the battle, to beat the main body is the single object to be sought.

* Posted at Ching-kou ; see p. 124 and Map V.

To be sure of victory, we must have every one co-operating in it.

Every man for the battle—divergent efforts are pure waste of energy.

B. THE DEFENCE OF THE FEN-SHUI-LING RANGE

While, in the tension of the Yalu fight, all the subordinates lost their heads, Kuropatkin himself kept, or at any rate soon regained, his self-control. He repaired the blunders that had been committed, established General Romanov in a supporting position amongst the mountains, and, in order to be on the safe side, took measures for the evacuation of Liao-Yang. He blamed nobody, but set to work to revive every one's courage.

The prospect before the eyes of the Commander-in-Chief was darker than it had been a few days before. But the object was unchanged; he still proposed to wait until he should be in superior force before he engaged in a decisive action. As it appeared that the protective manœuvre had collapsed, and must be given up, it was distance alone that could help him to bide his time until he should be the master of the moment. His moment was in August—still three months ahead.

On May 2, therefore, Kuropatkin had in mind the setting back of his concentration-place to Mukden, if not, indeed, to Harbin. He stopped all trains for the front at Mukden, and arranged for the evacuation of the stores of all sorts accumulated at Liao-Yang.

But, contrary to every one's expectation, the Japanese did not exploit their victory. The rear-guard of Zasulich's force at Kao-li-men, composed only of the 9th and 10th E.S. Regiments and two batteries, was not disturbed. Rest and plenty awaited the troops at Feng-huang-cheng, and order was thoroughly re-established in their ranks.

In these circumstances the idea was naturally resumed of defending step by step the broken ground on either side of the Mandarin Road, the more so as General Romanov's position seemed likely to offer a prolonged resistance.

The manœuvre of the protective force was, after all, by no means ruined, and a set-back of the main army to the north ceased by degrees to be thought necessary.

The 2nd, and after it the 3rd, of May passed away without incident. Kuropatkin became more and more confident again, especially when Mishchenko had returned to his patrolling duties at Sha-li-chai and Kartzev had resumed the barrage of the Kuan-tien-cheng road at Sai-ma-chi.

The Commander-in-Chief had calculated that the Japanese divisions whose presence off the Yalu estuary had been reported had reinforced Kuroki. Thence he had argued a swift and direct advance of the enemy in full force upon Liao-Yang, and in consequence had prepared to draw back to the north. But as time went on, and the Japanese 1st Army delayed its advance, Kuropatkin came back to the idea of gaining his time by means of a protective manœuvre—to be better executed this time.

The troops of the Eastern Detachment were excellent; their *moral* had been proof against the strain of a clumsy battle and a still clumsier retreat. They would ask nothing better than to revenge themselves for their reverse; in a word, they were still fit to carry on their protective manœuvre. Rumour, emanating from Japan, has alleged that there was great disorder at Kao-li-men, and that the 9th Regiment in its excitement mistook the 11th for the enemy, and fired into them. This is an illusion, comfortable perhaps for the victors, but quite destitute of foundation in fact.

If, however, the troops of the Eastern Detachment were still sound, their commander was thoroughly shaken. He no longer talked about the Order of St. George. He was demoralized, and when the leader is demoralized the troops are practically out of action—their *moral* falls to zero.

General Zasulich, who was in telegraphic communication with his chief, demanded leave to continue his retreat—to continue to keep out of the enemy's reach. He wished to have no more to do with his protective mission, which he declared was more impracticable than ever, and which from first to last he had never comprehended. The shelter of the mountains attracted him, and he never ceased from his lamentations till he had been authorized to put another thirty miles between himself and his adversary.

On the 4th he received permission to retreat towards Liao-Yang, and profited by it instantly.

He would not even wait to evacuate the stores accumulated at Feng-huang-cheng. He burned them instead—and imperfectly at that.

To give ground under pressure is to beat a retreat. To give ground without being pressed is mere flight.

The demoralization of defeat had done its work. The battle of the Yalu gave the Japanese control of nearly seventy miles of ground beyond that river.

From this instant all the world could regard the engagement as a disaster to the Russian army, and the disheartening effect of the battle and the flight was seriously felt in Russia. On their side, the Japanese were able to reckon a successful affair as a great victory, and the ascendancy they derived from it considerably augmented the already high fighting value of their army.

The Japanese cavalry advanced over the ground thus left free, and without meeting with any resistance occupied Kao-li-men on the 4th, Feng-huang-cheng on the 5th.

General Kuropatkin had only settled upon Liao-Yang as the concentration point of his army in order to be within reach of Port Arthur; if he had followed his own wishes he would probably have fixed the concentration point farther north. Fearing that the Japanese 2nd Army had come into line with the 1st, and that both were driving forward on Liao-Yang, he had thought it best to yield to Zasulich's entreaties, and to reproach

the Commander-in-Chief for doing so would be to ignore the part played by psychology in war.

But the Japanese did not stir from Feng-huang-cheng, and on the 6th Kuropatkin learned that General Oku and the 2nd Army had begun to land in Pi-tzu-wo bay.

The situation was now clear. The 1st Army had refrained from pursuit because it was alone in the region of the Yalu. It was not within the enemy's intentions, therefore, to march vigorously upon Liao-Yang.

Then perhaps Kuropatkin regretted that he had yielded to Zasulich's entreaties. At any rate he decided that the main army should not make any backward movement towards the north, and resolved to resume his protective manœuvre.

The Eastern Detachment was reorganized for the defence of the Fen-shui-ling range and Liao-Yang remained the chosen rendezvous of the main army.

General Oku's army, now disembarking at Pi-tzu-wo, would not be dangerous for a long time to come. General Kuroki's would be stopped in the mountain country.

On May 16 the Eastern Detachment, told off for the defence of the passes, was placed under the command of General Count Keller.

This officer had served in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 under Skobelev, but had been out of touch with active service for many years. After commanding the Corps of Pages for a long period, he had, for seven years past, been governor-general of a province.

Military qualities, only to be acquired by working in touch with troops, disappear after a time when that touch is lost. One fights not with one's reminiscences, but with one's reflexes; and a long period of civil work, developing the reflexes of administration, suppresses those of troop-leading. And even if Count Keller had regained his old habits and instincts, they would have been not those of a corps commander but those of a field officer—for it was as a field officer that he had retired from army service: keen, commanding, and active, all that he could do was to die like the brave soldier that he was.

The mission of the Eastern Detachment was to oppose any advance of the Japanese on the front comprised between the Taku-shan—Hsiu-yuen—Hai-cheng and the Kuan-tien-cheng—Saima-chi—Liao-Yang roads.

The manœuvre to be carried out was, as before, the protective manœuvre of a small corps against a very superior enemy—decisive action was still to be avoided. But the space that it could afford to lose was now very small, and it would be necessary to fight strenuously up to the very edge of a decision. The mountainous country with its few defiles enabled the defenders to fight very superior forces, the defiles not allowing the latter to develop their full effect.

In short, what was requisite was a stout defence that cherished no hope of ultimate counter-attack.

General Keller, when he had assumed command and examined the ground, distributed his troops

for the defence of his allotted section.* In the second fortnight of May they were posted thus :

Headquarters were at Lien-shan-kuan, along with the general reserve—the 11th and 12th E.S. Regiments, which had filled up, or were filling up, the gaps made by their heavy losses on the Yalu, and also two battalions of the 10th E.S. Regiment, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ batteries of the 3rd E.S. Division. Total 8-0- $1\frac{1}{2}$.

In the same locality, but not under Keller's orders, were one battalion of the 139th Regiment, and one of the 124th, sent thither by Kuropatkin to construct defences and repair roads, and receiving their orders directly from him.†

At Ta-wan, nine miles E.S.E. of Lang-tzu-shan, the 22nd E.S. Regiment and a battery were posted. This place, on the Mandarin Road, is the junction point of several routes : (a) a by-road from Feng-huang-cheng by Hsiao-yuen-kou‡ and Chiao-cha-tsien, over the Mo-tu-ling and Hsin-kai-ling passes, (b) a mountain track from Chiao-tou (on the Kuan-tien-cheng—Liao-Yang road), (c) a track which comes in from the Lang-tzu-shan—Middle Fen-shui-ling—Hsiu-yuen road, and (d) a very difficult path which was roughly parallel with the first-named route, over the San-tao-ling pass, to Ta-tien-tzu and so to Hsiao-yuen-kou.

* See Map VII.

† *Achtzehn Monate in der Mandschurei*, by v. Tettau.

‡ As far as can be traced, this place is the same as the Ta-yen-kou of the *British Official History*. Nowhere in the history of the war are the difficulties of translating the names so nearly insurmountable as here, where all the maps consulted, French, English, German, and Japanese, are seriously at variance as to topographical fact as well as names.—Tr.

The troops at Ta-wan had in front of them :

On the road towards Chiao-cha-tsien, at the Mo-tu-ling pass, 2 battalions of the 24th E.S. Regiment and 2 guns, and farther south, nearer to Chiao-cha-tsien, 1 battalion 24th E.S. and 1 sotnia, which were in contact with the Japanese outposts at Chiao-cha-tsien ;

On the Mandarin Road, holding Fen-shui-ling East, 2 battalions of the 9th E.S. with a half battery (4 guns) and a sotnia, and more to the south towards Tu-men-tzu, the other battalion of the same regiment and a sotnia, in touch with the enemy's outposts before Hsueh-hi-tien ;

On the road to Hsiu-yuen, on Middle Fen-shui-ling, 1 battalion of the 10th E.S. Regiment and a sotnia, the latter pushed out as far as the Wa-tzu-ling.

The bad track over the San-tao-ling was watched by the Mo-tu-ling group.

The northern road (Kuan-tien-cheng—Liao-Yang) was guarded at Sai-ma-chi by 17 sotnias and a battery, while farther back, above Chiao-tou, was the 23rd E.S. Regiment and a battery.*

The southerly road Taku-shan — Hsiu-yuen Hsi-mu-cheng—Hai-cheng was barred by Mishchenko with 11 sotnias and a battery † at Hsiu-yuen ; the 21st E.S. Regiment at Fen-shui-ling West, the 18th E.S. Regiment and a battery at Hsi-mu-cheng. Two companies of the 17th

* Rennenkampf's command ; see p. 147, footnote. According to the *British Official History* the 23rd E.S. Regiment was short of a battalion.—Tn.

† See p. 106 ; 1st Chita, 1st Verkhne-udinsk (less 1 sotnia), 1/Trans-Baikal H. A.—Tn.

E.S. Regiment, posted in the region of Wa-tzu-ling pass, kept open the communication between Hsi-mu-cheng and Middle Fen-shui-ling.

In June, Keller's Eastern Detachment was distributed over a front of seventy-five miles and a depth of thirty-five.

The mountain country offered but two avenues—if we omit the bad track over the San-tao-ling—by which the Japanese troops deployed on the front between Taku-shan and Chyang-syang could advance upon Liao-Yang. For one of these avenues, Taku-shan—Hai-cheng, the II Siberian Corps was responsible, and the troops stationed on it were therefore outside Keller's control, although they included the 21st E.S. Regiment of the 6th E.S. Division.

Between the various passages the country was difficult, but it was not absolutely inaccessible to infantry and even to mountain guns.

An enemy advancing along any of these roads would first meet Cossacks in very small numbers—except indeed on the northerly road, on which stood Rennenkampf's 17 sotnias, and on the southerly road (Taku-shan—Hai-cheng), where Mishchenko's 11 sotnias would have to be dealt with. After pushing back the mounted men, the Japanese would have to deal with small infantry groups—a battalion at Middle Fen-shui-ling, one in advance of the Mo-tu-ling, one at Tu-men-tzu; on the flanking routes the resistance, however, would for a long time be that of cavalry only.

Continuing their advance, the Japanese would reach Mo-tu-ling and East Fen-shui-ling; at each of these passes they would have to master a couple of battalions and two to four guns.

On the flanking routes they would meet an infantry regiment on West Fen-shui-ling, and another, with a battery, at Pa-li-king. This resistance would doubtless have been prolonged sufficiently to give the general reserve (11 battalions at Lang-tzu-shan—'Ta-wan) to reach whichever of the passes was threatened, for this involved only one forced march, or two at most. The general reserve, it must be remembered, warned in good time by the groups nearer to the front, would have been able to string itself out in the direction of the danger point, and so could have given an instalment of its support almost immediately.

In 1709, Marshal Berwick, charged by Louis XIV. with the defence of the Alps from Savoy to the mouth of the Var, expressed his conception of his task thus:

“The defensive was difficult, for an enemy in the plains of Piedmont who had decided upon his course of action could throw the whole of his forces at once on any single point that suited his purpose, while we, on the other hand, ignorant of his intentions, had to separate in order to observe all points. Thus it was probable that we should be broken through somewhere, in which case the enemy would be masters of the situation.

“I therefore thought out a new emplacement where I should be within reach of everything and able to arrive anywhere with the whole of the army, or at least with as much force as would suffice to bar the passage to the enemy.”

In May 1904 the Japanese 1st Army was in the Feng-huang-cheng region, supported and reinforced on the side of Kuan-tien-cheng by the reserve (*Kobi*) brigade of General Yoshida, on that of 'Taku-shan by the newly disembarked 10th Division. General Keller therefore could say, like Marshal Berwick, that his opponent, with a definite plan of operations, could “throw the whole of his forces at once upon any point that suited his purpose.”

It was the business of the Russian general, therefore, to “think out an emplacement” that would enable him to “arrive anywhere” with all his forces. Lang-tzu-shan—'Ta-wan was clearly the right “emplacement” in the present case. From this region he could move his strong reserve towards any point of the front of defence (omitting the 'Taku-shan—Hai-cheng road, guarded by the II Siberian Corps).

“This war,” continued Berwick, “appeared at first extraordinary and very difficult, but I can vouch for it that, by following out the idea I had formed, it was most easy. All that was necessary was to be well informed of the enemy's moves, and to work the shuttle to and fro * as required.”

* *Faire des navettes à propos.* This phrase has passed into current use in French military literature, but seems to defy perfect translation into English.—T.R.

General Keller had his reporters—the sotnias which, supported by infantry, stood beyond the Middle Fen-shui-ling and the Mo-tu-ling at Tu-men-tzu and Sai-ma-chi. It remained to solve the problem of “working the shuttle” judiciously.

If the Japanese stood still in their places on the various approaches while their main attack made itself palpable upon one of them, then the reporters would be able to give the commander the necessary data for setting the “shuttle” to work.

But if the enemy had recourse to feints, delivered by small forces along all the approaches, all the reporting organs would ring the alarm bell together, and the shuttle could not be set in the right direction.

Organized resistance on each avenue was the only way of seeing into the enemy's intentions; and organs of resistance, as well as organs of information, must be placed on all approaches.

Berwick proceeds: “As my whole system depended upon the preservation of the middle point of my line, I thought it essential to make sure of it. Briançon, therefore . . .”

The middle point of the line of resistance in the present case was the Mandarin Road. What was required, therefore, was the organization at Fen-shui-ling East, or, better, more to the front—somewhere between the pass and Tu-men-tzu—of a strong line of resistance. In one month Berwick made of Briançon “a post so excellent that a dozen battalions sufficed to defend it against a whole army.”

There could be no question of placing a dozen battalions towards Tu-men-tzu, but what was possible and necessary was that the 9th E.S. Regiment should be put in a "post" that was sufficiently well organized to stand the attack of very superior forces for several days. To-day, with the powerful artillery now available, provisional works enable one to hold barrier-positions, hills, or defiles for an appreciable time. In the present case it would have given a very solid barrage for the Mandarin Road with a minimum infantry garrison.

"I put five battalions into the Valley of Queyras, twelve in the camp of Tournoux." Had Berwick commanded in 1904 he would certainly have established a barrier-position across the Sai-ma-chi—Pa-li-king road, another* in front of the Mo-tu-ling, a third in front of the San-tao-ling, and a fourth before Middle Fen-shui-ling. In each of these positions he would have put a garrison, to which fortification would have given a capacity for resistance out of all proportion to its small numbers.

In this way the shuttle could have played to and fro accurately.

The posts created and the manœuvres designed in 1709 enabled Berwick, who was fighting only in a secondary theatre of war, to give a very interesting example of the principle of "economy of force" as applied in strategy.

"As a proof that I thought my defences sound,"

* The main or central post, it will be remembered, is supposed to be on the Mandarin Road, in front of Fen-shui-ling East.—Tr.

he says, "the next year I gave up, on my own initiative, twenty of my eighty-four battalions to enable the king to augment his armies elsewhere."

It is not only to the soundness of Berwick's dispositions that this sentence bears witness. It indicates also a loftiness of character rare, perhaps unique, in history.

Towards the latter half of May General Keller had elaborated his dispositions; the Japanese, too, had organized themselves about Feng-huang-cheng.

Contact between the hostile outposts was close, both at Tu-men-tzu and Chiao-cha-tsien, and in this intricate ground no patrol of either side managed to get through the enemy's line of observation. Chinese spies were the only means of obtaining information, and the news brought by these was generally inaccurate. When the Cossacks obtained information, it was more inaccurate still.

General Rennenkampf was at Ai-yang-cheng, the junction of three routes: from Kuan-tien-cheng on Sai-ma-chi (a bad road); from Feng-huang-cheng by the Ai-ho valley and Shih-ta-cheng (track); and from Feng-huang-cheng by San-tao-kou (track). The first and last of these were watched, but the second was left unguarded. Attacked by General Yoshida (Guard *Kobi* Brigade) with two battalions and a squadron by the Kuan-tien-cheng road, he was suddenly surprised on his right flank by a battalion and a battery under General Sasaki (12th Brigade of 12th Division), and fell back to Sai-ma-chi, where

he reported that he had had to deal with a whole infantry division.

Next day, May 29, a Chinaman told him that the enemy was working round the east side of Sai-ma-chi, aiming at Mukden. Without taking the trouble to verify the report, he struck a blow in the air towards Cheng-chang with half his force, while the other half retired in the direction of Chiao-tou, and were received by the 23rd E.S. Regiment at North Fen-shui-ling. Colonel Kartzev,* retiring on East Fen-shui-ling, was followed by some of the enemy, and reported that Sai-ma-chi was occupied by "at least 3,000 infantry, with a battery." †

General Kuropatkin thereupon ordered a reconnaissance towards Sai-ma-chi and Feng-huang-cheng.

General Keller had at his disposal 11 battalions (10th (less 1 battalion), 11th and 12th E.S. at Lang-tzu-shan, 22nd E.S. at Ta-wan), and 2 of the 9th E.S. Regiment were on the East Fen-shui-ling near Lien-shan-kuan.

General Romanov, with 6-5-1, was to march on June 1 by the Mandarin Road, and to push as far as Hsueh-hi-tien, General Keller moving the same day with 8-0-2 (and a few cavalry) from Lien-shan-kuan on Sai-ma-chi by Tsui-chia-tang. The Chiao-tou troops were to move forward on Sai-ma-chi, and attack in concert with Count Keller. Lastly, to replace the general reserve at Lang-tzu-shan, now unoccupied, Kuropatkin sent up the 2nd Brigade of the 2nd E.S. Division.

* See pp. 146, 153. —Tr

† *Revue militaire des Armées étrangères.*

Sai-ma-chi, thus attacked on two of its three avenues, was empty. There had never been any Japanese there except one or two reconnoitring *Kobi* companies of General Yoshida's command, which had merely come and gone.

General Keller's troops had marched for fifteen hours in severe weather. Many of them had left their boots sticking in the mud. Keller, however, unwilling to admit the fiasco, asked leave to push on to Ai-yang-cheng to see what might be there.

At this moment General Romanov was at Tu-men-tzu, not yet beyond the Russian outpost line (1 battalion of the 9th E.S. Regiment). The pass of Mo-tu-ling was guarded only by its original garrison (2-0- $\frac{1}{4}$).

Vague rumours of an advance of the 1st Army on Liao-Yang led Kuropatkin to recall General Keller's expedition. Romanov came back likewise, and on June 4 everybody was again in the old positions, greatly fatigued, and minus the satisfaction of having seen or done anything useful in the interval.

This manœuvre in the air, carried out without points of support to secure it, could not possibly have succeeded. "Shuttle-play" is only feasible under cover of centres of resistance prepared in advance. Such centres at Tu-men-tzu and in front of the Mo-tu-ling, each capable of defending itself for several days, would have enabled Keller to carry on his investigations to Ai-yang-cheng. If such a centre had been created in the middle of May at Sai-ma-chi it would have been known that only Japanese reservists were in front of it,

and moreover that they had been repulsed; and the false manœuvre of June 1 would not have taken place.

No sooner was all quiet again than the Japanese pushed up reconnaissances, and anxiety was re-awakened in the Russian camp.

On June 7 Grekov * reported 15,000 Japanese north of Ai-yang-cheng, and a division advancing from Feng-huang-cheng. On the 11th General Keller prepared another expedition to Sai-ma-chi with a brigade and four guns. Fortunately he took the precaution to have infantry mounted scouts with him to act as divisional cavalry, and through them he learned that the Japanese had again evacuated Sai-ma-chi.

On the 16th, still in doubt, General Keller advanced again, this time on Feng-huang-cheng by the Mandarin Road and the track over the Mo-tu-ling. In the evening he issued his orders for the attack of Hsueh-hi-tien. The badness of the roads and the severe weather made the march exceedingly trying, above all for the artillery.

At the moment of attacking, Keller realized that he had indeed in front of him at Feng-huang-cheng the main body of the 1st Army. He realized, too, that he had no supporting position close behind him—no “camp,” as Berwick would have said—that, in fact, he was in the air, and exceedingly insecure. Thereupon he fired a few shells, and gave the order “about turn.”

“Next day, the 18th, the troops resumed their

* Commanding troops at Chiao-tou.—TR.

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old positions about the passes. The Japanese on their side reoccupied their former outpost positions."

Another false manœuvre.

"If the enemy is free to act he can act, he can disturb our manœuvre. We have to guarantee ourselves against his possible action," says General Maillard.*

Berwick secured the free working of the shuttle by establishing entrenched camps on the dangerous approaches. Thanks to these, he could move the main body of his army wherever he judged their presence necessary. He was free to manœuvre; the enemy could not infringe on his freedom.

Failing to follow these principles, the Russian army in the Fen-shui-ling mountains was the plaything of events, at the mercy of Chinese and Cossack fables.

Failing to assure its liberty of action, it was unable to do any useful work.

C. THE MOVE TOWARDS PORT ARTHUR

- In the middle of May † the Eastern Detachment, established in the Fen-shui-ling mountains, barred to the Japanese 1st Army the Feng-huang-cheng—Liao-Yang or Mandarin Road, and the adjacent approaches.

The Southern Detachment (I Siberian Corps) watched the coast about Ying-kou (Niu-chuang port).

* *Eléments de la Guerre.*

† See Map VII.

The II Siberian Corps (5th E.S. Division), to the command of which Zasulich was appointed, was in process of formation in the Hai-cheng—Liao-Yang region.

The IV Siberian Corps was being gradually organized on the nucleus of the newly arrived 2nd Siberian * Division.

Kuroki's army not having persisted in its advance, the commander of the Russian Army of Manchuria had not carried out his intention of drawing back to the north. Nevertheless, in some uncertainty as to the decision to be taken, he had recalled Zikov's mixed brigade† from Wafang-tien,‡ in order to have it within call in case of a retirement to Mukden.

On May 6, hearing of the disembarkation of General Oku's army near Pi-tzu-wo, Kuropatkin decided to stand fast at Liao-Yang, but somewhat half-heartedly and unwillingly.

He was in this frame of mind when Admiral Alexeiev, the Viceroy, coming back from Port Arthur by one of the last trains that were able to get through, demanded the opening of active operations, in order to give the defenders of the fortress the assistance of which admittedly they stood in need.

From the first news of the Japanese landing on the Liao-Tung peninsula General Stessel's

* To be distinguished from East Siberian. Throughout the present work the latter are referred to by the initials E.S. only.—Tr.

† 2nd/9th E.S. Brigade, Primorsk Dragoons, and 1 H.A. battery.—Tr.

‡ On the Port Arthur railway line, somewhat to the north of Port Adams.—Tr.

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telegrams had been of the most alarming kind, and it must be said there was plenty of cause for his lamentations. The fortifications were still unfit to stand a siege. Both the divisions in the place were required for its defence, but at the same time the fortress was only provided with food and stores for one.* The squadron would not be fit to put to sea for a long time yet, and therefore it could not escape if the place were captured, etc.

On the 19th Alexeiev, who shared Stessel's fears, echoed them in a letter which he addressed to the army commander, urging that active steps should be taken to disengage Port Arthur.

On the 26th Oku's army won the action of Nan-shan.† It was feared that an open-force assault would bring about the fall of Port Arthur and the capture of the squadron. Kuropatkin's inactivity was universally blamed. None but a man of the very highest strength of character could have resisted the universal feeling.

In this letter of May 19 the Viceroy required General Kuropatkin to begin his operations, and gave him the choice of two alternatives :

(a) To leave a protective force towards Yang-kou and the peninsula and to act with the rest of the army against Kuroki.

(b) To contain Kuroki's army and march against Oku's.

Either of these alternatives would involve the abandonment of the plan of operations which

* The intended garrison. See p. 93.—*Tr.*

† At the isthmus of Chin-chou.

Kuropatkin had set himself to follow, and in which he placed all his confidence.

At the moment of his arrival in Manchuria, General Kuropatkin, in framing his plan of campaign, had said: "No operations will be undertaken until we have the assured numerical superiority. Nothing is to happen before August." In execution of this intention he had told General Kashtalinski (April 18) to hinder the Japanese at the passage of the Yalu and during his advance on the Fen-shui-ling mountains, "to ascertain his forces, dispositions, and lines of march" and to avoid any decisive engagement against superior forces.*

Four days later he began modulating into a new key. "The Eastern Detachment must not retreat too hurriedly, but is to keep close contact with the enemy." Again, a little later, "I am confident that you will meet the enemy with a tenacious resistance." And lastly, when Zasulich announced that "a Knight of the Order of St. George does not retreat," Kuropatkin did not recall him, though it was evident that he could neither understand nor carry out his mission.

General Zasulich was not the only one who thought it wrong to retire. The *amour-propre* of the Russian officers was gravely wounded by the notion of giving ground before the army of what they refused to consider as a civilized nation.

Zasulich's opinion, in fine, was that of the environment in which Kuropatkin lived, and little by little the General-in-Chief succumbed to

* See p. 110.

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his environment. He never lost sight of the fact that to accept a decisive engagement before his army was assembled was perilous, but his orders little by little lost in clearness, and more and more there crept into them suggestions of resistance.

When, however, Admiral Alexeiev intervened with his letter of May 19, Kuropatkin had come to realize, from the sequel of the Yalu engagement, that he had done very ill in yielding to the pressure of his *entourage*. He had resolved to return to his original scheme, and he refused to agree to the Viceroy's proposals.

He declared it to be contrary to the "principles of concentration" to bring on the decision while his means were insufficient. He showed that in three months the required forces would have come up. Then he would attack, for then and only then would he possess the means to win.

On May 23 the Viceroy sent his chief of staff, General Filinski, to the army commander to induce him to act. But Kuropatkin again stood firm.

On the 27th Kuropatkin was summoned to Mukden. It was the day after Nan-shan, and his resolution began to waver.

First a reinforcement was sent to the cavalry posted at Wa-fang-tien, then some battalions of the 1st E.S. Division were despatched by rail to Wa-fang-kou ('Te-li-ssu). But these moves were rather in the nature of "eye wash," meant to pacify an authority that Kuropatkin dared not flatly disobey.

On June 4 the highest authority of all intervened:

“*To ADMIRAL ALEXEIEV, Aide-de-Camp General,
Mukden*

“Grave fears being entertained for the safety of Port Arthur, I consider it absolutely necessary that the most decisive steps should be taken to preserve it from the blows of the Japanese army.

“I indicate neither the means to be used nor the direction to be taken, leaving these matters to the decision of the person whom I have entrusted with the full powers of Commander-in-Chief. But I consider that in the circumstances the time has come for the Army of Manchuria to open its campaign, for any further waiting for reinforcements may result in our being still inactive when the rainy season begins, and that Port Arthur will consequently be left wholly unsupported by the army.

“Inform General Kuropatkin that I place upon him the entire responsibility for the fate of Port Arthur.*

“NICHOLAS.”

We are only concerned with the lessons for the future, and our work therefore has no claim to fix the responsibilities for the past.

The event showed that the anxiety felt at Port Arthur, at Mukden, and at St. Petersburg regarding the security of the fortress was groundless.

* Telegram produced at the Stessel court-martial, printed by the *Russki Invalid* (trans. *Revue mil. des Armées étrangères*).

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The siege of Port Arthur was pushed on with the very utmost violence and fury, and yet, when after 241 days it surrendered, its capacity for resistance was—as the Stessel court-martial showed—by no means exhausted.

It was Kuropatkin's desire to reach August without a serious engagement. By that time he would have collected, at or north of Liao-Yang, the means of winning. Now, Port Arthur in fact resisted not merely up to August, but up to the following January.

An accurate estimate of the situation should therefore have permitted Kuropatkin, without any handicap on account of Port Arthur, to organize the Army of Manchuria for the great battle that was not to take place until he had a numerical superiority.

But Stessel's alarms found an echo in high places, and Kuropatkin's hand was forced. All the same, the whole responsibility for the unhappy Manchurian campaign falls upon the army commander.

Is this just or unjust?

In 1800 Napoleon, in full enjoyment of his authority as First Consul and the prestige that his victories had given him, proposed to Moreau that the latter should cross the Rhine between Schaffhausen and Constance, so as to turn the Black Forest and to fight Kray with reversed fronts. He sent for Dessolle, Moreau's chief of staff, to acquaint him with the idea, but soon

perceived that Moreau was not great enough to execute his project.* And he left him to carry out his own scheme.†

Napoleon himself had, four years before this, in a letter to the Directory, expressed his view as to the necessity of the general's having a free hand :

“HEADQUARTERS, LODI, 25 Floréal an IV.

“ . . . For this it is necessary not only that there should be a single general, but also that nothing should interfere with him in his movements and operations.

“ I have conducted the campaign hitherto without consulting anybody. I should have done no good if I had had to bring myself into harmony with some one else's views.

“ In the present position of the Republic's affairs in Italy it is absolutely necessary that you should have a general in whom you place entire confidence.

“ If this person were some other than myself I should not complain, but I should redouble my efforts to deserve your esteem in the post to which you might appoint me. Every one has his own way of making war. . . .”

* *i.e.* the combined play of the Army of the Rhine, the Army of Reserve, and the Army of Italy, of which the opening phase was to have been a rapid neutralization of Kray's Austrians.—Tr.

† Dessolle himself thus describes the aim of his mission and his interview with the First Consul : “ Moreau wished to cross the Rhine at Strassburg—Breisach and Basel, and, once the crossing was effected, to reassemble the army in Swabia. He asked to be relieved of his command if the First Consul persisted in his project of passage by Schaffhausen. The First Consul would not accept Moreau's resignation, and in the end accepted his project, very unwillingly, but without the slightest modification.”—Captain de Cugnac, *Armée de Réserve*.

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Bonaparte was ambitious—no man more so. At the time of his Italian campaign his fortune was not yet made, and yet without hesitation he challenged a yea-and-nay answer to the question of a free hand.

The mind of Kuropatkin conceived the plan of campaign which was best calculated to assure victory over the armies which Japan had landed, or might land, in Manchuria. When another scheme was set before him he accepted the task of its execution, although he had no confidence in it. The Russian general's character was less eminent than his intellect.

In our day, when masses of men have to be moved, fed, and manœuvred, when weapons have come into use which spread instantaneously a great wave of terror, and inflict the heaviest punishment on the least error, when there are the numerous and varied auxiliary services to co-ordinate, the General-in-Chief needs a brain of the first class. To command, to make decisions which in most cases there is no chance of revising, it is a character of the first class that is required.

This, indeed, is no novelty. Character has always been as necessary to the warrior as the capacity for great ideas.

“A warrior must have,” says Napoleon, “as much character as genius. Men with much genius and little character are the least suited to be warriors; they are ships made top-heavy by too over-rigging and under-ballasting. It is better to have much character and little genius; men thus gifted often succeed. In this profession of

arms, *the base must equal the height*. It is will, character, application, and boldness that have made me what I am."

General Kuropatkin had already shown, in the matter of the Yalu manœuvre, that the "base was not equal to the height." In agreeing to carry out a plan which he judged a bad one he showed himself wanting in force of character. The campaign that followed shows us a ship, tall-masted and full-rigged, but, for want of ballast, doomed to capsize.

CHAPTER V.

THE JAPANESE TAKE CONTACT

A. THE 1ST ARMY IN KOREA

IN studying the Japanese general plan, we have already seen that considerations of naval strategy led to the opening of hostilities at a moment when the ice forbade approach to the shores of the Liao-Tung; when, therefore, only indirect action was possible against the fortress of Port Arthur.

The 12th Division, preceded by four of its battalions which were put ashore on February 8, landed at Chemulpo as early as the 17th. The disembarkation was rapid, for Chemulpo was a commercial port, and additional works had been begun on the 9th.* Thus the 12th Division was ashore and complete by the 27th.

Korea had accepted the hegemony of Japan on the 23rd. Japanese troops had installed themselves, undisturbed, at Gen-san, Fu-san, and Masampo,† as well as at Seoul and Chemulpo.

* See p. 50.

† Ports on the east and south-east coasts of Korea.—TR.

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On the 13th China had issued a declaration of neutrality, authorizing the belligerents to operate in Manchuria, but reserving the sovereignty of this province, and fixing the line of the Liao-ho as the western limit of the theatre of war.

As soon as its disembarkation was complete, the 12th Division had commenced its march to the Yalu by way of the Mandarin Road,* that from Seoul passes by way of Ping-Yang, Anju, Wiju, Liao-Yang, etc., to Peking.

The information received showed that, east of the Yalu, the Russians had only a Cossack brigade, and that none of the enemy had penetrated farther than Ping-Yang.

A small Japanese detachment (one company lightly equipped and a supply unit) had succeeded in landing farther north, near Hai-ju.† These were able to reach Ping-Yang by the 21st, two days ahead of the 12th Cavalry (divisional regiment of the 12th Division). A Cossack detachment was driven back, and the town remained definitively in Japanese hands. It was a walled town, and even if the Cossacks returned in great force they would not be able to storm it.‡ It was, further, a point of passage over the Tai-tong river, which was difficult to cross at the moment when the thaw swelled its volume. The town and the river thus formed a *tête-de-pont* covering the port

* See Map III.

† Whence the Mandarin Road could be reached at a point sixty miles beyond Seoul.—TR.

‡ The capture of Ping-Yang by the Japanese, under General Nodzu, on September 15, 1894, had cost them 705 casualties.—TR.

of Chinampo, where the Japanese General Staff proposed to land the two other divisions that, with the 12th, were to form the 1st Army. Lastly, this important town contained supplies which enabled the 12th Division to live until coasting vessels could come inshore and revictual the troops.

The supply question was a very difficult one. The country itself was poor, and in addition vehicles could not follow the troops because of the badness of the Mandarin Road, which in the thaw degenerated into a muddy track. The vehicles had, in fact, to be left behind almost at the outset; and only the fact of their being mountain artillery with pack transport enabled the guns to keep up.

Under such exhausting conditions, the 170 miles between Chemulpo and Ping-Yang were covered by March 18.

It may well be imagined that the Japanese Headquarters did not commit the whole 1st Army to this sorry path. Even if it had intended to do so it would have had to abandon the intention.

On March 10 came the thaw, and Chinampo was open to the transports. At once the construction of landing-stages for the disembarkation of the 2nd and Guard Divisions was taken in hand. These divisions, mobilized at the same time as the 12th, had concentrated at Hiroshima, and began to leave Japan on the 14th, a cruiser squadron convoying them. On the 25th the Guard finished

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its landing, on the 29th the entire 2nd Division was on the soil of Korea.

The three divisions from this date formed the 1st Army under General Kuroki.

While the 1st Army assembled about Ping-Yang, an advanced guard—at first small and light, but soon raised to five battalions, eight squadrons, two mountain batteries, one engineer company, a bridging train, and half a field ambulance—advanced to the Che-chen river at Anju.

In rear of the advanced guard, road repairs were carried out on a large scale, in spite of the half-frozen earth, in order to allow the vehicles of the 1st Army to travel. The work, however, was soon undone by a thaw, which transformed the country into a vast marsh.

On March 27 General Asada, with the advanced guard, crossed to the north side of the Che-chen: next day he had an engagement with the Chita regiment of Cossacks, after which the latter, seeing the Japanese infantry, fell back to the Yalu without keeping touch.

Covered by Asada's force, the Guard engineer battalion bridged the Ta-ing river (70 yards), while that of the 12th Division built a bridge of 50 yards' length over the Che-chen.

The general disposition of the army was as follows: First the advanced guard, then the main body in three columns, Guard in the centre, 2nd near the coast, 12th on the right.

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ORDRE DE BATAILLE

1st ARMY

Army Commander, General KUROKI

Chief of Staff, General FUJII

12TH DIVISION, General INOUE (Chief of Staff, Lieut.-Col. OHARA)

12TH BRIGADE (General SASAKI)	23RD BRIGADE (General KIGOSHI)	Divisional Troops				
14th Inf. (3 batns.) 47th Inf. (3 batns.)	24th Inf. (3 batns.) 46th Inf. (3 batns.)	12th Regt. Mount. Art. (6 batns. = 36 guns)	12th Cav. (3 sqs.)	12th Eng. Batn. (3 cos.)	12th Sanitary Detach- ment	12th Train Batn.
			12-3-6			

2ND DIVISION, General NISHI (Chief of Staff, Colonel ISHIBASHI)

3RD BRIGADE (General MATSUNAGA)	15TH BRIGADE (General OKASAKI)	Divisional Troops				
4th Inf. (3 batns.) 29th Inf. (3 batns.)	16th Inf. (3 batns.) 30th Inf. (3 batns.)	2nd F.A. Regt. (6 batns. = 36 guns)	2nd Cav. (3 sqs.)	2nd Eng. Batn. (3 cos.)	2nd Sanitary Detach- ment	2nd Train Batn.
			12-3-6			

GUARD DIVISION, General HASEGAWA (Chief of Staff, Colonel
SHIGEMI)

1st GUARD BRIGADE (General ASADA)	2nd GUARD BRIGADE (General WATANABE)	Divisional Troops				
1st and 2nd Guard Regts. (6 batns.)	3rd and 4th Guard Regts. (6 batns.)	Guard F.A. Regt. (6 batns. = 36 guns)	Guard Cav. (3 sqs.)	Guard Eng. Batn. (3 cos.)	Guard Sanitary Detach- ment	Guard Train Batn.
			12-3-6			

ARMY TROOPS: Heavy F.A. Regt. (5 four-gun batteries of 4.7 in. howitzers)

Total * **36-9-23**

* = 40,000 combatants, all ranks.—Tr.

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On April 1 General Asada resumed his march towards the Yalu, with the following troops under his orders: 2nd Cavalry, 1st Guard Infantry, 2 mountain batteries, 12th Artillery = 3-3-2; with 1 company Guard engineers, half sanitary detachment, half-section infantry ammunition column and half-section artillery ammunition column.

The advanced guard was thus formed of troops belonging to each of the three divisions. It is easy to explain the employment of the batteries of the 12th: the condition of the road was such that only mountain batteries could move freely. But it is not so easy to understand why Asada had the divisional cavalry of the 2nd Division and not that of the Guard.

Was the idea to inaugurate a roster of duties, or to give all the divisions alike the honour of being represented in the advanced guard? These are questions of no particular interest to us.

The point that we should notice is that such an amalgamation from several divisions is especially undesirable in the case of an advanced guard.

An advanced guard marches in several groups, separated by considerable distances. It fights by groups, dispersed over a wide front. Cohesion between its various elements is therefore difficult to maintain, and hence it is the more necessary that it should be strong in the first instance.

Further, a detachment pushed out at a considerable distance from the main body—isolated from it, as General Asada was isolated—has to be prepared to struggle against superior forces.

Hence it will have to manœuvre in difficult conditions that will call for the joint action of all its parts towards a single rapidly chosen objective. Such co-operation will be the more feasible in proportion as the troops are accustomed to work in concert, under their habitual chief, or some other leader known to them.

In the given case, short of some very convincing reason to the contrary, the advanced guard should have included elements belonging, like General Asada himself, to the Guard.

The Emperor William I., in the days before 1870, was for long a partisan of a "heterogeneous" advanced guard, *i.e.* one made up, like Asada's, from different units.

He considered, very rightly, that there were grave objections to the mixing up of units. Now, with an advanced guard containing part of the unit at the head and part of the unit at the tail of the main body, it would be feasible, at the moment of engagement, to reconstitute the larger units by placing the advanced guard portion of the leading unit to the left and that of the rear unit to the right. Thus when the advanced guard engagement developed into the battle proper, it was possible to bring the larger units abreast without intermingling, the leading unit deploying to the left, the rear to the right. However, the want of homogeneity of the advanced guard and the objections to applying sealed-pattern arrangements to different particular cases in the end induced the king to give up the idea.

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General Asada's advanced guard continued to cover the 1st Army as far as the Yalu, without being relieved of its duties by other portions of the army. "A large advanced guard can be entrusted with protective duties, at the halt and on the move, for several consecutive days," says our *Field Service Regulations*. The example of Asada's advanced guard furnishes a practical confirmation of the soundness of this prescription.

It included, we may observe, ammunition columns. As a rule, reserve ammunition vehicles belonging to such units follow, not the advanced guard, but the main body of a column, as it is of great importance to avoid a string of vehicles between advanced guard and main body. In the present case, however, Asada's command was rather an advanced detachment, self-contained, than an advanced guard to other forces. It was two days ahead of the main body.

In a European theatre of war an advanced guard consisting only of half a brigade of all arms could not as a rule be pushed out two days' march ahead of the main body without courting disaster. It would be too weak in cavalry to see, and too weak in rifles and guns to hold the ground gained. At the first threat of the enemy it would have to retire, without having seen anything. An army advanced guard of this strength would only be permissible in Europe if it were meant to act in support of the army

cavalry * when the latter were sent forth in search of information. In such a case it would be the cavalry, strictly speaking, that was the army advanced guard, while the mixed detachment's only object would be to give the cavalry freedom to accomplish its difficult mission.

The Japanese 1st Army in Korea, we must not forget, was peculiarly situated, and we must be careful not to attempt the transplantation of its methods into our own soil till we have determined whether they will bear transplanting.


During the march from Ping-Yang to the Yalu General Kuroki was not once called upon to meet any hostile counter-move. It is therefore not even possible to estimate the tactical soundness of the measures adopted in this peculiar theatre of operations.

The 1st Army had to surmount the very serious obstacles presented by the climate and the terrain; and when we remember how in 1812 the best army in the world, under an incomparable leader, found its death, we must recognize that it was no small test of Kuroki's worth to bring his army to the Yalu at all.

* "Army cavalry" is our independent cavalry; an army advanced guard corresponds in position to our "protective" line, and in composition is a large self-contained force of all arms—such as under our regulations would be produced by the augmentation of the "protective" troops to form a strategic advanced guard (sections 65 (6) and 66 (1) *Field Service Regulations*, Part I.).

The principle and employment of such a great "army advanced guard" is the mainspring of the modern French school of strategy and tactics.—Tr.

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From Ping-Yang onwards the three divisions formed a single long column on the Mandarin Road, protected on its right only by weak flanking detachments. The order of march is shown in the annexed diagram.*

The advanced guard had a two days' lead from the first. Then came the first half of the 12th Division as head of the main body. Half a day's march behind its tail followed the other half. Three marches in rear came the head of the Guard, and so on, a small rearguard closing the procession.

The average day's progress was five to six miles.

The Guard cavalry kept up communication with the littoral. The artillery and its wagons were able to proceed only because the infantry pushed and pulled at the wheels, while the engineers filled up the holes in the road. As the supply vehicles were not able to move, all revictualling was done by sea, and the advanced guard was more concerned with the protection of the small "field depots"†

* *Rev. mil. des Armées étrangères.*

† *British Field Service Regulations, Part II., sect. 39 (8).*

formed by the fleet at Boto and Ri-ka-ho than with the enemy's doings.

On April 8 the rain began to fall in torrents, and the march became more trying than ever. At the moment the army was crossing the Che-chen and Ta-ing rivers. The bridge made by the Guards over the latter was carried away, and as there was no matériel available to replace it nearer than Japan, the two halves of the Guard remained separated by the river, now a wholly impassable obstacle. The 2nd Division's bridge over the Che-chen was already on the point of breaking down at the moment when the troops came up. The danger was met by overloading the bridge with heavy stones, so that it was anchored, with the roadway two to three feet under water. On the 11th, when the water had subsided, the whole division crossed, the bridge was then taken up, and the pontoons used to reconstruct the Guards' bridge over the Ta-ing. The army was then able to resume its march.

On April 14 the 12th Division joined Asada's advanced guard at Wiju. On the 21st the whole army was assembled on the left bank of the Yalu, where the heavy artillery, transported by sea to Ri-ka-ho, joined it.

At this date (the 21st) General Kuroki had a considerable superiority in numbers over the enemy, and was well aware of it. Nevertheless, he did not take the offensive, spending his time and energy instead in the most meticulous preparations.

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This procedure, at this moment of tension in which Europe was asking itself what might be the military value of this nation of new-comers, gave General Kuroki a reputation for exaggerated prudence that not even his bold handling of the 1st Army at Liao-Yang altogether effaced.

Meantime, the 2nd Army, in its transports off the island of Sinmido, stood in readiness either to assist the 1st, if need be, or to proceed on its way to Port Arthur.

By the end of April the object sought by the Japanese General Staff in establishing the 1st Army in Korea—indirect action against Port Arthur—was effected. The Russians had sent two divisions towards Korea and the Yalu. Other forces had been held at Liao-Yang, and at the news of the battle of May 1 even Zikov's brigade * was recalled. This unit, at Wa-fang-tien, had been in a position to watch the coast towards Pi-tzu-wo and Yen-tai Bay, to hamper the preliminary operations of landing and to gain time for reinforcements to come up by rail. By Zikov's withdrawal General Oku (2nd Army) was relieved not only of all opposition to his landing, but also of all unwelcome observation.

The 1st Army had suffered greatly, but it had enabled the Headquarter Staff to achieve its object. The will-power of the Japanese, which was to become more and more evident as the campaign proceeded, even thus early made itself felt.

* See p. 170.

B. THE CROSSING OF THE YALU

On April 28 the 1st Army was ready to attempt the passage of the Yalu by open force.

The main arm of the Yalu in the neighbourhood of the islands, and the islands themselves, were in the hands of the Japanese. The Russians were posted on the heights of the right bank of the Yalu at Antung, but from Antung northward it was a smaller river, the Ai-ho, which formed the wet ditch of their position; and this river is fordable in many places—indeed, it can be crossed almost everywhere by men wading waist-deep. The 1st Army's own bridging equipment and that lent to it by the 2nd Army had been used to form numerous pontoon bridges between the various islands, while, in addition, timber in quantity—the produce of a concession to a Russian syndicate for exploiting the Korean forests, accumulated near the Yalu mouth—was available for improvised trestle bridges.

The Russian cannonades of the preceding days, and the inspection of the amphitheatre of hills opposite, on which every movement of the Russians could be detected with good glasses, and the spy service, had given the Japanese staff very complete information of Zasulich's strength and dispositions. Then, and then only, General Kuroki gave the order for the attack (see Map IV).

SHASANDO, 10 a.m., *April 28, 1904.*

(1) The 12th Division to cross the Yalu at Sui-ku-chin on the night of the 29th, and to occupy the north and

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south ridge to the east of Hsia-ling-lao-kou* and Li-tzu-yuen; left to rest on hill 955. A detachment to march down the right bank of the river and occupy hill 630. The duty of the 12th Division is to cover the passage of the main army; a further detachment from the division to be sent round the right by Chiao-chia-kou to threaten the enemy's left and rear. Continuing its march, the 12th to occupy the line Sa-lan-kou—hill "K" (west of Li-tzu-yuen) on May 1.

(2) The 2nd Division to rendezvous near Shasando (east of Wiju) by 10 a.m. on the 30th, and, starting at midnight, to march via bridges C, A, E, and F, and occupy a line on Chukodai island before dawn on May 1. The artillery of the division to be in position on Kintei island opposite Chukodai, ready to open fire at daybreak on the 30th.

(3) The Guard to rendezvous between Wiju and Hibokudo by 10 a.m. on the 30th; this division to follow the 2nd over the same bridges and take up a line between it and the 12th.

(4) The howitzers to take up a position on Kintei island on the night of the 29th.

(5) The reserves (5 battalions, 5 squadrons) to rendezvous on Kyuri island by 4 a.m. on May 1, with the exception of one battalion, which is to be stationed on the left of the howitzer position to protect the artillery on Kintei island.

One rarely meets in field operations an order in which everything is regulated two days in advance with such detail and minuteness. However, the orders were in fact carried out exactly.

The commander of the 1st Army arranged everything beforehand as if for a review. This was reckoning without the enemy, and the event showed that he was right.

On April 30 the 12th Division advanced between the Ai-ho and the Yalu, driving before it without

* Ravine just east of Sa-lan-kou.

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difficulty the small scout detachments of Lieut.-Colonel Linda. On the same day, at 10 a.m. and then again at 1 p.m., the Japanese artillery directed a violent fire upon the two Russian batteries on Telegraph* and Ma-kou Hills, and silenced them.†

On May 1 Kuroki's 45,000 men were launched to the attack of the 5,400 rifles and 17 guns on the other side of the water.‡

At dawn the Guard Division was in the islands on the left bank of the Ai-ho, its left north-east of Chiu-lien-cheng, its right south of Li-tzu-yuan, its batteries on Tiger Hill—hill 630.

The 12th Division, to the right, fringed the Ai-ho, its batteries north of Li-tzu-yuan.

The 2nd Division, to the left, extended as far as the right of the howitzers on Kintei island; in front of the latter and thus on the left front of the infantry were the divisional batteries, opposite Chiu-lien-cheng.

The batteries on the islands, *i.e.* the 2nd Division and howitzer batteries, were commanded by the Russians (vertical interval 320 feet). The Japanese therefore had protected them by strong epaulements, which were hidden from the enemy's view by dummy forests made of branches brought up for the purpose. Channels had been cut to bring up water for sprinkling the ground in front of the guns, so as to prevent tell-tale clouds of dust arising from the concussion of the discharges.

* Telegraph Hill is "Suri-bachi-yama" on the map in Part I British *Official History*, "Conical Hill" on map 3, vol. i. of the *British Officers' Reports*.—Tr. † See Map IV. ‡ See Map V.

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The minuteness of the orders was answered by minuteness in all the details of execution. Eight to one as the odds were on their side, the Japanese were somewhat awed by the grand drama that was about to be enacted.

At 5 a.m. on May 1 the Japanese artillery opened fire with more than 50 guns at once, and for the next two hours it covered the Russian position with shells. The infantry remained lying down. No one, evidently, was disposed to commit imprudences, and it was expected that the guns would have done more than half of the work before the infantry advanced. For their guns—12 field, 6 mountain, and 5 howitzer batteries, 128 pieces in all—were overwhelmingly superior to the 17* of the Russians on Telegraph and Ma-kou Hills, and it was desired to exploit this superiority to the full.

At last, a little before 7 a.m., the infantry moved to the attack by rushes. The firing line became thicker and thicker, and it was in a dense swarm that the 2nd and Guard Divisions crossed the Ai-ho and closed on the Russian position that General Zasulich had just given the order to evacuate.

The struggle was brief, and had not necessitated any great efforts. Not only were the Japanese greatly superior in guns and rifles, but also the enemy had gone of his own accord, fighting only for the power of retreating.

Yet at 9 a.m. the Guard and 2nd Divisions

* Two batteries, less 1 gun disabled on the 30th and 2 guns detached to Ching-kou.

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came to a full stop, and voluntarily forewent the fruits of their victory.

Was it fatigue that caused this halt?

The troops had passed a sleepless night in getting into position for the battle.

From 5 to 7 a.m. the Japanese guns had sowed the hills of the left bank with its shells, then at 7 a.m. in a few minutes it had crushed the 13 Russian guns the instant they revealed their positions. When the infantry advanced, therefore, it was powerfully supported by a great number of guns shooting undisturbed. Nevertheless, the emotion of the infantry was very great; the Russian bullets made many gaps in the line, and they had rather run away to the front than advanced to meet the foe. The crossing of the Ai-ho, with the water up to the men's waistbelts, had been hard work.

But the weariness caused by a sleepless night and a two hours' fight is nothing more than the most ordinary infantry can master, and Kuroki's men were soldiers of the very first quality.

Moreover, fatigue does not appear in five-and-twenty thousand souls at the same moment. One man cannot or will not do more, while his neighbour is still "fit"; one company, more energetically handled by a captain who is a leader of men, is still full of spirit when another is at the last gasp. Two divisions are not simultaneously overwhelmed by a wave of fatigue without there being some at least of its components that will carry out their orders, and pursue a flying enemy.

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The 12th Division had fought a little all day on the 30th ; it had also made a hard march over the Hui-shan range to reach the edge of the Ai-ho. It had not, indeed, felt the strain of fighting, but for two days it had moved on the swinging flank of the army. This division, unlike the others, did not halt at 9 a.m. for a considerable length of time.

It was not fatigue, therefore, which pinned the Guard and 2nd Divisions to the ground.

Was it the want of accompanying artillery which caused the infantry to halt ?

The Japanese artillery was still behind its epaulements, and could not immediately follow up its infantry. But this is no reason for not pursuing, for good infantry advances until the enemy's fire stops it, and then awaits the arrival of its guns. In the present instance the Russians offered no resistance ; their guns had gone or were lying on the field, their infantry fire had ceased.

It was not, therefore, to wait for their guns that the Guard and 2nd Divisions gave up the pursuit.

According to the army commander's orders the frontal attack was to be combined with the enveloping movement of the 12th Division. Was it, then, to give the 12th time to execute their enveloping movement that the frontal advance came to a standstill ?

One does not execute a turning movement merely for the "fun of the thing." One does not manœuvre for manœuvring's sake, but to break

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down the enemy's resistance by an attack on its weak spot.

Here, however, the resistance was already overcome, and so far from a halt the logic of the situation asked for a vigorous advance upon the enemy, to force him to a close-quarter fight, and so to check his flight until the turning movement had taken effect. And if this were done the enemy would be not merely beaten, but destroyed.

It was not therefore to wait for the 12th Division that the Guard and 2nd Divisions suspended the combat.

General Kuroki, observing events with his own eyes, sent orders for the pursuit. "The Guard, resuming its advance at once, will establish itself on the heights about Ha-ma-tang. The 2nd Division will move on Antung, and will connect with the flotilla. The 12th Division will gain the heights west of Ta-lou-fang, a detachment on the right moving by Ching-kou."

These orders reached the Guard at 9.20, the 2nd Division (Telegraph Hill) at 9.30, the 12th Division (Li-tzu-yuen) at 10. The 12th Division began at once to execute them. The others, however, disregarded them altogether and stayed where they were until 1 p.m.

Watching from Tiger Hill, the army commander saw that his orders were a dead letter—and acquiesced.

The cause of this halt of the two divisions which forced the passage of the Yalu was not physical, nor tactical either; nor was it the extent

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of the losses, which only amounted to 300 killed and wounded. It must be sought for elsewhere.

Up to 1868 Japan had lived apart from other nations, neither knowing nor caring to know anything of European civilization. In that year, suddenly awakening from her deep sleep, she had entered of her own free will, and eagerly, into a new way of life, along which she had progressed so rapidly that she now felt herself capable of claiming equality with the most powerful of Western nations.

Japan's high estimate of herself was not accepted by the other nations, which supposed themselves to have the monopoly of intellect and culture. In the eyes of the rest of the world, Japan remained a backward nation.

In 1894 and 1900 the European nations had seen the Japanese army at work. They had formed a high opinion of its qualities, but the test was in each case too slight to have a decisive effect. Some plainer demonstration was needed to open the eyes of those who would not see, and to place the Japanese nation, in the world's sight as well as in its own, on the level of old Europe.

On May 1st, 1904, at 9 a.m. this demonstration had been given. Japan had defeated a great power of the white race that had hitherto dominated the world.

All over the world the battle of the Yalu produced an impression that was out of all proportion to the merely military fact that 5,000

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Russians with 18 guns had been beaten by 45,000 Japanese with 128 guns. In the crossing of the river and in the pursuit the winners lost only 867 officers and men.*

But no one misread it. The Yalu was no mere military affair, but one of those events which mark epochs in the history of the human race.

Valmy was less a battle than an attitude. In the face of the Prussian cannon-shot the French soldiers did not flinch. They saluted the assailants' advance with cries of "*Vive la Nation!*" and this sufficed to stop the attack, to bring Brunswick and King Frederick William to acknowledge themselves beaten. In this battle of Valmy, where 70,000 men were on the field, the Prussians lost but 184 out of 34,000. "Brunswick had clearly discovered in the army in front of him a phenomenon that had scarce been seen since the Wars of Religion—an army of fanatics, and if need be, martyrs." †

Valmy, as a military fact, was insignificant. It was nevertheless one of the most important events of history—the opening of a new era in the life of the nations.

On the evening of September 20, 1792, in the Prussian bivouacs, "Goethe was called upon to dispel, with his customary wit, the sinister fore-

* Officers	.	.	.	5 killed, 29 wounded	=	34
Men	.	.	.	163 ,, 670 ,,	=	833
				<u>168</u> <u>699</u>		<u>867</u>

(German General Staff, *Kriegsgesch. Einzelschriften*, No. 39/40.)

† Michelet, *Hist. de la Révolution*.

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bodings of his comrades. But these forebodings had mastered Goethe himself. Long he remained silent. When at last he spoke it was in a grave, solemn voice, and he only said these words, 'On this day and in this place there begins a new epoch in the history of the world.' *

Those who judge war merely by its material side see in the battle only the mourning it causes, the rancour it leaves behind. They do not understand its grandeur. For them it is but a brutal act, a triumph of muscle over brain, a mouldy relic of barbarism bequeathed by past centuries and automatically accepted by the present. The high souls, the intellect and culture, the moral force of the combatants, are outside their ken. The efforts expended in preparing an army for war, the energy and the science of those who labour in this preparation, count for nothing in the eyes of these ill-informed judges.

War has always necessarily brought high qualities into play. In our day its scientific moral and social characteristics range over a wider field than ever before. It is conducted by means of engines which are the outcome of industrial progress. The combination of a light gun and a high initial velocity is a function of advances in metallurgy. The composition of the powder is the work of chemistry. Wireless telegraphy found its first employment in the war navies. The first dirigible balloon of the world was assigned to a fortress. The aeroplane, in mere embryo, is handled by the soldier in view of war.

* Durny, *Hist. de la France*.

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Victory is the ransom paid by a vanquished opponent to a nation that has had the wisdom to submit to the sacrifices entailed by preparation for war. Victory is, above all, the result of the triumph of superior moral qualities over the brute instinct of self-preservation. It is the sacrament of courage, and never comes to those who fear—and fear is the lot of those who in peace have not cultivated *moral*.

Victory falls only to the nations that, strong in their civilization and their government, are fighting for a great cause. When the armies of the Revolution fought for liberty and national independence, they knew nothing but success. When the armies of Napoleon were used to enslave Spain, the tide of disaster set in.

War, then, is not the expression of vicious instincts. On the contrary it is in most cases the assertion of a nation's moral and intellectual greatness enlisted in a great cause.

In 1904 Japan had the firm intention of shaking off the oppression of the white race that had duped her over the Treaty of Shimonoseki. For ten years she had worked for her emancipation, and had undergone very great material sacrifices to that end. For ten years the nation had swallowed in silence the affronts of the various powers—Russia's occupying Manchuria, Port Arthur, perhaps Korea; England's installing herself at Wei-hai-wei; Germany's seizure of Kiao-chou.

For these ten years, too, the economic necessities that had led Japan into the war with China made themselves felt more and more. For these

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ten years tax had been added to tax, battleships to battleships, battalions to battalions. Were all these efforts and sacrifices to be a pure waste? Was the white race to master for its own sole profit the immense market of China?

Such were the questions at issue, and emotion ran high in Japan, higher still in the 1st Army.

The moment of liberation, it seemed, had come, and war would tell whether or not the yellow race was the equal of the white. The Japanese knew that the war would be the touchstone that decided without appeal whether Japan had the right to march side by side with Europe. The battle of the Yalu was a struggle not merely of nation against nation, but of race against race.

However well-prepared an army may be, the element of uncertainty is always considerable, and the emotion of the combatants is at high tension up to the very moment of the event.

General Kuroki doubtless desired each day to defer till to-morrow the battle on which, it was evident, issues of all possible seriousness depended. He did not hurry. His preparations never seemed to him complete enough—hence all his bridges and the Macbeth forests that hid his warriors.

When at last he gave the order for battle, he allowed every one two days in which to learn his part, to comprehend his mission.

A cannonade compromises nothing and may do some good. The batteries open fire. But he hesitates to launch the infantry.

On the morning of May 1, 1904, the emotion

THE CROSSING OF THE YALU 203

of the Japanese was as intense as was that of the French on the morning of September 20, 1792.

At 9 a.m., the moment that the Russians acknowledged themselves beaten, the strained nerves relaxed, the exultation was tremendous, and cries of joy resounded everywhere.* Officers and men abandoned themselves so entirely to the relaxation of victory that no one dreamt of completing the success by pursuit.

Thus from 9 a.m. to 1 p.m. on the Japanese side there was a halt which was by no means intended by the army headquarters.

"It was 9 a.m. . . . Although all the world has heard of the eagerness of the victors to get their guns over the Yalu, they were, I will not say more eager, but certainly more successful with their champagne, which arrived on the Russian trenches at that hour. Thus, hardly had the stern and deadly rattle of musketry receded into the mountains than it was joyously replaced by the slight and frivolous pop that salutes the arrival on the scene of the 'subtle alchemist.' "†

Officers and soldiers, staffs, army commander—all forgot the pursuit. The emotion was too much for them.

The 12th Division, owing to its being behind-hand in the morning's advance, had had no enemy

* German General Staff, *Kriegsgesch. Einzelschriften*.

† General Sir Ian Hamilton, *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book*, vol. i. p. 116.

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to beat. There was no drunkenness of victory in this division, which slowly continued its march towards the right. It advanced without halting to the neighbourhood of Ha-ma-tang, where it was destined to gather its own laurels.

The war placed Japan on a level with the great civilized nations, the yellow race on an equality with the white. Every one read aright the lesson of the Yalu. It was then, and it remains, the most important event of the Russo-Japanese war.

C. HA-MA-TANG—THE PURSUIT

“The necessary digestion of the joy of victory”* did not affect the Japanese 12th Division, as it had not had to win a victory.

This division was able to pursue its course, and execute the order received at 10 a.m. from General Kuroki † to “gain the heights west of Ta-lou-fang, a detachment on the right passing by Ching-kou.” Thus it came about that the moving wing of the army—that with the farthest distance to cover, that which at 9 a.m. was behind-hand—was the first to reach the enemy’s second position at Ha-ma-tang.

The detachment attacked Ching-kou by the left bank of the Ai-ho, while General Inouye and the main body of the division advanced by the right bank. The division marched by brigades abreast. Sasaki’s, skirting the bank of the Ai-ho, had the 47th in first and the 14th (less one battalion) in

* Müffling, *Aus meinem Leben*.

† See p. 197.

second line; of Kigoshi's the 24th led and the 46th followed. Except for the small effort of dislodging the Russian battalion and the two guns with it (p. 114) from Ching-kou, the 12th Division had no resistance to overcome, since Colonel Gromov, in virtue of Zasulich's order to retreat on Feng-huang-cheng, had evacuated the heights of the right bank (p. 132).

When the 12th Division had reached the Ching-kou—Ha-ma-tang track, Kigoshi's brigade, which was on the left, was the first to engage, facing south, Colonel Harada's 24th Regiment leading. At 12.30 p.m. Gromov had evacuated the col of Lao-fang-kou, and thus there was no force of the enemy to oppose the movement on Ha-ma-tang. Progress therefore was rapid, and at 1.30 the vanguard of the 24th Infantry threw itself upon a group of Russian mounted scouts who were watching, too closely for their own safety, the road from Lao-fang-kou.

Immediately afterwards its fire swept the road by which the battery 3/3rd E.S.A. was retiring. The wagons of this battery had already passed, but the guns could not continue their retreat, and the teams being shot down the gunners could do no more than swing the muzzles of their guns round upon the enemy.*

Because of the narrowness of the defile by which the advanced guard was approaching, the column had tailed out considerably, so that Colonel

* The position of the battery, according to the British *Official History*, was 1,000 yds. S.E. of Ha-ma-tang, that of the Japanese company, 5/11/24, on the spur about 800 yds. N.W. of Ha-ma-tang.—ТН.

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Harada had only one battalion with him to resist a vigorous counterstroke delivered by Colonel Tsibulski. But this critical situation did not last long. Soon the whole of the 24th was on the ground, then came the leading battalion of the 46th, and the retreat of the Russians on this side was cut off.

A little later the Guard and 2nd Divisions, which had finished "digesting the joy of victory" by 1 p.m., arrived in their turn and completed the investment of the Russians who were still on the hill of Ha-ma-tang. These brave men, hopeless of success, could only fight for their honour.

On April 17 General Kuroki at Wiju had received from the Great General Staff at Tokyo the following despatch: "2nd Army will begin to land near the mouth of the Ta-sha-ho on May 1. The complete disembarkation will take forty-five days. The 1st Army is not to advance beyond Tang-shan-cheng. Entrenching itself strongly at this point it is to wait until the 2nd Army, with which it is to co-operate, has finished landing."

After his victory on the Yalu, Kuroki had obtained permission to push on as far as Feng-huang-cheng.* On May 11 the whole of the 1st Army was concentrated there. The 12th Division lay east of the town, with outposts towards Sai-ma-chi, and connected with the Reserve troops

* See Map VII.

under Yoshida at Kuan-tien-cheng. The Guard was west of the town, and threw off a brigade and the divisional cavalry to the west to facilitate the operation of the 10th Division, which was about to disembark at Takushan. The surveillance of the Russian Eastern Detachment was entrusted to the 2nd Division, which to reduce the task of surveillance to a minimum had recourse to fortification.

The operations of the 1st Army were to be suspended for the forty-five days required for the landing of the 2nd Army in its entirety.

The object to be sought was the maintenance of the ground gained, whatever efforts the Russians might make to throw back the 1st Army into the sea or into Korea. To achieve this end the army commander relied upon fortification to augment his strength. Feng-huang-cheng was organized as a temporary fortress (*place du moment*).

In case of attack by very superior force, the 1st Army could shelter itself behind the works of Feng-huang-cheng. But it relied upon manœuvre also for its defence, and therefore pushed out its feelers to a considerable distance.

There was another way of frustrating the possible attacks of the Russians. He could have arranged to give way before a Russian advance and shelter himself behind the Yalu. But, unless his situation should become quite desperate, Kuroki could not entertain this idea.

The army had gained a moral ascendancy by the victory of the Yalu. To retire—even merely

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as a precaution and without pressure from the enemy—would have been to forfeit this ascendancy, that was such an inestimable asset for the battles that were still to come.

To retire would have had the further disadvantage that the 1st Army would not be able to prepare for its future offensive in combination with the other armies. Feng-huang-cheng was a threatening bridge-head in advance of the Yalu, and it was a matter of the highest importance to keep it.

Between Feng-huang-cheng and Liao-Yang the Mandarin Road traverses a mountainous, poor, and almost roadless country. As the line of operations and the movements of supply vehicles were practically confined to this one track—badly laid out, badly metalled, and incapable of standing the strain of much transport—it was out of the question to reinforce the 1st Army by other divisions for an advance.

Fortification therefore was the only means which could enable Kuroki's army to face the critical period between May 1 and the middle of June—that is, until the intervention of the 2nd Army should divert to another theatre some part of the Russian forces that were gradually accumulating in Liao-Yang.

The temporary fortress of Feng-huang-cheng was protected by powerful defences constructed on the adjacent heights.

In order to keep alive Kuropatkin's apprehen-

sions of an offensive of the 1st Army, various points along the front of his Eastern Detachment were menaced by small expeditions. These sallies were very effective in provoking the false manœuvres of General Keller, described above in Chapter IV.

In view of a further advance, Feng-huang-cheng was also organized as a great fixed magazine. Supplies and munitions were accumulated and hospitals formed there. Presently a narrow-gauge railway was made to bring this fixed magazine in touch with Antung, the port for disembarking stores.

A calm now settled down on this part of the theatre of war, as both sides had equally strong motives for gaining time.

D. THE 2ND ARMY IN THE LIAO-TUNG PENINSULA

In studying the Japanese plan of operations we observed that the first objective to be attacked was the Russian squadron, the second the army brought by Russia to the Far East.

The first phase in the execution of these operations had been a direct attack by Admiral Togo on the Russian squadron at Port Arthur.

The object of the second phase—the operations of the 1st Army in Korea, culminating in the battle of the Yalu—was indirect action against the same squadron.

In the third phase, direct action is renewed against the squadron, which Togo's fleet had been unable by itself to destroy.

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As soon as the victory of the Yalu had reassured the Japanese General Staff as to the safety of the 1st Army, the second phase was at an end and the third opened.

The 2nd Army left the neighbourhood of Sin-mi-do Island and steamed towards the Liao-Tung Peninsula, which was reached near the Elliot Islands.* The disembarkation commenced on May 5 near Pi-tzu-wo, at Yen-tai Bay. On the 7th the railway communication between Port Arthur and Liao-Yang was damaged. On the 13th it was definitively intercepted by the Japanese, and thenceforward Port Arthur was isolated from the rest of the world.

General Oku's instructions from headquarters were as follows :

The 2nd Army in conjunction with the fleet is to form a base of operations in the southern Liao-Tung. It should establish itself on the line Port Adams—the Ta-sha-ho facing north, and on the line of Chin-chou—Dalny facing south, thus providing itself with a base from which it can advance against the enemy in concert with the 1st Army.

The transports will as a preliminary be concentrated off Chinampo, ready to set sail at the favourable moment for the places of disembarkation, the Ta-sha-ho mouth and Yen-tai Bay.

The enemy's situation is at this moment as follows :

The Russian squadron is inside the harbour of Port Arthur, where the work of fortifying still continues. Entrench-

* An account of the elaborate precautions taken for the security of the transports is to be found in part ii. ch. i. of the British *Official History*.—Tn.

ments have been constructed on the position of Nan-shan, at the isthmus of Chin-chou, and some heavy guns have been mounted there.

The coast between Dalny and the Yalu estuary is watched by various detachments averaging some 300 men each. Port Adams is occupied. Dispositions have been made by the enemy to defend Ying-kou against attack by sea or land.

The Russians seem to be concentrating at Liao-Yang, Kai-ping and Feng-huang-cheng.

The work of the 2nd Army, then, was to establish itself in the Liao-Tung and to create a large base of operations extending from Dalny to Port Adams. Once this base had been acquired, it would be possible either to besiege Port Arthur or to move against the Russian forces at Liao-Yang in concert with the 1st Army.

Immediately after the receipt of these orders, General Oku quitted Japan (April 21). He sailed with a part of his transports to Chinampo first, then to Sin-mi-do Island (where he was at hand to assist Kuroki should the occasion demand it), and lastly, after the victory of the Yalu, to the Elliot Islands.

To protect the disembarkation of the 2nd Army from the enemy's interference, Admiral Togo sacrificed twelve merchant vessels and their crews in a third unsuccessful attempt to "cork up" the neck of Port Arthur harbour.

On May 5 the 3rd Division began to land. The 1st and 4th and the 1st Artillery Brigade (army troops) followed in their turn.

On May 13 at 8 p.m. General Oku issued his

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orders for the clearance of the wide base of operations Dalny—Port Adams. The 1st Division was to seize Chin-chou, while the 3rd and 4th occupied the line of Port Adams—the Ta-sha-ho. The 5th Division began its disembarkation in turn.

But the Japanese general, learning that the Russians at Chin-chou were being reinforced, while on the north side, towards Wa-fang-tien, there were few of the enemy, issued fresh orders on the 15th. The greater part of the army was to move on Chin-chou, the smaller to act as protective corps on the Ta-sha-ho.

On the 16th the Japanese 1st Division had a somewhat sharp brush with General Fock, commander of the Russian 4th E.S. Division, Port Arthur corps. Just at this moment Admiral Togo's fleet was suffering from a series of disasters which caused great emotion in Japan. On the 12th a torpedo-vessel struck a mine and sank; on the 14th the same fate befell the small cruiser *Miyako* in Deep Bay,* and next day, worst of all, the two great battleships *Hatsuse* and *Yashima* sank off Port Arthur after striking mines.† Rumours of Russian submarines gained credence. The safety of the troops on the mainland seemed to be imperilled.

On May 21 the 5th Division, now well advanced in its disembarkation, was left in observation of the

* East of Chin-chou.—Tr.

† On the 15th, in addition the fine cruiser *Yoshino* was sunk in collision.—Tr.

north front, while the 1st, 3rd, and 4th, and with them the army artillery, were ordered to assault and carry the isthmus of Nan-shan. On the 26th a terrible combat took place, in which a single Russian regiment (the 5th E.S.), aided by a powerful artillery, held the ground against three Japanese divisions. It lost 1,300 men, but the assailants paid for their success with 4,550 casualties. Next day the Russians evacuated Dalny.

“It is believed that the Headquarters at Tokyo, in discussing the use to be made of the victory of Nan-shan, considered whether it would not be best to push Oku’s army on to Port Arthur without allowing the enemy time to complete the defences of the place.

“The fear of leaving Kuroki unsupported within two days’ march of the enemy’s army, however, dictated another method of procedure—to besiege Port Arthur with a third army, to be formed under General Nogi on the nucleus of the 1st and 11th Divisions. Oku’s 2nd Army, to be pushed northward, would be formed of the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Divisions and reinforced by the 6th, operating in concert with the Takushan army” * (*Revue mil. des Armées étrangères*, May 1908).

The principal objective being the Russian fleet, it was logical to seek to reach it as soon as possible. But it would not have been reasonable to launch a

* Then consisting only of the 10th Division (General Kawamura), but afterwards formed as a 4th Army under General Nodzu, who had commanded in the Ping-yang and Hai-cheng campaigns, 1894-5.—*Tr.*

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field army, unprovided with siege resources, to the attack of even an incomplete fortress. As for the 1st Army, in reality this was not in danger; and even if fears had been entertained for its safety, it would have been easy to support it with the fresh divisions that it was proposed to send against Port Arthur under Nogi.

It is, nevertheless, extremely probable that the importance of the objective engendered an idea in some quarters of carrying the pursuit on the 27th up to Port Arthur. A quick straightforward attack * following immediately upon a victory over part of the garrison of a fortress has often an excellent chance of success. Many thoughtful men have judged that such an attack driven home upon Paris, immediately after the action of Châtillon, would have been successful.

The chance is better in proportion as the means available are larger. Our own field armies, aided by their heavy field artillery, need not hesitate to force on the assault of a hostile fortress. The annals of France record many such victories, and will surely record yet others in the future.

The Japanese 2nd Army, however, had lost very heavily at Nan-shan. On May 26 its organization was still incomplete.† The expenditure of ammunition in the battle had emptied almost all the wagons, and there was no artillery available heavier than ordinary field guns.

* *Attaque brusquée* has nowadays replaced the old "*Attack de vive force*" as a technical term of siegecraft.—TR.

† *I.e.* most of the ammunition columnus had not yet been landed. The guns had 198 rounds each at the front, of which 174 had been expended.—TR.

In these conditions it seems that the chances of a forced assault would have been small.

And, since the preparation of a siege army had been foreseen and would take but little time, it was logical to keep the 2nd Army free for field operations. This was the course adopted.

While General Oku was thus carrying out the preliminaries to the investment of Port Arthur, the 5th Division with the 1st Cavalry Brigade covered the army's zone of operations from interference from the north.

General Ueda, commanding this division, had on May 21 received the following order :

G.O.C. 5th Division with the detachments of the 3rd and 4th Divisions allotted to him, the force now landing, and the cavalry brigade will occupy the line from Pu-lan-tien along the Ta-sha-ho so as to protect the 2nd Army in its southerly movement.*

On the day after the action of Nan-shan, in view of the direction to be taken later by the army, General Ueda gave the 1st cavalry brigade the following order † :

WU-CHIA-TUN, May 28, 1904, 2 p.m.

H.Q. 5th Division.

You will leave your present camp to-morrow, May 29, early in the morning, and move with your brigade on Chiu-chia-tien, where you will take post with your main body.

You will despatch a detachment on Fu-chou or its environs, and will send reconnoitring patrols in the direction

* *British Officers' Reports*, vol. i. p. 65.

† See Map VII.

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of Hsiun-yao-cheng,* these to penetrate as far to the north as possible.

Two companies of the 11th Infantry Regiment are detailed to support you.†

This reconnaissance resulted in an encounter about 1.30 p.m. on May 30, between the 2nd squadron 13th Regiment and some Russian cavalry, at Wu-chia-tun‡ and Lung-wang-miao on the left bank of the Fu-chou-ho. "The Cossacks, with their reins tied to their belts," says the *Revue Militaire*, following the Japanese account, "wielded their lances with both hands. Striking violent blows with the staves on the bridle hands of their opponents, they dismounted them, and, once the Japanese were on the ground, speared them with skilful thrusts."

This unhorsing of cavalry by blows on the bridle hand is an improbable story. Nevertheless the fact remains that forty-one Japanese troopers were killed and wounded with the *arme blanche*, and that no parallel case occurred during the rest of the war.

From this day forward the Japanese cavalry, convinced of its inferiority with cold steel, did not venture to tackle the Russian, and fell back upon dismounted action. Now, dismounted fighting is not the normal for cavalry, for in it the cavalry is

* On the railway and between Te-li-ssu and Kai-ping, 30 miles north of the first-named.—Tr.

† *Revue Militaire*.

‡ There are several (five or six) villages of this name in the region. The scene of the cavalry fight is a little south-east of the railway bridge over the Fu-chou-ho. See plan of the battlefield of Te-li-ssu. The name means "five-family village."—Tr.

worse than the most medium infantry, while its greatest asset, mobility, is sacrificed.

According to the *Revue Militaire*, General Akiyama (the brigade commander), speaking of the dismounted fighting of his squadrons, remarked "one does what one can." Of what, then, was this cavalry brigade capable?

At the battle of Liao-Yang, in which the losses of the Japanese army were so severe, "General Akiyama commanded the mixed brigade of cavalry, but although he was supported by field-guns, machine-guns, and infantry, he could accomplish nothing against the right of the Russian Army. *The cavalry brigade had two men wounded.*"* Lieut.-Colonel Fukuda, of the Japanese staff, speaking of the fighting during the pursuit of the retreating Russians (Sept. 3) said, "Even at such a supreme moment as this there was, however, one group of men who were idle. This was the cavalry. So they were employed to go back to the river and cook food for their companions of the infantry."†

Thus, the effect of the fight at Wu-chia-tun on May 30 upon the Japanese 1st Cavalry Brigade was to demoralize it for the rest of the campaign.

The soldier who comes of a brave race is brave whatever the uniform he is dressed in. The heart of the Japanese trooper was surely as bold as those of his comrades of the other arms; yet, not only was he afraid of the *arme blanche*, but on the day

* Sir Ian Hamilton, *A Staff Officer's Scrap-Book*, vol. ii. p. 153.

† *Ibid.*

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after Liao-Yang he was convicted of having taken undue care to protect himself from shot and shell in addition.

At the outset of the war, while the Russian cavalry had a great reputation, the Japanese trooper had no confidence in his horse. The fight of Wu-chia-tun augmented his fear of the Russians' cold steel, and made him even less confident than before in his steed. Nothing—not even the inactivity of the Russian cavalry, not even the poor quality of the second and third levy Cossacks—could overcome his moral depression.

In 1870 the first engagements seriously shook the *moral* of our own gunners, who could see the inferiority of their guns to those of the Germans. At Rezonville the French artillery lost only 550 killed and wounded, while the German gunners left 670 of their number on the field of battle.* On that day the latter frequently fought under fire of the French infantry. But at no moment of the day were French gunners reached by Prussian bullets. They kept too far back from the firing line for that, so far indeed that they would only have been exposed to shell fire had not Bredow's and Redern's squadrons closed with them. On the 18th the French artillery displayed even less dash than on the 16th—as evidenced by the percentage of losses given in the official history.†

It could not be otherwise. But no one on that account has the right to suspect the intrinsic

* The Germans, it must be remembered, having only half as many batteries engaged as the French.—TR.

† *Les Opérations autour de Metz*, vol. iii, p. 711.

courage of any one of the men who served our guns in 1870. The Prussian *matériel* from the first asserted its enormous superiority over the French; and not one of the three arms, on the German side, showed more boldness than the artillery. The battles of August 1870 were victories of the Prussian gun. The gun being superior, the gunners thought that nothing was beyond their power to accomplish.

The Prussian rifle, on the other hand, was distinctly inferior to the French, and the Prussian infantry always sought to avoid tackling their opponents of the same arm, face to face and both sides unaided. When they did—as in the case of the Fond de la Cuve*—it was so nervously that a mere sketch of a counter-attack produced the most terrible panics. On the south side of the Fond de la Cuve, after the battle, only nineteen French bodies were found, most of them struck in the back by the bullets of their comrades who remained north of the ravine. It was not therefore the pursuit but the fear of pursuit that hunted Wedell's flying infantry "nach Thiaucourt."† If Marshal Canrobert had had some one under him to initiate a counter-stroke at Saint Privat on August 18, perhaps the Prussian Guard would have imitated the 38th Brigade.

On both sides the cavalry trusted in its horses. No cavalry combat having occurred to weaken the confidence of the French troopers, a Gallifet could charge again and again, even at Sedan.

* 38th Prussian Brigade at Mars la Tour, August 16, 1870 —Tr.

† Thiaucourt is ten miles south of the scene of action.—Tr.

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The soldier's moral force is the product of education and racial qualities. But it cannot have free play without a background of the confidence that is felt by the soldier who trusts his weapon.

The Japanese are making the most meritorious efforts to improve the quality of their cavalry remounts.

We ourselves have created an artillery matériel which has not yet been equalled, at any rate as regards the field-gun. Our infantrymen would lose the superiority in armament if to-morrow an adversary were to re-arm with an extra-rapid loader. Our cavalry demands a lighter horse-artillery gun, and, above all, horses that can gallop—not trotters that ordinary commerce does not want.

Their demands must be satisfied. The skirmish of May 30, 1904, near Wu-chia-tun and its enormous influence upon the Japanese cavalry, the meekness of the French artillery at Vionville and Gravelotte, the poor resistance of the Prussian infantry at the Fond de la Cuve are facts that it is well not to ignore.

Even the bravest race must inevitably be painfully impressed by the knowledge that its weapons—the horse, the gun, the rifle—are inferior. Let us not expose the French race to this impression, in respect of any arm of the service whatever.

If we cannot have quantity, let us see to it that we have quality. To our quality of race, let us add quality of training and quality of armament.

E. THE JAPANESE ARMIES ON THE EVE OF THE
BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU

After the storming of Nan-shan and the occupation of Dalny a separate siege army was formed for the attack of Port Arthur, under the orders of General Nogi. This 3rd Army, formed on the nucleus of the 1st Division which was taken from the 2nd Army, included, besides this, the 11th, 9th, and later the 7th Division, and also several reserve brigades. The single task of this army was the attack of the Russian squadron—the third stage of this being one of direct action by the army and navy combined.

The other armies were free therefore to act against the second of the two objectives laid down—the Far Eastern Army of Russia.

The 2nd Army, freed from all responsibilities as regards Port Arthur, and leaving the 1st Division to await its new comrades between Nan-shan and Dalny, brought back the 3rd and 4th Divisions into line with the 5th on the front Ta-sha-ho—Port Adams.*

Its new order of battle was: 3rd, 4th, 5th Divisions 1st Artillery Brigade, 1st Cavalry Brigade. Its base of operations lay between the line Ta-sha-ho—Port Adams and Dalny. From this base it was to march against the enemy “in co-operation with the 1st Army.”

On June 8, 1904, the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Divisions were facing north on the Port Adams line, while on the coast adjacent to the Elliot Islands the work of disembarkation went on incessantly.

* See Map VIII.

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The 2nd Army's final *ordre de bataille* was as follows:

2ND ARMY

Army Commander, General OKU

Chief of Staff, General UCHIA

3RD DIVISION, General OSHIMA

5TH BRIGADE (General YAMAGUCHI)	17TH BRIGADE (General KODAMA)	DIVISIONAL TOORPS			
6th Regt. (3 btns.) 33rd Regt. (3 btns.)	18th Regt. (3 btns.) 34th Regt. (3 btns.)	3rd F.A. Regt. (6 batts. = 36 guns)	3rd Cav. Regt. (3 sqs.)	3rd Eng. Btn.	Depart- mental troops
			12-3-6		

4TH DIVISION, General OGAWA

7TH BRIGADE (General NISHIJIMA)	19TH BRIGADE (General ANDO)	DIVISIONAL TROOPS			
8th Regt. (3 btns.) * 37th Regt. (3 btns.)	9th Regt. (3 btns.) 38th Regt. (3 btns.)	4th F.A. Regt. (6 batts. = 36 guns)	4th Cav. Regt. (3 sqs.)	4th Eng. Btn.	Depart- mental troops
			12-3-6		

5TH DIVISION, General UEDA

9TH BRIGADE (General NAGAOKA)	21ST BRIGADE (General TSUKAMOTO)	DIVISIONAL TROOPS			
11th Regt. (3 btns.) 41st Regt. (3 btns.)	21st Regt. (3 btns.) 42nd Regt. (3 btns.)	5th Mount. Art. Regt. (6 batts. = 36 guns)	5th Cav. Regt. (3 sqs.)	5th Eng. Btn.	Depart- mental troops
			12-3-6		

* The British *Official History*, vol. ii. p. 33, states that III/37 was probably absent in Korea.—Tn.

ARMY TROOPS

1st CAVALRY BRIGADE * (General AKIYAMA)	1st ARTILLERY BRIGADE (General UCHIYAMA)
13th Cav. Regt. (4 sqs. and mach. gun) 14th Cav. Regt. (4 sqs. and mach. gun) Horse Artillery battery	13th, 14th, and 15th F.A. Regts. (each of 6 batts. = 36 guns)

Total of the 2nd Army

0-8-19

36-17-37

= 37,500 combatants.

[N.B.—To these were added : †
6TH DIVISION, General OKUBO

11TH BRIGADE (Gen. IIDA)	24TH BRIGADE (Gen. KOIDZUME)	DIVISIONAL TROOPS			
13th Regt. (3 btns.) 45th Regt. (3 btns.)	23rd Regt. (3 btns.) 48th Regt. (3 btns.)	6th F.A. Regt. (6 batts. = 36 guns)	6th Cav. Regt. (3 sqs.)	6th Eng. Btn.	Depart- mental troops
			12-3-6		

ARMY TROOPS

11TH KOBI (RESERVE) BRIGADE	HEAVY ARTILLERY
12th Kobi Regt. (2 btns.) 23rd Kobi Regt. (2 btns.) 43rd Kobi Regt. (2 btns.)	2nd Group Foot Artillery (4 batts. = 16 guns) † 4th Group Foot Artillery (6 batts. = 24 guns) ‡

6-0-10

Gross Total 2nd Army

54-20-53

It is, however, the net total only which affects the Te-li-ssu phase. This was, as stated above, 36-17-37, or, according to the British *Official History*, some 37,500 combatants.—Tr.]

* According to the British *Official History* the machine-guns formed 6-gun battery.—Tr.

† Only one battalion of the 6th division and none of the Army Troops arrived in time to be present at Te-li-ssu.—Tr.

‡ Four batteries light mortars.—Tr.

§ One battery 25-pounders, one battery 6-inch howitzers, four batteries light mortars.—Tr.

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The days between June 8 and 13 passed without any noteworthy incident. Reconnaissances were carried out by small detachments, information being demanded especially of the espionage service. Meanwhile the army accumulated its resources and was daily strengthened by the landing of fresh men and matériel.

On the 13th Oku's army was ready to begin its operations against Kuropatkin's forces in concert with the 4th and 1st Armies.

The 4th Army, up to its junction with the 2nd Army at Hai-cheng, consisted only of the 10th Division.

[4TH ARMY]

10TH DIVISION, General KAWAMURA

8TH BRIGADE (General TOJO)	20TH BRIGADE (General MARUI)	DIVISIONAL TROOPS			
10th Regt. (3 btns.) 40th Regt. (3 btns.)	20th Regt. (3 btns.) 30th Regt. (3 btns.)	10th Mount. Art. Regt. (6 batts. = 36 guns)	10th Cav. Regt. (3 sqs.)	10th Eng. Btn.	Depart- mental troops
			12-3-6		

General Kawamura had commenced his disembarkation at Takushan on May 19. The first units landed, as soon as they set foot on the mainland, hastened to construct an entrenched camp, under cover of which the business of disembarkation could be carried on in entire safety.

The Japanese army, imbued as it incontestably was with the offensive spirit, yet made very free use

of fortification, and certainly the present example is amongst those that are most worthy of imitation.

At Feng-huang-cheng the 1st Army created a temporary fortress to secure itself. At Takushan the 10th Division formed a fortified bridge-head in front of its base of operations. When the 2nd Army occupied Dalny its first business was the fortification of a bridge-head to protect the disembarkation of the siege army's matériel at this port.

Whenever troops have temporarily to hold on to ground that they have won, they ought to call upon fortification to give them the strength that their numbers cannot give. This is the lesson taught by the 1st Army at Feng-huang-cheng, the 4th at Takushan, and the 2nd at Dalny.

The 10th Division soon came into touch with the 1st Army. The Guard Cavalry was pushed out by the latter towards Takushan, and when, on June 3, an entire infantry brigade (Asada's of the Guard) arrived at Sha-li-chai, the connection between Kawamura and Kuroki was complete.

The duty of the 10th Division was to form the connecting link between the 1st and 2nd Armies. During the advance on Liao-Yang it was to fill the very wide interval between Kuroki and Oku which was imposed by the topographical conditions.

Presuming that a reserve is a corps kept in hand to reinforce other corps which may require support in carrying out their tasks, the 4th Army may be considered as a reserve to the 1st in case Kuropatkin should descend from the Fen-shui-ling passes upon Feng-huang-cheng. Alternatively, this

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reserve could join the 2nd Army, as in fact it did, after having menaced the left flank of Stackelberg's Southern Detachment and overthrown the forces with which Kuropatkin protected Stackelberg's line of communication.

Moltke, in his army combinations of 1866 and 1870 almost always used a strong central mass upon which the weaker wing armies based their movements.

Marshal Oyama worked with very strong wing armies and a smaller central army which regulated its movements by theirs.

Some such combination seems to have been in the mind of Napoleon in the first three weeks of May 1800.

The principal army under Moreau was operating on the Rhine; a large army under Masséna was in Italy; a detachment was in the Valais. After his success at Stokach on May 5, Moreau's situation was as favourable as one could wish. Masséna's, however, was critical. Napoleon then demanded the formation of a "good corps of troops" under Mortier, who was to descend into Italy upon the rear of the enemy, just as the Japanese 10th Division might fall upon the rear of Stackelberg at Hai-cheng if the Russian general persisted in remaining thus far south.

A small central army, if it be very supple and boldly led, admits of rapid variations in the combinations of strategy. If the central army is heavy like Buridan's ass* or General de Failly's

* The logician's ass that died of hunger between two equal and equidistant bundles of hay.—Tr.

corps,* it will stand inactive between its two wing armies.

Now in strategy, as in tactics, inaction has always the most evil consequences, and we must not presume possible inaction in the executants in considering whether a particular combination is sound or unsound. One general's habit of mind is not another's, and a combination that the first may employ with advantage may be dangerous in the hands of the second.

In 1799 and 1800 the situation of Switzerland, forming as it did a salient between Alsace and Piedmont, was considered to be advantageous to the French troops therein, because they could threaten the flank of the Austrians or that of the Russians as they advanced by the Danube and the Po respectively.

To-day the situation of Poland, which projects between East Prussia and Galicia, causes uneasiness in the Russian War Office, whereas a Masséna or a Bonaparte would regard it as an offensive place of arms, affording inestimable advantages for manœuvre. Marshal Oyama, too, would place there his 4th Army—a manœuvring army which could support either an army advancing westward through East Prussia or another advancing through Galicia. The Russian General Staff, however, which Manchurian experience does not seem to have enlightened as to the value of the offensive, sees in Poland, as it would have seen in Switzerland, a dangerous salient that the enemy could easily surround.

* August 4-6, 1870, Bitché —TR.

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On June 2 Kawamura received from Tokyo the following instructions:

"The 10th Division will hold itself ready to move on Kai-ping as soon as the order is given. Supplies and transport will be made ready at once and pushed as far up as possible."

The commander of the 1st Division, under whose orders Asada's brigade and the Guard cavalry regiment had been placed, resolved to clear a breathing-space for himself, and to that end to capture Hsiu-yuen.

On the other side Mishchenko, whose mission was to keep touch with the Japanese forces at Takushan and Sha-li-chai, had established posts on all the routes leading to Hsiu-yuen. These gave way before Kawamura's attack, reporting the lines of march and the strength of each of his columns. General Mishchenko held on just long enough to induce the Japanese to develop a combined front and flank attack on Hsiu-yuen, and then withdrew, slowly and without losing touch with the enemy, on Fen-shui-ling West.

The teaching of war was bearing fruit. The Russians were learning how to manœuvre.

At the moment when the 2nd Army was about to fight the battle of Te-li-ssu,* the 4th occupied Hsiu-yuen, and was completely in touch with the 1st, which had its main body installed about Feng-huang-cheng, and its advanced guards at Hsueh-hi-tien.

* See Map IX.

CHAPTER VI

TE-LI-SSU *

A. MOVEMENT OF THE I SIBERIAN CORPS TOWARDS PORT ARTHUR

GENERAL KUROPATKIN, yielding to the insistence of superior authority, decided to make an attempt to succour Port Arthur, avoiding, however, with the utmost care, anything which might compromise his communications with Mukden. He calculated that the Army of Manchuria, at the end of May, was not strong enough to master the Japanese forces that had been landed on the continent; and that, above all, the loss of the railway would be for the Russians an irreparable disaster.

He ordered General Stackelberg to group the units of his (I Siberian) Army Corps closely around Kai-ping, and to push on the advanced guard of cavalry farther south. The latter occupied Wan-chia-ling, and the infantry immediately disposable received orders to support it.

On May 25 the cavalry (General Samsonov), with the Primorsk Dragoons and the 8th Siberian Cossacks, was in contact with the outposts of the

* The battle is often called by the name of Wa-fang-kou, a station twelve miles farther north.—TR.

Japanese 5th Division. Little by little more mounted troops joined him, and on the 30th the first cavalry engagement took place, at Wu-chia-tun, near Ta-fang-shen (see p. 216).

On June 7 the whole of the cavalry was united at Wan-chia-ling, under the orders of General Simonov. Samsonov remained with the force, but held no definite command. This cavalry group contained the 4th, 5th, and 8th Siberian Cossacks, the Primorsk Dragoons, and 2nd and 3rd Trans-Baikal H.A. Batteries = 0-24-2.

On the 8th * this cavalry division reached Wa-fang-tien. The same day the 1st E.S. Division (General Gerngross) advanced to Te-li-ssu. Of the 9th E.S. Division (General Kondratovich) two battalions of the 36th E.S. were at Wan-chia-ling, two battalions of the 33rd E.S. at Kai-ping, the 35th E.S. at Pa-tsia-chai, the 34th E.S. at Ying-kou, and one battalion of the 33rd E.S. at Ta-shih-chiao. The 2/35th Brigade (European) was moved to Hai-cheng as a reserve, ready either to support Mishchenko † or to follow up towards Wa-fang-kou.

Kuropatkin's verbal instructions to Stackelberg were confirmed in writing by Directive No. 4,800.‡

The mission of Your Excellency's corps is to draw upon itself, by an offensive movement towards Port Arthur, the greatest possible force of the enemy, and so to weaken the enemy's forces operating on the Kuan-tung Peninsula.

* See Map VIII.

† Mishchenko was facing towards Hsiu-yuen (p. 228).—Tr.

‡ *Lectures at the Nikolai Staff College*.—French trans.

MOVEMENT OF I SIBERIAN CORPS 231

To obtain this result your movement against the enemy's northern screen should be carried out with rapidity and decision, so as to crush their advanced detachments at once if these prove to be weak. No decisive action is to be undertaken against superior forces, and you must be careful not to employ the whole of your reserves in an engagement so long as the situation is not cleared up.

The final objective of your southern movement is the capture of Chin-chou, and in the sequel an offensive in the direction of Port Arthur.

This directive has no parallel in history. The object is the capture of Chin-chou, followed by an offensive towards Port Arthur. Why does Chin-chou figure in the order, as it is a defenceless place? *

To march from Kai-ping to Chin-chou is certainly to take the offensive towards Port Arthur, and it seems that the directive really means "go to Chin-chou, and you will then see if it is possible to go on to Port Arthur." But in being forbidden to commit himself to any decisive action Stackelberg was deprived of the means of going even to Chin-chou.

It is easy for the critic to amuse himself at the expense of so vague an order. But if instead of criticizing one tries to rewrite the order as it ought to have been drafted, one does not produce anything satisfactory; unless, perhaps, it is something like General Lafoës's advice to General Solano (p. 3 above), *i.e.* "jingle the bells" as noisily as possible in the direction of Port Arthur.

From Chin-chou to Liao-Yang is fifteen marches. The railway and the only practicable road run

* In the British *Official History* (pt. ii. p. 34) the text of the last paragraph in the order gives "the Chin-chou (Nan-shan) position."—Tr.

close to the coast, and the Japanese, thanks to their command of the sea, could land wherever it pleased them to do so, to cut the line of retreat of the Southern Detachment.

The Japanese 10th Division on the Takushan—Hsiu-yuen—Hai-cheng road might strike in upon the line of communications from the other side.*

If Kuropatkin gave Stackelberg troops enough to beat the 2nd Army, he exposed himself to the risk of Kuroki's planting himself at Liao-Yang, to the utter ruin of the Russian army.

It is the business of the General-in-Chief, who alone is in a position to know whether the task set by Policy is impossible to execute, to inform Policy of its error. And consequently, by common consent, the responsibility for defeat rests on the shoulders of the General-in-Chief.

Stackelberg, conscious of the dangers of his situation, did not advance beyond the station of Te-li-ssu, where his troops detrained. He desired in the first place to create a fortified base of operations ere he pushed on southwards. In advance of the Te-li-ssu position, then, he formed another at Wa-fang-tien, whither he sent an infantry brigade in support of the mounted troops.

Such an advance from position to position, is indeed the best procedure for a detachment sent out to a great distance against an enemy estimated to be in superior strength.

Stackelberg and his staff were installed in a

* In this connection see British *Official History*, pt. ii. pp. 35-6.—TR.

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train at Te-li-ssu station, as was the custom of the Russian generals in this war. Close at hand was the telegraph line that carried his anxieties and his demands for reinforcements to Liao-Yang. These were met by the despatch successively of the 2/35th European Brigade; the 35th and 34th E.S. Regiments, which only entrained on the evening of June 14; and the 9th Siberian (Tobolsk) Regiment, which only arrived in time to assist General Samsonov in covering a difficult retreat.

General Stackelberg seems to have fixed the 17th as the date of pushing on his main body to Wa-fang-tien. The offensive of the 2nd Army forestalled him.

The strength of the Southern Detachment on June 15 was about 30,000. Its *ordre de bataille* was as follows * :

SOUTHERN DETACHMENT (I SIBERIAN CORPS, ETC.)

General STACKELBERG, Commanding
General IVANOV, Chief of Staff

9TH E.S. DIVISION, General KONDRATOVICH

1/9TH E.S. BRIGADE (General KRAUSE)	2/9TH E.S. BRIGADE (General ZIKOV)	DIVISIONAL TROOPS
33rd E.S. Regt. (3 btns.) 34th E.S. Regt. (3 btns.)	35th E.S. Regt. (3 btns.) 36th E.S. Regt. (3 btns.)	9TH E.S.A. BRIGADE (General MROZOVSKI) 1, 2, 3/9th E.S.A.† (= 24 guns)

12-0-3

* Some additional details inserted from British *Official History*.—Tr.
† 4/9th E.S.A. absent at Ying-kou. [British *Official History* says 2/9th E.S.A.—Tr.]

1st E.S. DIVISION, General GERNGROSS

1/1st E.S. BRIGADE (General RUTKOVSKI)	2/1st E.S. BRIGADE (General MAXOMOVICH)	DIVISIONAL TROOPS
1st E.S. Regt. (3 btns.) 2nd E.S. Regt. (3 btns.)	3rd E.S. Regt. (3 btns.) 4th E.S. Regt. (3 btns.)	1st E.S.A. BRIGADE (General LUCHKARSKI) 1, 2, 3, 4/1st E.S.A. (= 32 guns)

12-0-4

SIBERIAN COSSACK DIVISION, General SIMONOV

2ND SIBERIAN COSS. BRIGADE (Gen. CHIRIKOV)	(Of 1st Siberian Coss. Brigade)	USSURI CAVALRY BRIGADE (Gen. SAMSONOV)	DIVISIONAL TROOPS
5th Siberian Coss. (2 squadrons) 8th Siberian Coss. (6 squadrons)	4th Siberian Coss. (3 squadrons)	Primorsk Dragoons (6 squadrons) Frontier Guards (2 sqs. and 2 cos.)	1, 2/Trans- Baikal H.A. (= 12 guns)

1-19-2

OTHER TROOPS

2/35TH INFANTRY BRIGADE (General GLASKO)	(9th Siberian [Tobolsk] Regiment, 4 battalions, was not present at the battle)
139th Regiment (4 battalions) 140th Regiment (4 battalions)	
	8-0-0

Total

24 $\frac{1}{2}$ -19-9

B. PRELIMINARIES OF THE BATTLE OF TE-LI-SSU

On June 8 General Stackelberg was busied with the organization of his forces and the creation, near Ta-fang-shen, of a defensive position in

which the Southern Detachment could accept battle. One stage (about 9 miles) farther south, at Wa-fang-tien, was the main body of the cavalry, of which General Simonov had assumed command on the previous evening. General Rutkovski arrived at Wa-fang-tien on this day with the 1/1st E.S. Brigade, and, in concert with the Cossacks, set to work to form an entrenched position about Wa-fang-tien, astride the railway.

About a day's march farther south, "mixed" advanced detachments were in contact with the Japanese outposts along a front of some twenty-five miles.

By these dispositions General Stackelberg ensured that his southward advance would be sure, if slow. They were also perfectly adapted to meet an offensive of the Japanese.

The outposts or rather contact detachments had informed General Stackelberg that one hostile division occupied the valley of the Ta-sha-ho, that a brigade was astride the railway, and another brigade north of Port Adams on the Port Arthur—Liao-Yang main road. The Headquarters Staff of the army for its part sent word that the screen in front of which the Southern Detachment was halted consisted of one or at most two divisions.

On the morning of the 13th the contact detachments were pushed back a little to the north by the Japanese screen. Skirmishing went on throughout the day, and a more serious encounter,

in which a battalion on each side was engaged, took place at Wu-chia-tun (South).*

Doubt was thus gradually dispelled, and that evening Stackelberg concluded that the Japanese army, whose outposts lay but $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Wa-fang-tien, was advancing to the attack.

On the evening of the 13th, the 34th and 35th E.S. Regiments had not yet arrived at Te-li-ssu, and the 2/35th Brigade had only just begun to detrain.

Evidently the time for the Russian offensive had not yet come. It was not within Stackelberg's power to answer the offensive by the offensive. But the information available represented the Japanese strength to be two divisions only, and Stackelberg thought that in two days' time he would be in superior numbers. The problem therefore was to gain June 15, and General Stackelberg, one would suppose, would order his advanced guard to contest the ground step by step, so as to prevent the Japanese from establishing themselves in front of the main position before the 15th.

His order, No. 193, issued on the evening of June 13, runs as follows †:

The enemy, strength about two divisions, is moving south of Wa-fang-tien station. The troops of the I Siberian Corps, in case of the enemy taking the offensive towards

* This is the third of the many villages of this name thereabouts to which we have had occasion to refer. It lies $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles south-west of Wa-fang-tien (see maps of Te-li-ssu battlefield). In French each has a different name—some (as for instance this) two.—Tr.

† See Map X.

PRELIMINARIES OF THE BATTLE 237

Te-li-ssu station, are to occupy the position organized to the north of Wu-chia-tun *—on either side of the railway.

Instructions for the Cavalry.—To retire on Ta-fang-shen village and establish themselves west of it; cover the right flank of the position, observing the tracks and valleys about Ta-fang-shen, Huang-chia-tun, and Hui-chia-tun.

In the main position referred to, every one had his place marked out in advance. Thus, on the evening of the 13th, General Stackelberg had in mind only a defensive battle in an organized defensive position, and everybody was told off to his own place even before it was known whether General Oku's offensive would be continued.

In short, the order is thoroughly defective. It betrays a complete misunderstanding of the services that a large force of cavalry can render, and it forbids the advanced guard to do its work. In the event, Stackelberg could complain, and with good reason, of the blunders committed by his executive officers, and above all by the cavalry, in the course of the battle, but his order No. 193 of the 13th was not calculated to encourage the cavalry to do anything.

General Simonov's division was incontestably superior to the squadrons that Oku could put in line against it; moreover the combat of May 30 had given it a very considerable moral ascendancy over the Japanese cavalry.

It would have been fair to predict, then, that

* *I.e.* the Te-li-ssu position. This Wu-chia-tun is the scene of the cavalry encounter of May 30, near the railway bridge over the Fu-chou-ho.—*Tr.*

the Cossacks would in no wise be interfered with in their work of watching the marching columns of the 2nd Army. They would work round them, determine their contour and report their progress—would shed noonday sun upon their own Headquarters and plunge General Oku's into midnight darkness.

General Rutkovski, with his brigade of infantry, his battery, and the horse artillery, would act as he pleased upon the Japanese marching columns that General Simonov had blinded, even to the extent of engaging them very vigorously, for the Cossacks would always enable him to judge risks accurately.

Certain military writers proclaim the bankruptcy of cavalry, and, arguing from the smallness of its services in Manchuria, demand the reduction, if not the practical abolition, of this costly arm.

Going into the question, however, as deeply as it deserves we shall very likely come to the conclusion that it is the Simonovs, and not the cavalry, that we ought to abolish.

If cavalry is only to be used for fighting on foot, and we have to convert it into mounted rifles, it can with advantage be replaced by infantrymen on ponies. But let these infantrymen on ponies once collide with cavalry that gallops and uses the sword, and they will soon be destroyed or flung back under the feet of their comrades who march on their own legs and carry their belongings on their own backs.

The *arme blanche* fight of May 30 effaced the

Japanese squadrons, and Simonov's division from that moment was free to "realize itself" without interference, and to render enormous services. It is these services which we have to appraise if we are to weigh, by a true scale and with standard weights, the potential value of cavalry in future wars.

The Russo-Japanese war has falsified many hopes. It was those who so readily imagined the advantages that Russia would derive from her immense superiority in mounted troops who were the first to ask themselves whether the times have not changed—whether we do not need Drouots more than Murats. Now that the facts are better known, it is seen that there is still room for a Murat. The hopes that were founded upon the Russian cavalry may be hopes deceived, but hopes blasted they need not and must not be.

In pursuance of order No. 193 Simonov's division assembled at Wa-fang-tien on the morning of June 14, and retired to their allotted place by the direct road to Ta-fang-shen.*

General Rutkovski started the 1st E.S. Regiment at 6 a.m. to fall back into its place in the line of defence. The 2nd E.S. Regiment with the field battery (1/1st E.S.A.) was still at Wa-fang-tien at 10, and the guns greeted the advanced guard of the Japanese 5th Division with a few rounds and then vanished in their turn. From this time forth there was no one to observe the movements of the Japanese forces.

* See Map X.

At 1 p.m. the Russian troops were all in their places in the main position.

On the right of the position, south of and close to Lung-kou, were fifteen squadrons, correctly drawn up in a plain surrounded by heights. They were covered by a small body of cavalry, which occupied a saddle 2,800 yards W.S.W. of 'Ta-fang-shen. One squadron was detached to Fu-chou.

The 1/36th E.S. Regiment had one company in Ta-fang-shen, the other three entrenched on the hillside above. In rear, near San-hsi-erh were the two batteries 1, 4/9th E.S.A. enfilading the valley of the Fu-chou-ho, and near them were two battalions of the 33rd E.S. Regiment. To the right rear of the batteries were II, III/36th E.S. Regiment as local reserve of the section. Lastly, 3/9th E.S.A. was posted at the bottom of the valley, near the river-bank.

These troops represented for the moment the whole 9th E.S. Division, which was still short of its general, and of the 34th and 35th E.S. Regiments. These arrived at Te-li-ssu in the evening of the 14th and the night following.

East of the Fu-chou-ho, the 4th E.S. Regiment held with one or two companies the village of Wu-chia-tun (North), and occupied trenches half-way down the hillside north of this village, 3, 2, and 4/1st E.S.A. being posted on the hill itself. Two battalions were told off to the ground south and east of the hill, while the other was in reserve north of the batteries, near Lao-hsiao-kao, along with the battery 1/1st E.S.A.

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The 3rd E.S. Regiment was east of the 4th, and had one battalion in front line in shelter trenches.

The 1st and 2nd E.S. Regiments, after their retreat from Wa-fang-tien in the morning, were placed east of Wu-chia-tun (North), the 1st deployed on the left of the 3rd to watch the track from Chu-chia-tien, the 2nd, in reserve, écheloned back on the left flank, between Wa-fang-wo-pu and Ho-chia-tun, with two sotnias of Cossacks.

The 2/35th Brigade was at Te-li-ssu.

The ground upon which General Stackelberg had decided to fight is very broken. The Fu-chou-ho divides the position into two sections. The hills run, roughly, downwards from east to west. They are bare, treeless save for a few poor bushes. There are houses only in the valleys. The railway is the best road of the district, the lanes being usually too narrow to allow vehicles to pass one another.

The front of the Southern Detachment's position was about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles. On the day of battle the Fu-chou-ho was everywhere fordable.

The foreground of the position on the right bank of the Fu-chou-ho is bare and destitute of covered approaches. In the centre, about Wu-chia-tun (North), villages, orchards, and high crops impede the defenders' view and facilitate an advance upon the position. Towards the Russian left wing, about Wa-fang-wo-pu, the ground was difficult, and clearly seen by the defenders; the assailant, more-

over, had no good roads at his disposal, and his guns could only move with great difficulty.

On the night of June 12-13, Stackelberg had been to Kai-ping to report on the situation to General Kuropatkin and to receive his orders. On his return to Te-li-ssu he had given his instructions at 1 a.m. on the 13th in view of the defensive battle rendered imminent by the advance of the Japanese.

C. THE JAPANESE APPROACH-MARCH

On the evening of June 13 the heads of the columns of the 2nd Army, covered on a wide front by its outposts, occupied the line Tai-ping-chuang—La-tzu-shan—Wu-chia-tun (South); in order of divisions, from right to left, 3rd, 5th, 4th.

This day, at 7 p.m., General Oku issued the following orders * :

1. The army will advance to-morrow with the object of repulsing the enemy on the line Ssu-chia-tun (East)—Liu-chia-kou (East).

2. The 3rd Division (less 1 regiment) leaving the line Tou-chia-tun (? Hou-chia-tun)—Yen-chia-tun at 5 a.m., and keeping to the east of Yen-chia-tun—Chang-hsiao-fang—Chu-chia-tien, will advance to the line Ssu-chia-chou †—Lung-wang-miao.

3. The 1st Artillery Brigade (less 1 regiment) will be attached to the 3rd Division, and will assemble by 5 a.m. at Kuan-chia-tun.

* In dealing with Te-li-ssu it has been impossible to bring the original names into complete harmony with the British *Official History*. Doubtful cases have been decided after comparing the original with the British *Official History* and *British Officers' Reports*, these themselves not being always in agreement.—Tr.

† "Cheng-chia-tun" in the French version.—Tr.

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4. The 5th Division (less 2 sections cavalry and 1 regiment infantry) will leave the line Hou-chia-tun—San-chia-kou at 5 a.m., and, keeping touch with the left of the 3rd Division, will advance to Chu-chia-tien and try to occupy a line from Lung-wang-miao to Liu-chia-kou (East).

5. The 4th Division will move from Wu-chia-tun (South) at dawn, and, keeping west of a line through Wu-chia-tun (South)—Lo-chia-huang—Liu-chia-kou (West), march to the Fu-chou-ho. Arrived there it will halt and be prepared to operate against the enemy's right and rear, keeping a careful look-out to the north.

6. One regiment of the Artillery Brigade will leave Kuei-ma-chiao * and join the 4th Division by the Fu-chou road.†

7. The 6th Infantry Regiment (less 1 battalion), the 11th Infantry Regiment and two sections of the 5th Cavalry Regiment will form the army reserve, and will assemble by 5.30 a.m. at Liu-chia-tun.‡

8.§ The Cavalry Brigade will move on Sha-pao-tzu, and thence menace the left flank and rear of the enemy. It will push out reconnaissances northwards.

9.§ Information as to the enemy ?

In execution of this order of 7 p.m., June 13, the 3rd and 4th Divisions moved off, each in two columns, which, preceded by their own advanced guards, pushed straight forward in the assigned zone. The 4th Division steadily trended away from the main army. When its right arrived at Sha-tan-tzu at noon on the 14th it halted thereabouts, eight miles from the left flank of the

* On the railway four miles south of La-tzu-shan (not on the map).—Tr.

† *I.e.* the Port Adams—Fu-chou high-road.—Tr.

‡ Just beyond the south edge of the map, near the railway.—Tr.

§ Neither of these paragraphs appears in the *British Officers' Reports* or in the *British Official History*, from the French translation of which the author quotes.—Tr.

5th Division. The Cavalry Division reached Shapao-tzu, four to five miles from the outer flank of the 3rd Division.

Thus the total front of deployment of the 2nd Army was about twenty-two miles.*

The ground, very broken, passable only with difficulty, except along the valleys and the tracks used by the natives, does not furnish a sufficient explanation for so wide a deployment at the moment of engaging.

In a subsequent study, dealing with the conduct of the modern battle, we propose to go into the reasons for deployment on a wide front preliminary to an engagement. For the moment, then, it will be sufficient to note :

1. That the three divisions of the 2nd Army actually fought at Te-li-ssu on a front of five miles.

2. That on the eve of the battle they were spread over a front of twenty-two miles.

3. That this army had no general advanced guard.†

4. That the Japanese general organized his battle in advance, not trusting to an inspiration at the last moment, nor to the information that might be furnished by an organ adapted to this special service, to enable him to bring off the decisive act (*c'èvenement*).

General Oku's method was the same as General Kuroki's. In the two days preceding the battle of

* The strength of the army, it may be recalled, was about 37,000.—Tr.

† See British *F.S. Regulations*, pt. i. p. 178, end of para. 66 (i).—Tr.

the Yalu the commander of the 1st Army had deployed his three divisions on a wide front, so that the battle of the 1st of May was simply the concentric advance of the three divisions against Zasulich's front and left flank.

Similarly General Oku's battle—as his order of the 13th shows—was to be nothing but merely a concentric advance against the front and one flank of Stackelberg's position. The attack on the Russian left was only intended as a menace, for cavalry alone was told off to it. That on the Russian left was meant to be decisive, for a whole army division was put into position to carry it out.

The contrary method is to advance in one, or at most two, concentrated columns, with a general advanced guard ahead. This general advanced guard is supposed to take contact with the enemy and seize supporting points along a broad front, while the army commander groups his main body.

Then, the advanced guard fight having given the army commander the required information, the latter forms his plan of attack, and draws upon his closely-grouped main body, allotting the due proportions to the wearing engagement and the decisive attack.

These two diametrically opposed methods represent respectively the German and the French schools. We shall discuss them later on, when we have had the opportunity of comparing and contrasting the great battles of Manchuria with those of Europe.

On June 14th the forward movement of the 3rd and 5th Divisions was unopposed. On the right a mixed detachment, composed of the 34th Regiment, a battery, and two squadrons of the 3rd Division, advanced by Ssu-chia-tun (South) on Wa-fang-wo-pu. The main body of the division, passing by Chu-chia-tien, established itself on Chang-tien-shan (hill 750) (one battalion 33rd on the hill, two in reserve behind), the 18th Regiment and a battery connecting with the 34th Regiment on the right flank.

The 5th Division occupied hill 1050 north-west of Chu-chia-tien with the 41st Regiment on the evening of the 14th, a battalion of the left column of the division prolonging the line towards Wu-chia-tun (West). The main body of the division remained near the railway between Wa-fang-tien and Chu-chia-tien.

The right-wing battalion of the 34th (3rd Division) made a vehement attack upon the Russian left wing. It was repulsed with severe losses, but the result was that General Stackelberg sent the 2/35th Brigade (Glasko's) towards Wa-fang-wo-pu, and thus the 34th, by drawing upon itself the enemy's disposable troops, increased the chances of success of General Oku's schemes against the Russian right.

The commander of the 2nd Army, having laid down his plan in advance, was able to dispose his troops in advance.

A feint against the Russian left displaced the centre of gravity of the enemy's army, and thereby

favoured the success of the Japanese main attack. General Oku did not ask himself, where is the enemy? or, what are his mistakes that I may profit by them? He intended a defined manœuvre, one which he calculated would give the best results, and, by feinting, he induced the enemy to weaken the point which he meant to attack.

This mode of procedure is practicable not only against an opponent who has made up his mind to a passive defence. Napoleon was strictly on the defensive on December 1, 1805, and the initiative lay on the side of the Austro-Russians. Austerlitz, therefore, was a French defensive against an Allied offensive, and the decisive attack upon the Pratzen Heights was simply a counter-stroke (*riposte*).

Napoleon, by his feints, induced an ill-conceived attack on the basis of which he planned his counter-stroke in advance. General Oku's feint provoked his opponent into an untimely "parade," which exposed him to the designed thrust.

We need hardly say that we have no intention of comparing the Te-li-ssu affair with the masterpiece of the God of War. What we wish to do is to show that the art of feints has its place even in modern war.

We are too ready to assert that the Japanese were merely the pupils of the Germans and that their doctrines are the German doctrines. But a little, and we shall be calling the Japanese mere marionettes worked by wires from Berlin.

The siege of Port Arthur is an episode absolutely without precedent in Prussian history—Sevastopol, indeed, is the only parallel. Another piece of

evidence is to be found in the criticisms of Major Löffler *—criticisms usually wide of the mark because this German officer, with all his ability, can only see through German spectacles.

The Japanese officers, like other people, have learned the art of war by studying the campaigns of great captains, and there are great German captains amongst these. But they did their work in their own way. They manœuvred *à la japonaise*. They succeeded in combining German method with French improvisation, the preconceived and pre-arranged attack with the feint.

General Oku showed at Te-li-ssu that the feints which Napoleon used to turn to such profit are still practicable to-day—that the art of feinting only requires what it always required, an artist.

“The Prussian army,” says General Bonnal, “knows only the offensive and the defensive. Its sword-play is pre-eminently plain and absolutely innocent of feints. Its strategic and tactical phrases consist of a few words which never vary—that is, its art is rudimentary. But it makes good the poverty of its combinations. It is its tenacity, its energy, its attention to detail, and its unity of thought that render it so formidable an adversary.”†

After the cruel disasters of 1870, French officers set to work to copy their conquerors, and attempted to inoculate the little French soldier with the serum of the *Parade-schritt*. It was not for the first

* *Russo-Japanese War* (French translation).

† *Sadowa* (English translation), p. 49.

time. After the first Silesian wars, the military world had busied itself in copying whatever Frederick did at Potsdam. But what was suitable for the Prussian army was not so for others, and in the Seven Years' War they were beaten one after the other. After this war admiration for the conqueror was naturally greater than ever, and one tried to outdo another in faithfully copying the master.

But the Emigration cleared the French army of its officers, and the spirit of the Revolution brought to the colours officers and men who could not carry out the great Frederick's pace-stick movements. Some other methods had to be found, and in the event the sons of the Seven Years' War men, commanded by a Seven Years' War general, succumbed to these methods.

The "rudimentary art" of the Germans, the direct thrust of brute force, is not suited to us, and it is not by this method that we shall beat our former conqueror. If we oppose direct thrust to direct thrust we shall suffer a new defeat, for we have neither the numbers nor the methodical thoroughness of mind that the brute force method requires for its successful employment.

To the direct thrust we must oppose manœuvre, with all its suppleness, all its power, and all its feints.

Napoleon teaches us the art of manœuvre, of feinting, and of striking, and we cannot too deeply meditate upon his lessons to-day.

There is, indeed, the danger that we may try to transplant the methods of the First Empire bodily

into the twentieth century. But the study of the Russo-Japanese War, of its manœuvres and its feints, will help us to keep in the true path, and it is on this account that it deserves exhaustive study.

Apart from the feint on the right wing, the Japanese operations on the 14th would have been limited to taking contact with the enemy had not a blunder of the advanced guard of the 5th Division's right column produced a heavy cannonade.

Shortly after 1 p.m., when the advanced guard in question—41st Regiment and one battery—had reached Chu-chia-tien, it received word that a number of mounted men were visible on the skyline of the crest north of Wu-chia-tun (North). The battery commander, rightly guessing them to be a staff, thought fit to cannonade them. The battery ascended hill 1050* and opened fire upon General Gerngross and his cavalcade. Instantly three Russian batteries engaged it, and their fire quickly drove the Japanese gunners to leave the guns and seek cover for themselves. Some time afterwards the other batteries of the 5th Division came up at the trot, and these, at about 3 p.m., were getting the upper hand of their opponents. The artillery duel lasted till nightfall (7 p.m.). The Russian battery, 4/1st E.S.A., lost all its officers, and was reduced to silence about 5 o'clock.

Once more we see, from this incident, that by themselves guns can do no more than make a noise, without settling anything.

* West of the railway and nearly one mile south-west of Wu-chia-tun (North).

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Here is an artillery duel which begins at 1 p.m. and goes on till 7 p.m., and yet produces no effect. Even the Russian battery 4/1st E.S.A. had recovered its *moral* and refitted its matériel in time to fight in the morrow's battle.

Isolated artillery actions—and for the matter of that, all isolated actions—are to be avoided. Either they are useless or else they are absolutely injurious to the commander's plans, as Spicheren, for example, was injurious to Moltke's in August 1870. But these isolated actions never happen save when officers and men are keen and eager for battle. Never in 1870 did our troops slip from the control of the heavy restraining hand. Never in 1904–5 did the Russians commit one of those mad actions of which the Germans and the Japanese had to record so many. Historical criticism blames, but there are some kinds of blame of which the recipient may be proud. And let us hope that we ourselves shall be blamed sometimes in our next war !

D. THE COMBINATION OF FRONT AND FLANK ATTACKS

The 14th had been employed by the Japanese in violently taking contact with the I Siberian Corps. In the evening General Oku issued the following order :

WA-FANG-TIEN, June 14, 11 p.m.

The 5th Division will operate on the right bank of the Fu-chou-ho. It will make its dispositions under cover of night to attack the heights of Ta-fang-shen, taking care not to allow itself to be drawn northward into the defiles.

The 3rd Division is to act in concert with the 5th ; it will therefore await the first results of the latter's offensive before beginning itself to act against the front and left flank of the Russians.

OKU.*

The 4th Division received a special order, which was carried in duplicate by two different routes, and only reached its destination at 5 a.m. on the morning of the 15th. It ran as follows :

WA-FANG-TIEN, June 14, 11 p.m.

As no danger is to be anticipated from the direction of the valley of the Fu-chou River, you will detach a force of at least one brigade of infantry to-morrow, which will attack the enemy's right flank and help the advance of the other divisions.†

The text of these two orders is doubtless correct in a general way, but it is probable that in passing from hand to hand, and from one language to another, they have undergone a certain amount of modification.

Thus the order to the 5th Division presents obscurities. Why the warning "not to be drawn northward into the defiles"?

According to the *British Officers' Reports*, the text is this :

The 5th Division will advance to-morrow before dawn from the neighbourhood of Wu-chia-tun (West), and attack the enemy at Ta-fang-shen, but will delay its further movement up the Fu-chou-ho valley. [Probably—as a footnote says—in order to wait for the arrival of the 4th Division, which was then twelve miles or so from the headquarters of the army.]

* *Revue mil. des Armées étrangères.*

† *British Officers' Reports.*

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However, we have the execution of the orders to guide us in doubtful points, and it is clear that General Oku's intention was for the 5th Division to cross the Fu-chou-ho by surprise at dawn. Once the river was passed, the 5th Division was to mark time until it was advised of the arrival of the 4th Division. Then it was to attack Ta-fang-shen. At the same moment, and only then, the 3rd Division was to advance against the Russians in front of it, the signal to be given by the 5th Division, and was only to be given after the 4th had come on the scene. Clearly, therefore, the intention of the general commanding was to ensure simultaneity in the frontal and flank attacks.

Whether or not the intention was translated into fact we shall presently see. It is of importance, however, to state definitely—as we can now undoubtedly do—that simultaneity *was* intended.

The methodical organization of the battle, on the Japanese side, is worthy of attention. The 14th was employed in violently taking contact with the Russian left. On this day Oku assured himself of Stackelberg's intention of accepting battle on the morrow, and, further, he succeeded in deceiving his opponent as to the direction of the main attack.

The night of the 14–15th was employed by the artillery in taking up positions close in, and by the 5th Division in prolonging the left of the 3rd and working nearer to the Russian main line.* Night concealing these movements, the enemy would

* See Map XI.

not realise the true point of attack until the very last. Then, the various forces of the attack being in readiness, the whole would engage together at the same moment.

The original front of the 5th Division was wide. From the right of the 41st Regiment to the left of the 21st is about four miles, which means an average of $1\frac{3}{4}$ men to the yard. The 3rd Division was to attack, or to defend, as the case might be, upon a similarly extended front, and the same with the 19th Brigade.

With this mean density, one of our army corps in Europe would cover a front of nearly nine miles, whereas many of our generals think that this should not exceed two and a half to three miles at a maximum.

The battle of Te-li-ssu possesses, in this connection, the very greatest interest, for the Japanese general's idea was not deformed by collision with the enemy's action to such an extent that it cannot be traced out in the events of the 15th.

The more completely the leaders in modern battles have succeeded in translating their ideas into fact, the better we are able to clear our minds as to the battle of the future. But usually it is by no means easy to disengage these ideas from the wreckage. It is difficult to be certain of Moltke's intentions, because they were in most cases frustrated by acts of initiative on the part of his subordinates. At Sedan alone he was really obeyed, and at Sedan he had only to beat a beaten

army. In the battles of the Russo-Japanese War, too, our judgment must often be suspended, because Kuropatkin broke them off before their culmination, and hence before the victor's combinations had worked themselves out to their lawful conclusion.

At the moment when the 2nd Army was proceeding to the attack—at 9 a.m. on the 15th—the troops were distributed over a front of about ten miles, this front forming a semicircle, of which the centre was Te-li-ssu. The right flank was protected by the Cavalry Brigade, which was six miles out on that flank, the left by the 7th Infantry Brigade, which remained at a distance of about seven miles.

The troops employed in the battle itself, arranged at the outset in a semicircle, advanced inwards on the centre of gravity, Te-li-ssu. Had it not been that the resistance was greater at some points than at others and so deformed the curve, the Japanese line would at every moment have formed an arc of a circle of ever-decreasing radius, with its centre always in Te-li-ssu. This would have been the perfect execution of General Oku's theory.

One cannot too often insist upon the fact that battle is a drama in which geometry has no place. There is no question here of reducing it to diagrams. Our intention is simply to obtain an illustration from experience of which we shall be able to make use later.

Even in 1870 the power of fire was very great, and since then our weapons have considerably increased in effectiveness. Their long range

enables two widely separated units to combine their action upon one and the same point. The present-day rifle is capable of crushing effect at 1,000 yards, and by using the higher elevations a powerful convergent fire is made possible.

The long range of the rifle, further, enables us to inflict serious checks upon the development of an attack in its early stages, while by exploiting the rapid fire of modern weapons a body of troops on the defensive is able to swell the apparent numbers of its guns and its rifles.

A wide front is not injurious to the offensive, since the development of converging fire is by no means hindered thereby. Nor is it liable to break, as it used to be, since even thin lines have considerable fire-power.

The greatest possible fire-power is produced by the simultaneous employment of all available means. General Oku therefore, by keeping back only small reserves, and his divisional commanders by putting every gun and nearly every rifle into line at once, gave their fire the greatest possible intensity from the very first.

The difficulty of the problem consists in the *maintenance* of this maximum intensity.

It may be maintained by replacing the losses, as they occur, by reinforcements from the rear. But the very existence of a reservoir for this purpose implies that at the outset we have not put all our rifles into line—that is, we have not developed our maximum fire-power.

Formations have often been proposed in which

in principle a quarter of the whole force forms the firing line, a quarter the "reservoir," a quarter is kept in hand to manœuvre and to bring off the decisive act, and the last quarter is meant to exploit the victory when it has been won. In such formations the fire-power developed at the outset is only one quarter of the maximum.

The "wearing-down fight" or the "contest of endurance," as it is alternatively called, is carried on with a portion of the available means of fire-power which is little by little committed to the contest. In such a wearing-down fight, for example, we might begin operations with the first quarter of our available weapons, and might keep up this 25-per cent. intensity by drawing successive reinforcements from the second quarter or reservoir in rear. Then come the manœuvre and the decisive act, which absorb the fire-power of the third quarter and, perhaps, if the last card has to be played for a bare win or for a tie, that of the fourth quarter as well.

The method of the Japanese 2nd Army on June 15, 1904, was entirely different. The maximum intensity of fire was developed at once, practically every weapon being put into line in the beginning. This necessitated a great extension of front.

This maximum initial intensity would be liable to fall off as the losses decreased the density of the line of battle. And the falling-off would be rapid, as there was no one in rear to fill the gaps.

In the Japanese army, as in the Old Guard of Napoleon, the gaps were filled by closing up the

ranks. The troops of the 2nd Army were spread out on the arc of a circle, and marched upon the same centre. Thus the front would automatically diminish as the attack progressed, and the increasing density of the ranks would compensate for the increasing losses.

A formation of this kind makes all subsequent manœuvre impossible, for the troops once deployed can only move straight forward upon the centre. General Oku therefore, preferring the *a priori* method, carried out his manœuvre before and not during the battle.

The enveloping tendency, outlined at the very outset, was maintained throughout the battle. It was maintained, moreover, without the aid of a numerical superiority; for the Japanese 7th Brigade, instead of throwing its weight into the balance, committed the grave blunder of manœuvring at a distance from the field.

As we shall see, the Japanese were guided in the subsequent battles of the campaign by this theory of initial envelopment. We shall therefore be able later on to study it under varying conditions and so to form a more complete estimate of its worth.

E. THE RUSSIANS AT TE-LI-SSU DURING THE PREPARATION OF THE JAPANESE ATTACK

On June 14, at 1.5 p.m., General Gerngross, the commander of the 1st E.S. Division, was saluted by Japanese shells as recorded above. Between two and three the commander of the

Southern Detachment himself, wandering over the hills above Wu-chia-tun (North) had watched the artillery duel for a time, and had then returned to Te-li-ssu. Arriving at the staff office, which was installed in a train at the station, he framed his orders for the battle which he judged would take place on the morrow.

The order was numbered 194—and that is all that is known about it. No one ever received it.*

Lively discussions have taken place at the Nikolai Staff College on this order, its tenor, and the causes which prevented its transmission to those concerned. But this incident has not been, and perhaps never will be, cleared up.

At all events, to suspend the erection of the Tower of Babel it was only necessary to produce a confusion of tongues, and to reduce an army to chaos it is quite enough to allow the operation orders to vanish. Ignorant of these orders, each leader worked in the dark, out of touch and out of harmony with his neighbours.

We must not therefore be astonished if the battle of Te-li-ssu on the Russian side is one long string of blunders.

The study of wars, old and new alike, reveals at every page extravagant and almost incredible surprises. "Nothing is improvised in war," and in an army which has been formed in a hurry,

* "According to General Stackelberg, an order No. 194 was issued on June 14. We did not receive this order."—Lient.-Col. Komarov, *Nikolai Staff College Lectures*, French edition, part i. p. 151.

and in which the command and the staff work are organized on the battlefield, in which there is no settled doctrine—in such an army nothing can surprise us very much. The French army in 1815 was a hastily formed army. Its soldiers were marvellous, and its regimental officers and under-officers unequalled. But its staffs were inexperienced, and this fact we have to thank for the inaction of d'Erlon's corps at Ligny and Quatre Bras, and for the greater part of Grouchy's blunders on the day of Waterloo.

Yet it is not only in improvised armies that staff blunders entailing the gravest results are made. Moltke said of the German general staff: "Our force in the next war will be in the command and the general staff. The possession of this force our opponents may well envy us, for they do not possess it themselves." Moltke had made this general staff, he had tried its working in 1866, and considered it as perfect. It can be envied, but never equalled.

However, on August 15, 1870, this faultless staff committed a blunder which may be set by the side of Stackelberg's famous order No. 194.

On that day the general officer commanding the German 5th Cavalry Division addressed to General von Voigts-Rhetz, commanding the X Army Corps, the following note:

NONVILLE, *August 15, 1870, 5 p.m.*

According to information just received, a body of French infantry is advancing in the direction Tronville—Puxieux. It is desirable that infantry should be sent at once from Thiaucourt to Dommartin la Chaussée. A patrol has seen

hostile vedettes near Vionville, and discovered near Rezonville a great camp of all arms.

RHEINBABEN.

This report reached Thiaucourt (headquarters X Corps) at 5.30 p.m. Voigts-Rhetz and his chief of staff, Colonel von Caprivi, realized its enormous importance.* It argued that the army of Marshal Bazaine was in the region Rezonville—Metz.

The news would have been read in the same sense by Prince Frederick Charles as it was by Voigts-Rhetz and Caprivi, and instead of pushing the II Army *dans le vide* towards the Meuse he would have swung it on to the front Gorze—Thiaucourt, and told the commanders of the III and X Corps to avoid a decisive action until the army was united.

There are few examples in military history of a single piece of news possessing such importance. *The information vanished.* "The staff registry of the X Corps records the arrival of the report and its transmission to the headquarters of the II Army. But it never reached these headquarters." Presumably it slumbered in some staff officer's pocket.

When, therefore, the II Army orders for the 16th reached Thiaucourt at 7 p.m., the staff of the X Corps found to their dismay that the army was going to march to the west, while the enemy was to the east. But it did not occur to any one to ride over to Pont-à-Mousson to find out

* See the author's "Les Coups de Canon du Général Rheinbaben," *Revue de Cavalerie*, 1910.—Tr.

why the headquarters of the II Army had disregarded the information which had been, as every one supposed, sent to them.

This staff blunder would have resulted in disaster, perhaps irremediable disaster, if the French army had been commanded by a chief worthy of it, instead of by Bazaine.

It would seem as if this incident had escaped Field-Marshal von Moltke's memory when he wrote the words we have quoted.

These mistakes in staff work, and the grave consequences that they have had, or might have had, demonstrate the importance of a well-organized staff.

While the organization of a country's military forces in army corps and armies in time of peace is a disputable and disputed question, the necessity for a proper organization of the staff is beyond all dispute.

General Stackelberg's order No. 194, then, was received by nobody, and was first heard of only at the Nikolai Academy, when Stackelberg referred to it in his own defence.

The order was followed by notes. These latter alone are known and can be used as a basis for the study of operations on the Russian side.

On the evening of June 14 Gerngross's division was in position on the heights of Wu-chia-tun (North). It had repulsed the troops of the right wing of the Japanese 3rd Division, whose mission

had been to attract the Russian reserves towards their left.

The 2/35th Brigade was at Tsui-chia-tun (East) when at 6 p.m. its commander, General Glasko, received from General Stackelberg the following note, No. 4:

I am sending a battalion of the 34th E.S. Regiment to support your detachment. Your mission is, after arranging with General Gerngross, to attack in flank the Japanese engaged with General Gerngross near Wa-fang-wo-pu. In case of necessity your line of retreat is on Tsan-chin-fang, Tsui-khi-tan, and ultimately on Tan-si.*

In execution of this order, General Glasko left Tsui-chia-tun (East) at 9 p.m., and started to march towards Ho-chia-tun, thus approaching one and a half miles nearer his objective. At the same hour he sent his aide-de-camp in search of General Gerngross to inform that officer of his mission and to come to an understanding as to the direction of the attack.

At Ho-chia-tun Glasko waited for his staff officer's return. This officer in the course of the night came back with a note from the commander of the 1st E.S. Division to the following effect: "I am on the road between Wa-fang-wo-pu and Wu-chia-tun (North). If the general commanding the army corps desires to attack at dawn, it will be possible to do so with success."

This note shows that General Gerngross was completely in the dark. No order No. 194 having

* Tsan-chin-fang is in the N.E. corner of the map; the others are undiscoverable on English maps.—Tr.

put him in possession of his chief's intentions, he could only reply evasively to the proposal for co-operation made by General Glasko. In brief, his answer means, "What does the General-in-Chief want?" And General Glasko so well understood it in this sense that twice in this same night he sent to General Stackelberg. But the night passed without an answer, and the *moral* of everybody was correspondingly depressed.

The broken and trackless country made communication very difficult. But it was only five miles from Ho-chia-tun to Te-li-ssu Station, and it is not therefore the country that must be held responsible for the want of communication. It is to be imputed rather to the bad education of the Russian army.

The connection between superior and subordinate is both moral and material. The moral, the best of all forms of connection, is a product of "orders" and "doctrine."

An "order" is premised by a view of the situation as the superior sees it, and this part of such documents is of the very highest importance in an army in which initiative is held in honour. In the case of troops that are incapable of acting for themselves it could be left out altogether. It is practically a sort of permission to disobey the order if the recipient, closer to the battle, sees from the premiss that the order is based on an erroneous interpretation of facts or reports.

It is a sort of "if" placed at the head of the order. The study of past history demonstrates that this "if" is often necessary, and the military

history of the future will bring out the necessity still more conspicuously.

Having first explained the situation, the order next lays down the object to be attained, and lastly the means of attaining it. The *object* is the expression of the commander's will, and no person whatever has the right to substitute his own will for it. The object remains the same even though the "if" has to be very freely employed.

In an army with a "doctrine" the manner of attaining the end may vary according to the mental and moral powers of the individual, but the *end* is never lost sight of. There will always be degrees of skill, of boldness, and the measures taken will vary accordingly. But these variants will all have certain common factors of such a kind that a mere indication by the commander suffices to tell the subordinate executants the line of action to be followed. Hints will be taken, and efforts will converge.

This intellectual connection is indispensable in modern warfare, with its great armies and its wide spaces. It cannot exist in militias, in improvised armies, because its groundwork is "doctrine," and doctrine is absorbed, not from books, but from constant working association.

The material connection enables one to answer the "ifs" in certain cases where the executant finds himself confronted with a totally different situation from that set forth in the premiss of his orders. Initiative is the execution of the order that the commander would give if he were on the

spot. If by material connection his idea can be obtained and conveyed to the spot, it must be obtained. This material connection stiffens the timid—and in war responsibility is so crushing that there are sure to be a good many of these. Lastly, as “the unforeseen is the law of war,” material connection allows of the instant rectification of a manœuvre begun in a wrong direction.

It is thus a necessity that between the chief and his subordinate leaders of tactical groups there should be a network of moral and material communication.

On June 15, 1904, neither the one nor the other existed.

General Stackelberg and the Chief-of-Staff were in the headquarters train, and it is not easy to see why General Glasko's emissary failed to find any one. The position of General Gerngross's headquarters was indicated in the note to Glasko, and the regimental mounted scouts should easily have been able to establish and maintain easy communication between the two. No one, however, thought of this. Up to the very end of the battle, they spent their time in an endless hide-and-seek.

Necessary as are these material communications for the transmission of orders, they are equally necessary for the transmission of reports. When he is out of touch with the front the commander is in the dark, and stumbles from one surprise into another. Unable to see around him, he is unable to give orders or directions.

Thus Stackelberg remained in ignorance of the course of the battle, which he had failed to guide

and even to direct. Te-li-ssu was the battle of incoherence.

After passing the night at Ho-chia-tun with his brigade, General Glasko, not knowing what to do and still without orders, gathered his officers, laid his difficulties before them, and asked the advice of each. It was the "council of war"—the way that led Prussia to ruin in 1806. There are certain things that reassert themselves time after time, however long the list of their previous convictions that history has to show. This is one of them, and we shall infallibly meet it again in the future.

The hybrid plan that was born of this council of war was about to be put into execution when, at 6.30, General Glasko received this note from General Gerngross: "Take the offensive; we will support you from the mountains."

This, too, was subjected to discussion, a resolution was arrived at, orders given, and the ball was about to open, when at last, at 8 o'clock, there came the following from General Stackelberg:

In case the Japanese take the offensive with superior forces against the centre of the position or elsewhere, the I Siberian Corps will retire slowly towards Wan-chia-ling.* In this event the detachment of General Glasko will hold out as long as possible on the line Tsui-chia-tun (West)—Kou-chia-tun in order to allow the army corps retiring from Te-li-ssu northward to get clear of the defile. . . . If the Japanese retire the troops will remain in their positions until further orders.

* About 8 miles farther back on the railway (Map IX.).—Tr.

At the moment when this order arrived Glasko's advanced guards, moving upon Wa-fang-wo-pu and the *col* to the north of Cheng-chia-tun, were exchanging shots with the Japanese advanced posts. General Glasko ordered the advance to be suspended, and affairs remained stationary until 10 o'clock, while Gerngross was fighting alone. At that hour came Colonel Zapolski of the headquarters staff with the order to Glasko to attack vigorously.

The study of the Staff College lectures, and of the complaints and counter-complaints of the actors and spectators—not only in the Yalu and Te-li-ssu engagements, but also in the great battles that came later and the siege of Port Arthur—shows that in every grade of the hierarchy each authority tries to saddle his superiors or his subordinates with the responsibility for his acts. Military honour enjoins upon the soldier that he shall accept the responsibility for what he does, and nowhere do we find the sentiment of military honour more highly developed than in the Russian army. And yet, though every Russian officer earned the St. George's Cross, not one owned up to his responsibilities, each shifting them to the other's shoulders.

The fact is that all acted in good faith, but in ignorance. In 1870 it was the same with us. The MacMahons, de Faillys, Frossards, Fortons—all alike were ignorant.

War is not improvised ; only those can make war who have learnt how to make it. Orders can only be given and can only be executed by those

who in peace have learned to give them and learned to execute them.

What were the necessary conditions for the success of the attack that General Stackelberg proposed to make against the Japanese right flank?

(i) A Leader; (ii) Object; (iii) Means.

(i) A leader who sees, who knows, and who orders.

But here there was no leader. Glasko was ordered to come to an understanding with Gerngross, and Gerngross had been given no mission of any sort.

(ii) The object.

After studying the orders, and with all the subsequent discussions before us, we still do not know what was the object to be attained.

All that Stackelberg says is, "If the Japanese advance, fall back upon a second line of resistance, and hold out there; if the Japanese retire, stand fast and await orders."

(iii) Means.

The *Revue militaire des Armées étrangères* considers that only the 4th E.S. Regiment should have remained in position, and that the attack should have been made with the three other regiments of the 1st E.S. Division and the two of the 2/35th Brigade (17 battalions).

The Nikolai Academy lectures, however, indicate that the 4th and 3rd E.S. Regiments should stand fast.

Lastly, Gerngross's words, "we shall support you from the mountains," indicate clearly that the

offensive movement was meant to be the work of Glasko's regiments (8 battalions) only.

Nothing therefore was settled.

There was plenty of justification for General Stackelberg's uneasiness. Anxiety is the common lot of generals on the field of battle, for they are playing a serious game, one upon which depends their reputation and the fortunes of their country, and they are playing it in a *milieu* of obscurity and self-contradictory information.

But this emotion the general ought to keep to himself. The orders that he gives should bear no trace of it; and the subordinate should only have to execute his chief's fixed and clearly expressed intentions.

F. THE DECISION

On the morning of June 15 the Japanese *3rd Division* occupied the hill (1200) north of Kou-yin, with the right battalion of the 34th; the left battalion barred the saddle between Wa-fang-wo-pu and Ssu-chia-tun (South); the other battalion was in reserve near Kou-yin. The 33rd regiment had $1\frac{1}{2}$ battalions on hill 750 (Chang-tien-shan), the rest of the regiment forming the divisional reserve just south of Chu-chia-tien. The 18th occupied the interval between these two regiments, with all its battalions in line. One of the divisional batteries was with the 18th, the other five and the whole 13th Artillery Regiment* were near Chu-chia-tien.

* Of the independent artillery brigade.—TR.

The front of the division was about $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

Up to 8 a.m. the Japanese infantry lay under cover of the entrenchments that they had thrown up in the night.

The entire *5th Division* had crossed the Fu-chou-ho, and was established on the heights west of Ta-fang-shen.

The *4th Division*, grouped on the previous afternoon about Sha-tan-tzu, had formed, at 6 a.m., a detachment of all arms (= 6-1-3 and 1 company engineers) under General Ando of the 19th Infantry Brigade. This was to attack the enemy's right and so assist the advance of the other divisions. At 8 a.m. this detachment was in the bend of the Fu-chou-ho, not yet in touch with the *5th Division*.

The feint of the Japanese 3rd Division on the previous evening had attracted General Stackelberg's forces towards his left. It was thus from this flank that the Russian attacks came on the morning of the 15th, and they were so violent that at one time it was thought that the defence must give way.

After an exchange of shots between the Japanese 3rd and 13th Field Artillery Regiments and the divisional batteries of Gerngross, there was a lull. Then at 8 a.m. the 2nd and 3rd E.S. Regiments debouched from hill 1250 (above Wa-fang-wo-pu), first against Ssu-chia-chou and the Japanese 18th Regiment, and then against the 34th.

The Japanese infantry in their shelter trenches saw the attack come on, in spite of the heaviest fire, to within 50 yards of them. If at this moment Glasko's brigade had come on the scene, General Oku's right would have undergone a reverse, perhaps a disaster.

General Oku expended his last reserve in assisting the 3rd Division. This division, after having stopped Gerngross's attack and being reinforced by the general reserve, was able to deal with the violent attacks that Glasko's brigade delivered after 11 a.m.

The principle of economy of force was carried to its logical conclusion by General Oku in this battle of June 15. In fact, the breath of defeat passed over the non-decisive front, though the troops there were not in fact dislodged.

Oku had the courage to expend his last reserve to aid them, and this alone saved his right wing. How many less fearless men would have kept the two reserved battalions of the 6th Infantry to occupy a supporting position.

Nothing is so dangerous as this theory of a *repli*, which is still sustained by defensively-minded people who cannot grasp the fact that to win one must be the bolder man.

At one time these people used to speak of "keeping a reserve in hand to the very last"; then, the reserve in the sense of an unemployed body of troops being condemned, they changed their phrase and called it a *repli*. The art of being beaten will never discover a shorter cut to defeat than this.

The *repli* finds its use in protective manœuvres, in which there is no intention of winning, nor even of fighting too seriously. In all other cases it is the gravest of all mistakes; it is the acceptance of defeat, bred of the preconceived idea of not doing everything to win. It was Kuropatkin's usual practice—from which one might be tempted to believe that the beaten general makes more disciples than the conqueror.

From 8 a.m. to 2 p.m. the fighting was desperate on the Japanese right, and hand-to-hand encounters were frequent. Six Russian regiments exhausted themselves against four Japanese.*

The 5th Division had at 7 a.m. begun a violent bombardment of the heights of Ta-fang-shen which inflicted considerable injury upon the few guns that the Russians showed in that quarter. About 8 a.m. when the divisional commander heard the roar of battle on his right (3rd Division) instead of his left, whence according to army orders the impulse for the attack should have come, he thought that something unforeseen was happening.

“The pursuit of a preconceived idea which is not based on the actual state of affairs always involves the risk of misunderstanding the reality. In chasing the ideal that one's own brain has conceived, it is very easy to overlook what ought to be done at the particular moment. The belief in a single method that promises victory as the outcome

* See Map XII.

of a single plan has always led men to ruin, as it led Mack and Massenbach."*

The "state of affairs" not being precisely as foreseen in the orders, a solution had to be improvised. General Ueda therefore ordered the attack to commence.

He selected as his objective hill 400 (north of Ta-fang-shen), and at 10 a.m. debouched from the heights of Wang-chia-tun (West). By noon the 5th Division had reached its objective, but it was in no condition to push on beyond hill 420 (north of San-hsi-erh), although it had caused General Kondratovich to use up practically all the 9th E.S. Division.

Instead of the simultaneous onset of the three divisions, General Oku found himself involved in a succession of encounters. First the 3rd Division alone had borne the brunt, then the 5th had committed itself to the utmost. These forces had used themselves up, and had used up the enemy. The two files had worn one another down, and both, though equally well-tempered, were deeply notched.

The forces on the ground were approximately equal.

If the students who stand by the "wearing-engagement" idea have felt themselves check-mated, as perhaps they did, in reading General Oku's operation orders, they are now free to resume their beloved idea, for the logic of facts decreed it that the "*wearing-engagement*" should precede the "*decisive attack*."

* Von der Goltz.

At the same time, in wearing out the other party one wears out one's self. Two divisions wore down two divisions, and the theory of the "wearing-down" engagement comes to this, that we must bring superior numbers on to the ground. Having done this, we may wear out the enemy and ourselves more and more, and still have a surplus in hand for the decisive act. The wearing-down process, therefore, seems to be a game to be played by the stronger side.

If we count merely by battalions, we must assume that the Russians were stronger than the 3rd and 5th Japanese Divisions and the 23rd Regiment of the 6th Division.* At the same time administrative services in the Russian army were not manned by special troops, but by large infantry drafts, and it is probable that the Russian superiority in infantry was very slight.

If we count in the batteries, the Japanese engaged in the wearing-down attack were incontestably superior.

The adherents of the "wearing-down" method will not therefore find in Te-li-ssu the example they desire—the case of a quarter of one's own force using up the whole of the enemy's.

A good file can only be worn down by a better, or at least by one as good. This is the lesson written on the field of Te-li-ssu.

The 19th Brigade of the 4th Division, which at 8 a.m. was in the bend of the Fu-chou-ho, crossed

* Two battalions of which had come up from the landing-place on Yen-tai Bay.

that river at 9 a.m. near Wang-chia-tien, and pursued its march on Lung-kou. There, at noon, it surprised the cavalry division of General Simonov.

Infantry, the blind arm, surprises cavalry, the eyes of the army—one may well say that anything can happen in war.

It has been said, and often repeated, that “cavalry did nothing in Manchuria.” As regards Te-li-ssu the saying is only too just.

The Russian cavalry commander, General Simonov, had only arrived at the front on June 7, and at the time of the battle he was practically unknown to his troops. For fifteen years past he had given up military duty, and devoted himself, as governor, to the civil administration of a province. He had lost his cavalry instincts. He no longer knew the powers of the fast-moving arm.

It must be remembered, too, that except for the Primorsk Dragoons his cavalry was composed of the 2nd and 3rd category Cossacks, and that these Cossacks were “the fathers of families and the owners of their horses.”*

General Stackelberg's orders of June 13 had thus defined the part to be played by the Cavalry Division: “To retire on Ta-fang-shen, to *establish* itself west of that place, and to cover the left flank of the army by watching the tracks and valleys in the region of Ta-fang-shen, Huang-chia-tun, and Hui-chia-tun.”

In execution of this order the division had left Wa-fang-tien on the morning of the 14th, and had

* *Revue mil. des Armées étrangères*, No. 966, p. 473.

retired on Ta-fang-shen. At the moment when it was surprised it was correctly drawn up on the plain of Lung-kou, with a wide plain in front of it for a classical cavalry charge.

General Stackelberg's order had said the cavalry was to "establish itself," and it did so.

The soldier and the provincial governor have not the same vocabulary ; each has his own trade and his own way of understanding words. A Murat would have understood the word "establish" in some such way as this: Main body at Ta-fang-shen, advanced guards towards Hui-chia-tun, Huang-chia-tun, and Wang-chia-tun West, patrols towards Wa-fang-tien, Wu-chia-tun South, and Sha-tan-tzu. The "establishment" of the main body would have been in unstable equilibrium, ready to be altered in any direction at a touch, according to the reports of the patrols and the actions of the advanced guards—*i.e.* the "actual state of affairs."

A civil governor could not understand it so. The division therefore remained properly grouped on a fine flat plain, carefully avoiding any hills which might break its order.

In the morning the cavalry had seen the movement of the 5th Division, and this had been reported at 7 to General Stackelberg, who, however, only received the report at 11. The duty of cavalry is not confined to despatching one report. It has to watch constantly. What General Simonov did was to announce the enemy's advance and then to blindfold himself.

Assuredly it was with justice that this cavalry commander was condemned. Destitute of all

notion of a modern cavalry engagement, he "established" himself in a suitable field and waited for an imaginary enemy to come and settle the quarrel after the good old fashion of the fight of the Thirties, midway between Ploërmel and Josselin.*

"Cavalry did nothing in Manchuria." Against cavalry that had ever so little alertness, Ando's brigade would not have succeeded in its surprise attack, for the Japanese headquarters had done nothing to assist it.

Since midday on the 14th, the 4th Division had been halted at Sha-tan-tzu. It had only its three-squadron divisional regiment with it. Part of this regiment was at Fu-chou, whence it had driven a Cossack sotnia. Another body scouted to the north, but only at a very little distance, and there remained but few horsemen to protect Ando's detachment from the impertinences of hostile cavalry. A vigilant enemy would have marked the Japanese movement, and Stackelberg, warned, would have, or at any rate ought to have,† avoided a contest with superior forces.

The Japanese headquarters, by misplacing its cavalry, showed that it did not know how to employ it. The commander of the 4th Division, likewise, failed to make use of what horsemen he had, for up to 2.30 in the afternoon he held his 7th Brigade

* A combat fought between thirty French knights under Beaumanoir and thirty English and Breton knights under John Bramborough, on March 25, 1351.—*Tr.*

† See Kuropatkin's order, p. 230-1.—*Tr.*

back, facing north against an imaginary enemy whose non-existence a cavalry patrol would have sufficed to discover.

“The cavalry did nothing in Manchuria”—because no one there knew how to use it.

But although, uncovered as it was, the movement of the 4th Division ought not to have been successful, it was not mere luck which brought about the Russian defeat.

In the one army inertia, in the other movement, was the rule. This is the secret of victory ; and we may say with General Maillard,* “ Aptitude for war is nothing else than aptitude for movement. Every army that is slow and heavy is helpless. Sooner or later it is at the mercy of a more mobile and more active opponent.”

* *Éléments de la Guerre*, part i. p. 2.

ADDITIONAL NOTE

THE RUSSIAN RETREAT FROM TE-LI-SSU

THE situation shown on Map XII. is that at noon on June 15. Shortly before, Stackelberg had issued orders for retirement, and the retreat of the right wing (Kondratovich's 9th E.S. Division), induced by the breakdown of Simonov's cavalry and the attacks of the Japanese 5th Division and 19th Brigade, began at this time. It was directed in person by General Stackelberg, who had two horses shot under him. At 2 p.m. the threatening inward swing of Ando's 19th Brigade was checked by General Samsonov, thanks to the arrival of the fresh 9th Siberian Regiment, and Stackelberg was able to draw off Kondratovich's division and that part of the cavalry which had retired on Te-li-ssu, as well as his trains, without losing seriously in prisoners.

The gradual forcing back of Kondratovich's division exposed General Gerngross's right at Wu-chia-tun (North) and Lung-wang-miao more and more to oblique fire from the 5th Japanese Division. Stackelberg's order to retreat does not seem to have reached Gerngross; but soon after noon that officer, owing to the precarious condition of his right at Wu-chia-tun (North), etc., and the non-appearance of General Glasko on his left, decided on his own responsibility to retire.

Almost at the same moment Glasko was developing his attack towards Wa-fang-wo-pu and the *col* north of Cheng-chia-tun. But although his left was only opposed by the Japanese 3rd Divisional Cavalry and part of Akiyama's brigade, and his right by the outermost Japanese battalion (I/6, sent up from the Army Reserve), he had gained no

advantage when Gerngross's retreat arrested the advance (2 p.m.). Presently there came Stackelberg's order to retreat, and Glasko thereupon drew back to the line Tsui-chia-tun (West)—Cha-tao-fang, which his rearguard held against Akiyama.

Meantime the left of the Japanese 3rd Division, following up Gerngross's retirement, had occupied the village and ridge of Lung-wang-miao; and finding there thirteen abandoned guns, used them with great effect upon the Russian troops as they retired up the valley towards Te-li-ssu. Isolated bodies of Gerngross's command were also cut off in the hills. But the 3rd Division was too exhausted to pursue actively, and a heavy storm coming on at about 3 p.m. the victors came to a standstill all along the front, only a couple of contact squadrons being pushed forward.

The Russian losses were about 3,700, those of the Japanese 1,200. The Russians halted and reformed at Wan-chia-ling, while Oku's army remained about Te-li-ssu and Chien-mei-tun.—TR.

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